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The aim of this dissertation is to shed light on an oft-overlooked aspect of 
Hobbes’ and Locke’s educational theories. Specifically, this dissertation examines the 
role of mothers in Hobbes’ Locke’s, and Wollstonecraft’s political theories and defends 
the claim that mothers have an overlooked, important role to play in civic society insofar 
as they contribute to educating children to become good members of civic society.  
  To date, scholars working on Hobbes and Locke have largely focused on only one 
type of education and its relationship to civic society. Specifically, they have focused on 
civic education. Civic education refers to formal programs, such as day school or 
university curricula aimed at molding individuals into citizens or subjects, capable of 
sustaining a thriving commonwealth.  
 However, when scholars focus on civic education, they miss part of the story 
surrounding how Hobbesian and Lockean education is implemented because not all of 
their educational program can be contained in formal schooling. In the Chapters 1 and 2 
of the dissertation, I show that mothers play a role in educating future subjects and 
citizens in Hobbes’ and Locke’s theories by means of what I call civic socialization. 
Civic socialization refers to the informal processes by which children are educated to 
	
	 viii 
become good subjects and citizens who contribute to the wellbeing and stability of the 
commonwealth.   
 In Chapter 3, I consider whether mothers’ role in civic socialization is compatible 
with early modern, liberal theories. Insofar as Hobbes and Locke are early modern, 
liberal thinkers, they maintain that men and women are naturally equal. However, 
mothers’ role in civic socialization often results in their subordination to fathers. Mary 
Wollstonecraft, although a figure in modern philosophy, is useful for showing this 
tension. In her theory, even when mothers are highly educated, their role in civic 
socialization often means that mothers must use their education for the benefit of their 
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A NOTE ON THE TEXTS 
 
The following works by Hobbes are cited by chapter and paragraph number: 
Leviathan with selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668, edited by Edwin Curley 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994); and, On the Citizen, edited by Richard Tuck and Michael 
Silverthorne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). References to Hobbes’ 
Behemoth are cited by page number; referenced material from this text appears in 
Behemoth or the Long Parliament, edited by Ferdinand Tönnies (London: Frank Cass & 
Co., 1969). 
References to Locke’s First and Second Treatises are cited by chapter and section 
number using the following edition of the text: John Locke, Two Treatises of 
Government, edited by Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). I 
cite Locke’s Some Thoughts Concerning Education and A Letter Concerning Toleration 
by title and page number using the following editions of those texts: Some Thoughts 
Concerning Education, in The Works of John Locke in Nine Volumes, vol. 8 (London: 
Rivington, 1824 12th edition); and, A Letter Concerning Toleration and Other Writings, 
ed. Mark Goldie (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2010), http://lf-oll.s3.amazonaws.com 
/titles/2375/Locke_Toeration1560_LFeBk.pdf.  
For all of Wollstonecraft works, I cite by title and page number using the 
following editions: A Vindication of the Rights of Men with A Vindication of the Rights of 
Woman and Hints, edited by Sylvana Tomaselli (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995); and, Maria: or, The Wrongs of Woman (New York: W.W. Norton & 






There is no doubt that education is crucial in the political theories of Thomas 
Hobbes and John Locke. As exemplars of early modern, liberal conceptions of 
philosophy, both are deeply committed to changing their readers’ approaches to politics1 
by introducing them to a new, enlightened way of thinking about the world. They are, in 
short, concerned with how people’s minds can and should be formed. This dissertation 
sheds light on an oft-overlooked aspect of Hobbes’ and Locke’s educational theories and 
examines one implication that arises from this discussion. Specifically, this dissertation 
examines the role of mothers in Hobbes’, Locke’s, and Wollstonecraft’s political theories 
and defends the claim that mothers have an important role to play in civic society as part 
children’s education.  
That Hobbes and Locke were deeply concerned with education has been well-
documented in the secondary literature. For example, in Chapter 2 of Gender, Class, and 
Freedom in Modern Political Theory, Nancy Hirschmann details the importance of habit 
formation in Locke to developing children’s (and subsequently adults’) characters.2 
Nathan Tarcov notes that a Lockean education in habit formation is critical to the stability 
of the commonwealth.3 In Visions of Politics Volume III: Hobbes and Civil Society, 
Quentin Skinner mentions the disdain with which Hobbes treated university professors of 
																																																								
1 Locke and Hobbes are both also committed to changing their readers’ views about a number of issues 
including but not limited to epistemology, morality, and religion.  
2 Nancy J. Hirschmann, Gender, Class, and Freedom in Modern Political Theory (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2008), 88. For another voice echoing this same claim, please see: John Baltes, “Locke's 
Inverted Quarantine: Discipline, Panopticism, and the Making of the Liberal Subject,” The Review of 
Politics 75, no. 2 (Spring, 2013): 173-92, http://www.jstor.org/stable/43671129. 





his time and discusses Hobbes’ call for educational reform as critical to the stability of 
the commonwealth.4 There is, consequently, substantial evidence documenting a 
connection between education and civic life for these early modern, liberal thinkers. 
What has gone largely unnoticed, however, is the part of the story surrounding 
how Hobbesian and Lockean education is implemented. This is where the pedagogical 
work of mothers is most visible. To date, the role of mothers in education has largely 
escaped anything other than a cursory exploration in the secondary literature on these 
canonical philosophers. Consequently, in the first two chapters of the dissertation, I show 
that mothers play a role in educating future subjects and citizens in Hobbes’ and Locke’s 
theories by way of what I call civic socialization. Civic socialization refers to the 
informal processes by which children are educated to become good subjects and citizens 
who contribute to the wellbeing and stability of the commonwealth. This is in contrast to 
formal processes of education, which include day schools or a university education.  
Civic socialization is, as the terminology suggests, civic in nature for Hobbes and 
Locke, and it is in this sense that this dissertation project connects up with larger projects 
regarding Hobbes’ and Locke’s political theories. While not used by either Hobbes or 
Locke, the phrase “civic socialization” is an apt moniker for the phenomenon I wish to 
capture. In order to see why this terminology is warranted, it is useful to both recognize 
how current terminology falls short in describing the phenomenon at hand, and 
understand why the terms “civic” and “socialization” are more appropriate. We will then 
																																																								
4 Quentin Skinner, Visions of Politics Volume III: Hobbes and Civil Science (Cambridge: Cambridge 




see why “civic socialization” is a useful name to use in this case and why the 
phenomenon has been largely overlooked in the historical scholarship.  
At first blush, it might seem as if there is no need to use this phrase “civic 
socialization” to describe what goes on in Hobbes’ and Locke’s works. There is already a 
phrase, “civic education,” that contemporary scholars often use to describe educational 
programs aimed at forming individuals into functioning members of society. However, 
there is good reason to find a different phrase to describe the phenomenon with which I 
am concerned in my dissertation. As scholars currently use it, “civic education” refers to 
courses and formal programs aimed at molding individuals into citizens or subjects. 
Consequently, the phrase “civic education” would be misleading if applied here to what 
mothers do. Mothers are not university instructors for Hobbes or Locke, after all. Indeed, 
the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP) entry on civic education (which mentions 
both Hobbes and Locke) states, “Civic education was not a significant theme in Locke’s 
important treatise Some Thoughts Concerning Education, which was more about teaching 
individuals to be free and responsible in their private lives.”5 “Civic education” might be 
a more apt phrase to describe Hobbes’ claims about what books should and should not be 
taught in universities6 or to talk about Locke’s preference for boarding schools.7 The 
																																																								
5 Jack Crittenden and Peter Levine, “Civic Education,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford 
University. Article published December 27, 2007; last modified May 30, 2013, 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/civic-education/.  
6 For example, Hobbes devotes significant time to discussing University education. As he sees it, “the 
instruction of the people dependeth wholly on the right teaching of youth in the universities.” Leviathan, 
XXX.14. And he explicitly argues that Leviathan should be a textbook used in universities because it will 
teach people how to be better subjects: “Therefore I think it [Leviathan] may be profitably printed, and 
more profitably taught in the Universities, in case they also think so, to whom the judgment of the same 
belongeth. For seeing the Universities are the fountains of civil and moral doctrine...there ought certainly to 




focus in scholarship on “civic education” may even help to explain why mothers’ role in 
education has gone overlooked. Mothers are largely absent from discussions in Hobbes 
and Locke regarding formal schooling, save for a passage in Locke’s Some Thoughts 
Concerning Education in which he says that mothers can teach children certain subjects 
such as Latin and geography.8 
The project here, in contrast, is not concerned with the formal instruction of 
subjects and citizens in schools. This project is about the informal processes by which 
subjects and citizens come to have the sorts of beliefs, attitudes, and dispositions 
necessary to being functional members of the Hobbesian or Lockean commonwealths.9 
The SEP entry, as it turns out, is correct to claim that Locke was not concerned with civic 
education as it has been understood; however, Locke was concerned with another kind of 
education, and that is what I take up in my project. I am concerned with the ways in 
which private, home life is connected to politics and civic society. In particular, I focus 
on the ways in which individuals come to be socialized as children in the family such that 
they become better subjects and citizens.  
																																																																																																																																																																					
deceiving spirits. And by that means the most men, knowing their duties, will be the less subject to serve 
the ambition of a few discontented persons, in their purposes against the state.” Leviathan, review and 
conclusion.16. 
7 In Some Thoughts Concerning Education, Locke explains why homeschooling is preferable to boarding 
schools. This has to do in large part with the bad habits and morals he believes students pick up away from 
home. Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, 54-55. 
8 Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, 171. 
9 Some might ask, “Why not argue that the term, ‘civic education,’ has been used incorrectly? Why use a 
different term to talk about informal processes if these informal processes constitute a type of education?” 
There may, indeed, be reason to believe that “civic education” as it is often used in scholarship is too 
narrow to capture everything that a civic education should and does entail; however, given that this term 
has a generally agreed up meaning, to clearly distinguish my topic from other, previously discussed topics, 




Although I opt not to use “civic education” to describe the informal nature of the 
educative practices with which I am concerned, the “civic” portion of “civic education” 
remains relevant in this project. Given that I am concerned with the beliefs, attitudes, and 
dispositions necessary for living in civil society, one might think that the most accurate 
term to use here would be “civil socialization.” There are two reasons, though, for using 
“civic” instead of “civil.” First, by using “civic” I am able to maintain continuity with the 
ongoing discussions surrounding the relationship between education and political 
stability in early modernity in which scholars like Tarcov, Hirschmann, Skinner, Jeremy 
Waldron, Ingrid Makus, and many others have been engaged.10  
Second, “civic” has a narrower range of interpretation in academic circles than 
“civil” does. This helps me to better capture precisely what this informal education is an 
education in. As Darren Lilleker notes in Key Concepts in Political Communication, 
“Civil society relates to the freedom individuals enjoy to engage in political activity of 
their choosing, without institutional or societal constraint; the study of civic society 
focuses on the rules and norms of a society: how it is ordered.”11 The education Hobbes 
and Locke espouse is one designed to ensure that subjects and citizens live within the 
rules and norms of their respective commonwealths. In Chapters 1 and 2 of the 
dissertation, I show how Hobbes and Locke differ with regard to what their education in 
																																																								
10 Tarcov, Locke’s Education for Liberty; Ingrid Makus, Women, Politics, and Reproduction: The Liberal 
Legacy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996); Jeremy Waldron, God, Locke, and Equality: 
Christian Foundations of John Locke’s Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); 
Jeremy Waldron, “Hobbes: Truth, Publicity and Civil Doctrine,” in Philosophers on Education: New 
Historical Perspectives, ed. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (New York: Routledge, 1998), 139-47; Skinner, 
Visions of Politics Volume III: Hobbes and Civil Science; Hirschmann, Gender, Class, and Freedom in 
Modern Political Theory; Nancy J. Hirschmann, “Hobbes on the Family,” in The Oxford Handbook of 
Hobbes, ed. A. P. Martinich and Kinch Hoekstra (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 242-63.  




civic socialization entails and how this is shaped by their unique political views. Had I 
used the term “civil socialization,” the differences could not be as clearly tied to their 
political frameworks.  
The “socialization” part of “civic socialization” points toward the ways in which 
this education takes place in informal social interactions and non-governmental rewards 
and punishments for certain ways of behaving in a functional society. In particular, this 
term, “socialization,” does a far better job capturing the practical and moral dimensions 
of education that are not necessarily entailed in typical conceptions of formal education 
as such. For example, care for others is something individuals learn through social 
interactions over the course of time. There is no schoolroom course for explaining how 
and why caring for others is useful for society; we learn about caring for others by having 
others care for us, or seeing the happiness or relief that caring for others brings. While 
Hobbes focuses primarily on socializing his subjects to see the relationship between 
protection and obedience and Locke is concerned with habituating individuals to the 
natural law, both explicitly endorse socialization as a means to these ends in their texts. I 
detail how this process works for Hobbes and Locke in Chapters 1 and 2, respectively.  
Seeing that civic socialization actually is present in Hobbes’ and Locke’s theories 
is important. For historians of philosophy, this project helps us to have a more robust 
picture of Hobbes and Locke on education. That civic socialization has gone somewhat 
overlooked in their theories needs to be remedied so that we can have a more complete 




important for forming good subjects and citizens, historians can develop clearer picture 
of social and political life in Hobbes’ and Locke’s works.  
Having shown that mothers are responsible at least in part for the project of civic 
socialization, I conclude the dissertation by looking toward some of the potential 
implications of my findings. First, it is quite clear that our accounts of education in early 
modernity are even broader than thinkers have previously acknowledged. Consider 
Tarcov’s Locke’s Education for Liberty, which paints a broad picture of Locke’s 
educational program. Even this work does not go so far as to focus on the role of mothers 
or to note the full extent of civic socialization (although he does get quite close). Second, 
women in their role as mothers play a far more substantial role in the theories of Hobbes 
and Locke than previously thought. Carole Pateman’s The Sexual Contract suggests that 
women largely disappear from social or civic life once they have contracted themselves 
into subordination in marriage in early modern political theories.12 While there may be 
serious reasons for thinking that women are marginalized and politically subordinated, 
this dissertation project shows that women still can and do have roles in civic society.  
There is a third, more complex issue that bears unpacking regarding the civic and 
moral implications that motherhood has for mothers. To this end, I explore one way in 
which Hobbes’ and Locke’s claims about mothers and education intersects with the place 
of women in social and political theory more broadly construed. There, I use Mary 
Wollstonecraft to tease out one consequence for how we, as interpreters, understand the 
role that mothers (and, given the historical context of the time, women in general) play in 
																																																								




their political theories. While this role may seem benign or even empowering on the 
surface, if we critically analyze the concept of civic socialization and the assumptions 
underlying mothers’ responsibility for it, we can see that motherhood in Hobbes’, 
Locke’s, and Wollstonecraft’s theories likely reinforces mothers’ civic subordination to 
fathers and husbands.  
When we reflect upon the role of mothers in education, we will see that Hobbes, 
Locke, and Wollstonecraft all hold positions that may seem impossible to reconcile. In 
particular, they all seem to suggest that mothers deserve a certain level of respect because 
of their role in civic socialization. Wollstonecraft and Locke go so far as to suggest that 
mothers should be educated individuals. However, they all also suggest that mothers 
should stay at home, listen to the fathers in the household, and raise children whether 
they are educated or not. Yet, they acknowledge no obvious conflict contained in their 
positions; indeed, they seem to hold that these ideas are entirely compatible and that such 
compatibility is uncontroversial.  
It is important to study the ways that philosophers may have said some things that 
are new and radical while simultaneously holding onto other ideas that are traditional. 
Hobbes, Locke, and Wollstonecraft suggest that mothers should remain engaged in child-
rearing in the home and away from other projects associated with civic engagement of the 
time, including but not limited to roles in the justice system (e.g. sheriffs, justice of the 
peace), fiscal system (e.g. tax collecting) or other appointed magisterial offices.13 There 
																																																								
13 There are, of course, notable exceptions regarding queens. The concern here, however, is not with the 





is, then, a deeper tension in these texts: on the one hand, Hobbes, Locke, and 
Wollstonecraft express a commitment to fundamental human equality; on the other hand, 
motherhood likely excludes mothers from other aspects civic life in the commonwealth 
and subsequently placed in a position of subordination to men. The hope is that thinking 
through this tension will bring to light greater understanding of the relationship between 
natural equality and civic inequality. 
Some scholars, such as Pateman, suggest that the inequalities that result from 
women’s subordination are problematic for early modern, liberal thinkers. She argues in 
The Sexual Contract that women become subordinated in the conjugal contract, and that 
this represents the key movement away from social and political life. However, my 
project shows that there is an alternative way to highlight the tension between gender-
based civic inequality and natural equality. There now may be reason to think that 
regardless of whether women contract into subordination in the conjugal contract, women 
may end up becoming subordinated (if they were not already subordinated) or reinforcing 
their already existing civic subordination if they become mothers.  
With that said, that there is a tension between motherhood in civic society and 
natural equality does not automatically mean that these thinkers have logically 
inconsistent positions. Hobbes, Locke, and Wollstonecraft, in fact, seem to see no moral 
or logical problems with societies that keep women in the home. In point of fact, 
Wollstonecraft goes so far as to argue that the project of motherhood can make women 
better, more virtuous people. And Hobbes’ and Locke’s views of mothering and 




that insofar as mothering is good for the stability of the commonwealth, it is good for 
women, generally, as subjects of the commonwealth.  
The role of motherhood is complex for these thinkers, and—in my estimation—it 
would be unwise to say that any of these thinkers should be criticized or praised for 
valuing women because they are mothers without recognizing the complexities of the 
context in which these writers wrote. This project is not about excoriating or exonerating 
Hobbes or Locke for having harmful or progressive views of motherhood. Instead, the 
project here is about raising motherhood as an important issue for political philosophers 
of the 17th and 18th centuries and encouraging further conversation about the role that 
mothers play. Of particular importance are questions about whether and how it is possible 
to value natural equality while simultaneously promoting civic inequality.  
By looking to the history of philosophy, we can see some intriguing ways in 
which some ideas can and were actually held together in the past that we, living in 2018, 
may think of as philosophically incompatible. This, as I take it, can shed light on whether 
these concepts really are incompatible or not. If they are not, then there may be good 
reason to revisit some of our contemporary assumptions regarding motherhood, equality, 
education, and participation in social or civic life.  
The history of philosophy is ripe for further study, particularly when it comes to 
mothers. Any philosopher concerned with the cultivation and maintenance of political life 
must reckon with mothers, and there is much more to mothers’ roles in philosophy than 
as mere incubators for the next generation of subjects or citizens. Early modern scholars, 




understand more about their conceptions of education and the relationship between 
education and political stability. What I present here is one way of talking about mothers, 












 Most scholarship on Hobbes has focused on his particular formulation of social 
contract theory, his notion of politics, his conception of religion, or relationships between 
these issues. To be sure, all of these are important for a forming a robust understanding of 
Hobbes’ theory; however, there is more to the picture, and the focus of academic 
discourse has obscured our ability to see some of the finer details of Hobbes’ theory. 
Specifically, scholars to date have overlooked the importance of civic socialization to 
Hobbes’ work. I offer a close, textual analysis of Hobbes’ Leviathan that reveals the 
importance of civic socialization for understanding Hobbes’ work more generally. In 
particular, I show that Hobbes relies upon a conception of civic socialization that shows 
that the family—and mothers in particular—play a civic role in Hobbes’ conception of 
society. 
Cultivating good Hobbesian subjects requires the development of several 
characteristics, such as obedience, that foster and solidify subjects’ loyalty to the 
sovereign. I refer to this cultivation process as civic socialization. Civic socialization is 
an expansive term, and it is unnecessary to address all facets of it here because only one 
facet is salient to a discussion of Hobbes and civic socialization: obedience to the law. In 
this chapter, I begin by clarifying Hobbes’ conception of obedience. To this end, I argue 




nonetheless useful for signaling that Hobbesian obedience involves more than just 
obeying the law out of fear of punishment. Next, I discuss the role of education in 
fostering the growth of obedience-as-loyalty. Then I address the role of the family—and 
mothers in particular—in this loyalty-promoting education, better referred to as “civic 
socialization.” I return to the expansive nature of civic socialization at the end of this 
section in order to gesture toward some particular connections that one might want to 
make between mothers and other aspects of civic socialization.  
Section 1: Hobbes on loyalty, family, and mothers 
Part A: education and obedience: Hobbesian civic socialization 
	
 On Hobbes’ view, obedience needs to be cultivated through a certain degree of 
understanding or drilling, both of which education facilitates. Consider Hobbes’ claim 
that the safety of the people should be accomplished “by a general providence, contained 
in public instruction, both of doctrine and example, and in the making and executing of 
good laws, to which individual persons may apply their own cases.”14 The sovereign has 
a duty to protect her subjects from enemies both within and without. This protection goes 
a long way in engendering the love of Hobbesian subjects. Safety, the reasonable 
assurance that subjects will not be harmed so long as they harm no one else, is ensured 
only when the subjects obey the sovereign. Obedience, however, is not always so easy to 
ensure. Simply asking someone to obey gives no reasonable assurance that said person 
will actually obey. In the passage above, Hobbes shows readers that in order for people to 
have a reasonable assurance of safety, subjects need both laws and education.  
																																																								




How laws work to keep subjects safe is fairly straightforward: so long as people 
fear the punishment that comes with breaking laws against stealing, murdering, etc., 
people have some assurance that others will also be deterred from such activities that are 
contrary to general public safety. This, of course, would work best when people know the 
law first, but even then, there is no requirement for understanding the grounds of the law 
or valuing the law as useful for public stability. Instead, the only requirements for 
Hobbesian laws to deter criminal behavior are that the sovereign can and does enforce the 
law and that individuals fear the sovereign’s punishment. 
If Hobbes thought that the sovereign only needed fear to get subjects to obey, or if 
Hobbes thought fear was the best way to get subjects to obey, then the claims about 
“public instruction” might be superfluous. Little instruction is needed to tell subjects that 
there are laws and that the sovereign can punish them for transgressing the law. The 
language of the quote, however, suggests that “public instruction” is distinct from “the 
making and executing of good laws.”  
On my reading, the claims about “public instruction” are not superfluous, nor do 
they seem even strange because my interpretation connects Hobbesian obedience with 
loyalty. The obedience that Hobbes wants from subjects is complex. While it is good, on 
Hobbes’ picture, for a subject to obey simply out of fear, it is better for a subject to obey 
because she believes that obedience to the sovereign is a morally praiseworthy thing or 
because the subject has a habit of unreflective obedience to the sovereign. Let us call this 




relationships,15 the most germane of which for my discussion is political loyalty,16 which 
might or might not be the same as patriotism,17 but which does—in any case—describe a 
relationship of devotion between those governed to their government. The best 
Hobbesian subject is loyal to the sovereign, and not entirely out of a sense of fear. Rather, 
the ideal Hobbesian subject should be devoted to the sovereign.18 This devotion might 
come from the belief that it is morally correct to obey the sovereign, or it might come 
with unreflective habituation; it might involve a series of commitments or actions; but 
whatever it is that is over-and-above the threat of punishment that motivates subjects to 
																																																								
15 There are all kinds of ways to talk about loyalty: spousal relationships, citizen-state relationships, 
employee-employer relationships, consumer-brand relationships, and many, many more. For a general 
overview of loyalty, readers might consider the following texts: The Philosophy of Loyalty by Josiah Royce 
(1908, reprinted 1995), in which Royce mentions briefly that some types of loyalty would seem to include a 
degree of obedience, The Limits of Loyalty by Simon Keller (2007), in which Keller gives a good overview 
in his first chapter about what loyalty is and why it is a complex topic, and Alasdair MacIntyre (1984), Is 
Patriotism a Virtue? (The Lindley Lecture), Lawrence: University of Kansas. Reprinted in Primoratz (ed.), 
2002. Full bibliographic information for each of these works can be found in the bibliography. 
16 Debates about the nature of political loyalty and its relationship to nationalism dominate the 
contemporary discussion of political loyalty. For more on this debate, please see Roger Scruton’s “In 
Defence of the Nation,” in The Philosopher on Dover Beach, Maurizio Viroli’s For Love of Country: An 
Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism, and Jürgen Habermas, Citizenship and National Identity: Some 
Reflections on the Future of Europe, in Praxis International (it can also be found in Jürgen Habermas’ 
Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy). These current 
debates, however, go far beyond Hobbes’ conception of political loyalty and often presuppose a liberal 
framework that involves participatory government in a way that Hobbes simply does not have in his theory. 
Even within the current debates, however, there is no dispute that loyalty involves a devotion to one’s 
country (used often to refer to that country’s government).  
17 Keller argues that patriotism might not be the same as other brands of political loyalty or other types of 
loyalty altogether in his article “Patriotism as Bad Faith.” Simon Keller, “Patriotism as Bad Faith,” Ethics 
115, no. 3 (Apr., 2005): 563-92, http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.bu.edu/stable/10.1086/428458. Alternatively, 
MacIntyre seems to suggest that patriotism is a type of loyalty (even if there are other types of loyalty) that 
is very much a virtue. MacIntyre, Is Patriotism a Virtue?, 4-11. 
18 Whether the individual reflects upon her belief and consequently knows that it is morally praiseworthy or 
does not reflect upon her belief but still obeys because it is a deep-seated habit to obey matters little to 
Hobbes, and it does nothing to challenge the conception that what I call Hobbesian loyalty entails 




obey, let us call that “loyalty” for Hobbes. This terminological usage seems fitting insofar 
as it links up with some of the ways in which philosophers now think about loyalty.19   
In the passage regarding “public instruction,” my interpretation helps to see why 
Hobbes would need such instruction that goes over and above obedience from fear. On 
Hobbes’ picture, when subjects receive an education that allows them to understand why 
it is important to follow the sovereign’s dictates, they come to appreciate the sovereign’s 
role in protecting them from the state of nature and grasp that the subjects have 
authorized the sovereign to make laws. This realization, consequently, facilitates the 
development of loyalty to the sovereign.  
 In the quote above, Hobbes breaks down “public instruction” (education) into two 
parts, “doctrine” and “example.” When considered in context, it becomes clear that 
Hobbes intends for education via doctrine and example to result in subjects that follow 
the law “sincerely from the heart.” Following the law “sincerely from the heart” involves 
far more than following the law out of a fear of punishment.20 “Doctrine” here refers to 
formal schooling, the recitation of public creeds, and other institutionalized forms of 
education. Hobbes explicitly says that the sovereign may appoint formal teachers to 
instruct subjects in the grounds of doctrines critical to the stability of the commonwealth, 
																																																								
19 Royce suggests that obedience is an outgrowth of loyalty more generally. However, it bears noting that 
the reliance on obedience is not required in all views of loyalty to one’s country. There are robust 
discussions of how one can be loyal to one’s country—a patriot, even—and yet believe that the country has 
done something wrong. Michael Walzer argues this in the first chapter of Obligations: Essays on 
Disobedience, War, and Citizenship. What is less clear, however, is whether or not loyalty to one’s country 
can involve transgressions of the law in the name of bettering that country. This is certainly not the case for 
Hobbes (in the first lines of his first chapter, Walzer notes that Locke is the origin of for dissenting from the 
law while still being loyal), but it bears noting that this is part of the larger discussion about what political 
loyalty entails. Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty, 259. Michael Walzer, “The Obligation to Disobey,” 
chap. 1 in Obligations: Essays on Disobedience, War, and Citizenship (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1970). 




such as not stealing from one’s “neighbours by violence or fraud of anything which by 
the sovereign authority is theirs,” not to “speak evil of the sovereign representative….or 
to argue and dispute his power, or any way to use his name irreverently,” and “not to be 
in love with any form of government they see in their neighbour nations.”21 As noted 
above, all of these doctrines should be followed “sincerely from the heart [my 
emphasis].”22 Following sincerely from the heart involves having certain “designs and 
intentions,”23 certain attitudes and dispositions necessary to correctly behave in society.  
Doctrine is important to Hobbes’ political theory insofar as Hobbes notes that 
doctrines can disrupt political life. Doctrines can corrupt individuals in society and 
disrupt stability because instructors have the power to expose students to otherwise 
dangerous ideas which include but are not limited to a love of democracy.24 For example, 
Hobbes blames at least part of the English Civil War on the formal instruction youths 
received at university, going so far as to say that the universities were like “the wooden 
horse was to the Trojans.”25  Universities house instructors who exposed students to 
dangerous texts—they smuggle in seditious ideas, such as the aforementioned love of 
democracy, into students minds. When instructors expose their students to certain liberal 
thinkers—particularly those of Ancient Greece and Rome who espoused democracy—
they present their students with ideas dangerous to the stability of the Hobbesian 
government because they are likely to lead to revolt and civil war. Skinner discusses the 
																																																								
21 Leviathan, XXX.12, XXX.9, XXX.7. 
22 Leviathan, XXX.13. 
23 Leviathan, XXX.13. 
24Leviathan, XXI.9, XXX.7. 




specifics of Hobbes’ problems with certain choices in educational material in detail in his 
work, Hobbes and Republican Liberty, and one of the key moves he makes is when 
Skinner argues that educational choices can cause problems because they convince 
students that “freedom is a matter of living independently from arbitrary power” as 
opposed to freedom being compatible with living under arbitrary power.26 Insofar as 
teachers are responsible for choosing which doctrines students are exposed to, teachers 
have a fairly serious impact on making students into more or less loyal—better or 
worse—subjects.  
As important as doctrine is to Hobbes’ conception of education, it is only part of 
the story; there is still the matter of “example,” from above. At least a portion of 
Hobbesian education falls under civic education. Civic education, for Hobbes, can be 
understood as any formal or informal method of cultivating characteristics that contribute 
to the peace, stability, and flourishing of the commonwealth. This includes civic 
socialization as an informal method for achieving this point. When Hobbes uses this 
term, “example,” in the aforementioned quote, he is pointing to the non-schoolroom-
based methods by which people learn how to behave in society. This includes, but is not 
limited to, seeing others be good Hobbesian subjects. On my account, at least part of 
what subjects learn is loyalty, and one place they learn this is by example in the home. 
Part B: the role of the family in civic socialization 
	
The family is uniquely suited to socialize children to become loyal subjects 
because the family’s structure mirrors Hobbes’ political structure in some important 
																																																								




ways. For example, Hobbes, himself, explicitly compares how the family works in 
practice to how the Commonwealth works in practice: “cities and kingdoms (which are 
but greater families),”27 “a great family if it be not part of some commonwealth, is of 
itself (as to the rights of sovereignty) a little monarchy,”28 and his comparison of 
Abraham as head of household to that of the sovereign in the Commonwealth. The 
connections are striking. The children are like subjects; both must be protected from harm 
and both must obey those who protect them. Disobedience in both cases results in 
punishment, and this punishment is supposed to be a deterrent to further transgressions 
not only by the individual but by those who witness the punishment. Like the subject-
sovereign relationship, the child-parent relationship is contractual. Unsurprisingly, then, 
there is a general scholarly consensus that Hobbes makes this analogy between the family 
and the commonwealth. Scholars, including but not limited to Skinner29 and Tarcov30 
have repeatedly emphasized that Hobbes sees the way the family functions as the same in 
practice as how the Commonwealth functions.  
Hobbes’ account of why children must obey parents—and also why subjects must 
obey the sovereign—is unique among his contemporaries and predecessors. Unlike Sir 
Robert Filmer, Aristotle, Grotius, or most every scholarly and lay person during Hobbes’ 
own time, Hobbes does not believe that children owe obedience to their parents because 




29 Skinner, Hobbes and Republican Liberty, 104. 




dominion, and dominion is separable from the biological begetting of a child.31 The 
purpose of obedience within families is the same as the purpose of obedience to the 
sovereign: to maintain order and promote industry. Children are analogous to subjects in 
that they both must be cared for by the heads of their respective entities, and both have a 
subsequent obligation to obey. Disobedience in both cases results in punishment.  
Some scholars, including Jean Bethke Elshtain, take this similarity between the 
commonwealth and the family to be an indication that the family is not a useful training 
ground for developing civic virtues. She says: 
The existence of families does not succeed in taming the savage heart of Hobbesian man, 
in part because with the birth of each child the state of nature, a seething within, is 
reproduced. The ‘dominion’ of the father within the family is not some smooth order 
passed on from generation to generation; instead, each father must make his children 
submit to him, through a struggle, by use of ‘natural force.’ He can destroy them should 
they refused to obey. The threat of destruction is the basis of the Hobbesian solution to 
the problem of order on all levels and in each arena of human intercourse.32 
 
Elshtain argues here that the family is, instead, a breeding ground for competition and 
force. If Elshtain’s picture of Hobbesian politics and the family are complete and correct, 
then it would seem as if Hobbes’ sovereign does not need loyalty and that the family does 
nothing more than provide opportunities to learn to obey from fear.   
																																																								
31 This is not unlike Hobbes’ assertion that women could be sovereigns. 
“Hobbes contends that biological begetting does not confer on fathers the right of dominion over their 
children, that is the right to obedience from them for having saved their lives in the state of nature. He gives 
us two reasons for this. The first is that the right of dominion derives from the child's consent, whether 
express or tacit, to the father's dominion….The second reason Hobbes provides for not resting the father's 
dominion over the child on biological begetting is that this would mean that the father and mother, who 
have both taken part in the biological act of begetting, would then both have dominion over the child. But 
two cannot have dominion over the same person. Dominion, or any form of authority, is meaningful, 
according to Hobbes, only when it is undivided. Only one parent can then have dominion over the 
children.” 
Makus, Women, Politics, and Reproduction: The Liberal Legacy, 16. 
32 Jean Bethke Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought, (Princeton, 




However, Elshtain has overlooked the importance of gratitude and its role in both 
politics and the family. Gratitude for care leads to loyalty to both parents and sovereign. 
Hobbes says, “the first instruction of children dependeth on the care of their parents, it is 
necessary that they should be obedient to them whilst they are under their tuition, and not 
only so, but that also afterwards (as gratitude requireth) they acknowledge the benefit of 
their education by external signs of honour.”33 Notice that Hobbes insists that children 
continue to obey their parents after their infancy. The only instances in which gratitude 
leads to loyalty are those in which an inferior feels gratitude to a superior, and the only 
instances Hobbes gives of this in his works are the subject-sovereign relationship and the 
child-parent relationship.34 Even after children grow up to become adults, they cannot 
forget that at one point their whole lives depended upon their parents’ kindness. At the 
time of that kindness, the children were vastly inferior in ability to their parents, and this 
is what makes the gratitude that comes from the parent-child relationship special. Outside 
of the family the only other gratitude individuals might be expected to encounter during 
their lives is in their relationship as subjects to the sovereign, to whom they owe gratitude 
for keeping them out of the state of nature. Hence, the family habituates children to 
gratitude towards a superior and prepares them for this same relationship with their 
sovereign.  
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34 “benefits oblige, and obligation is thraldom; and unrequitable obligation, perpetual thralldom, which is, 
to one’s equal, hateful. But to have received benefits from one whom we acknowledge for superior inclines 
to love, because the obligation is no new depression; and cheerful acceptation (which men call gratitude) is 





This feeling of gratitude results in obedience to the dictates of parents and 
sovereign from a sense of loyalty and not only because of a fear of punishment. As noted 
above, Hobbes seems to think that whatever it is that motivates obedience beyond a fear 
of punishment can involve a number of things, like the moral justification of the regime 
or unreflective obedience from habit, and because these things link up in several ways 
with how scholars now talk about loyalty, “loyalty” is a reasonable descriptor for what 
goes on in Hobbes. Even though Hobbes, himself, did not use the term, it seems to fit 
well what he means when he talks about obedience (and particularly when he talks about 
obedience to parents and to the sovereign).  
Section 2: mothers and civic socialization 
	
 The family is a structure that has a hierarchy. When it works properly, there is 
concentrated authority coupled with people who obey, but the Hobbesian family is not 
necessarily required to have one and only one authority figure. Neither, for that matter, is 
Hobbes’ government. In both the family and government, Hobbes concentrates power 
ultimately in the hands of one figurehead; however, there can be some members with 
more power than others. This is where mothers come in: they have some power, but not 
all. In particular, as part of the family mothers participate in Hobbesian civic 
socialization.35 There are two claims that Hobbes is subsequently committed to that help 
																																																								
35 One might wonder whether older siblings could occupy the same space as mothers because both can 
serve as models for obedience. There is, however, an important distinction in their roles. Hobbes might be 
willing to say that older siblings’ modeling of authority is beneficial; however, there may not be a 
protection issue for siblings like there is for a parent. Mothers by virtue of what Hobbes takes a mother to 
be necessarily have a relationship of protection with their children. There is no evidence that siblings have 




to spell out how mothers play a role in civic socialization: (1) the habituation claim and 
(2) the pedagogical claim. 
Part A: the habituation claim 
	
Several scholars have noted that families are responsible for habituating children 
to obedience. For example, Hirschmann takes the role of the family in civic socialization 
seriously, and she presents a consistent view on the subject. For example, she says, 
“[f]amilies…habituate men and women to obedience and curb their natural hostility and 
distrust.”36 She sees how the family plays a role in making subjects better able to live 
together.  
Elshtain also notes the role of parents in making children into good subjects. She 
says, “In order to prepare the child for his role as the dutiful subject of an awesome, all-
powerful earthly lord, one parent must rule in the family. Hobbes states that the 'one' can 
be either man or wife.”37 Although she does not use the term “obedience,” it is clear from 
her phrasing that obedience is at issue here. “Dutiful” does the work of “obedience” here. 
Sharon Lloyd notes that Hobbes thinks the family performs educative practices in line 
with those contained in the Old Testament.38 In another vein, although Makus does not 
spell out the causal connection between the obedience learned in the household with 
obedience in civil society, she does note that parents are responsible for inculcating their 
children with obedience and that this process is something the sovereign takes care to 
																																																								
36 Nancy J. Hirschmann, “Gordon Schochet on Hobbes, Gratitude, and Women,” in Feminist 
Interpretations of Hobbes ed. Nancy J. Hirschmann and Joanne H. Wright, (University Park, PA: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2012), 138. 
37 Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought, 111. 
38 S. A. Lloyd. Morality in the Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes: Cases in the Law of Nature (Cambridge: 




make sure will happen when she says, “In Hobbes’ civil society, the laws on education 
established by a sovereign authority make parents responsible for educating their 
children....parents teach their children the Law of Gratitude, which persuades children to 
honour their parents, thereby increasing the parents’ power.”39 It is, then, uncontroversial 
to note that parents have responsibilities associated with loyalty formation via obedience 
from something that goes beyond fear of punishment.  
 The education parents provide to children is not merely useful for producing 
well-behaved children; rather, it is important for Hobbes politically because it is about 
forming good subjects. In The Oxford Handbook of Hobbes, Hirschmann provides us 
with an account that explains how families shape children’s personalities and this makes 
children more likely to be—as she calls it—good citizens:  
families teach children the values and ideals that they need to become ‘citizens’ as well: 
law-abiding, security-loving, domesticated individuals. Hobbes says several times that 
one of the reasons that children owe obligations of gratitude to their parents is the 
‘education’ they receive from them. But this education is clearly less formal than 
university education; rather, it is a mode of instruction through the shaping of personality 
and understanding. The family is an institution that helps create individuals who want the 
very order that Hobbes wants citizens to desire.40   
 
Hirschmann sees that the obedience parents instill in their children has to do with shaping 
the children’s character—their personalities and their understandings.  
The point, however, is somewhat broader than even Hirschmann indicates here. 
This education does not only cause children to become loyal (obedient because of 
something that goes beyond fear of punishment) citizens; rather, even those children who 
are not citizens grow up to become better subjects. This is particularly important for 
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Hobbes who needs a majority of individuals residing in the commonwealth to be loyal, 
and the commonwealth consists of more than simply citizens. As Skinner and other 
Hobbes scholars note, the frontispiece of Leviathan depicts the sovereign surrounded by 
not only men but also women (as evidenced by their caps) and children, and so it is clear 
that Hobbes sees the commonwealth as more than just male citizenry.41  
Hirschmann sees that parental educational practices shape children’s personalities 
and understandings, but she leaves open the opportunity for other scholars to spell out the 
mechanisms by which parents actually do this. My task is to spell out the mechanisms by 
which parents make children into better subjects, and the mechanism they use is 
habituation.42 To say as Hirschmann has done, that parents make children into better 
subjects using methods that are “less formal than university education” does not yet 
explain precisely what is happening in the family or how it happens. As part of the 
family, I argue that mothers aid in this educative endeavor in two ways: mothers 
participate in the disciplinary project that habituates children to obedience, and mothers 
model obedience to fathers. Both of these are specific mechanisms by which mothers aid 
in habituating children to being better Hobbesian subjects.  
Moreover, the explanation I offer dovetails well with Hobbes’ broader theory of 
the mind. Hobbes is an empiricist, and his particular brand of empiricism is one in which 
																																																								
41 Skinner, Hobbes and Republican Liberty, 191. 
Susanne Sreedhar, “Hobbes on ‘The Woman Question’,” Philosophy Compass 7, no. 11 (2012): 772-81, 
10.1111/j.1747-9991.2012.00519.x.  
42 Other groups also play a role in civic socialization: teachers and administrators have at least some impact 
on how subjects learn to live together in society. My interest lies in the family, however, because of the role 
that women as mothers play in the family. When readers focus on the family, they can come to see how 
women have a role to play in civic socialization. When readers focus on teachers and administrators, 




an external experience affects internal mechanisms which then gives rise to sensation (it 
is the internal sense that results in sensation, specifically). All knowledge comes from 
these sensations according to Hobbes. The process of education that I describe here is 
quite similar. Children have the sensation of obedience, meaning that they actively 
engage in the practice of obeying others. This sensation of obedience comes from an 
external experience (a parental command, for example) motivating their internal 
obedience to a parent. The children then later come to know or understand (which, for 
Hobbes, is an act of the imagination) why obedience is an appropriate response. What 
they will understand is that they should obey their parents’ commands because they 
should be grateful to their parents for their sustenance and general care.  
(a) mothers participate in the disciplinary project that habituates children to obedience 
	
 On the surface, Hobbes’ references to fathers as disciplinarians seem to serve as 
evidence that Hobbes excluded women from the disciplinary work of parenting. For 
example, Hobbes often explicitly says that fathers are in charge of disciplining their 
children. Recall, for example, that Hobbes says that the family is “a little monarchy.”43 
However, Hobbes also provides the famous “God hath ordained to man a helper”44 
passage to reference wives’ relationships to husbands and mothers’ relationships to 
fathers. Although Hobbes does not say this explicitly, his statements—when taken 
																																																								
43 Leviathan, XX.15. 
44 Pateman addresses this passage directly in her work, “‘God Hath Ordained to Man a Helper’.” Carole 
Pateman, “‘God Hath Ordained to Man a Helper’,” British Journal of Political Science, 19, no. 4 (Oct., 
1989): 445-63, http://www.jstor.org/stable/193985. There, she argues that when wives are subordinated to 
their husbands, they give up sharing much of the power that comes with being a mother. With that said, 
though I have reasons for disagreeing with her conclusions, her initial assessment of the relevance of this 





altogether—commit him to a position in which mothers participate in the disciplinary 
project that habituates children to obedience by sharing in the disciplinary work of 
childrearing alongside fathers.  
If readers consider the “God hath ordained to man a helper” passage, they will see 
that Hobbes explicitly sees mothers as God-given assistants to fathers in the home. 
Mothers aide fathers in managing the home. If we are to take seriously the analogy 
between fathers and monarchs, then we are committed to a reading in which the 
discipline that parents perform is akin to the punishment that the sovereign performs. 
What this means, then, is that at least part of what fathers are supposed to do is to 
discipline their children and provide them safety. The purpose of discipline is the same as 
the purpose of punishment (at least in part).  The “God hath ordained to man a helper” 
passage shows that mothers, on Hobbes’ view, help their husbands to perform his duties. 
In practice, this could play out quite readily as mothers disciplining their children and 
protecting them from harm (i.e.—punishing a child for playing with knives or making 
sure that the child obeys local laws by not stealing from a merchant). After all, neither the 
father nor the mother can watch each child every minute of every day. Together, though, 
they stand a better chance of catching children in bad acts and disciplining them. 
This connection helps to make further sense of Hobbes’ claims that the sovereign 
is supposed to make subjects honor their parents, plural: both the father and the mother. 
In Chapter XXX, The Office of the Sovereign Representative, Hobbes explicitly notes that 




[italics in the original].”45 Hobbes does not seem to explain how or why the sovereign has 
a duty to make sure that children honor their parents. Nevertheless, there seems to be a 
connection between this duty that sovereigns have and Hobbes’ general idea that 
children’s obedience to their parents is important to society’s functioning: all of the aims 
presented in Chapter XXX are about producing a stable commonwealth. With that said, 
there are some fairly clear reasons why children owe parents obedience regardless of the 
sovereign’s duty to ensure this. Obedience is owed because parents—both mother and 
father—aid in protecting the child. Hobbes says in this chapter that “because…the first 
instruction of children dependeth on the care of their parents; it is necessary that they 
should be obedient to them,” thus explicitly connecting the relationship of parents and 
children with that of protecting and obedience. At least part of protecting children 
involves disciplining them so that they learn to avoid bad or dangerous behaviors, just as 
part of protecting subjects requires the sovereign to punish transgressions in order to 
prevent and deter further harm to others. On Hobbes’ view then, children practice 
obedience to their mothers. In doing so, children acquire the habit of obeying authority, 
and they will need this habit as good subjects of a Hobbesian commonwealth.  
(b) mothers model obedience to fathers 
	
Although Hobbes might not spell out the logic that mothers model obedience by 
obeying fathers and that children will see this, such a claim is compatible with Hobbes’ 
account. If readers take seriously the several ways in which Hobbes likens the family to 
																																																								




“a little monarchy”46 or the father to the sovereign,47 then the father is like a sovereign. 
Those the father cares for—like the subjects the sovereign cares for—owe the father 
obedience. Hobbes is explicit on this account when he says that the rest of the family is 
“subject to their fathers and masters, as to their immediate sovereigns.”48 Because the 
father is like the sovereign, obeying the father is a role that model—it is like—obeying 
the sovereign. In some key ways, the father is different from the sovereign. For example, 
the father’s power is limited by the sovereign; whereas, the sovereign’s power is 
unlimited. However, what Hobbes is paying attention to here (and throughout Leviathan) 
are the points upon which the two positions are analogous.49 The analogy carries over to 
mothers as well, as mothers occupy a position in the family analogous to the position the 
father occupies with relation to the sovereign.  
The father must obey the sovereign, but in all things that the sovereign does not 
explicitly command or forbid, the father rules in his own household. It follows that, in all 
things that the father does not explicitly command or forbid pertaining to their common 
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47 Leviathan XXII.26, XXX.11. 
48 Leviathan, XXII.26. 
Some scholars, notably Hirschmann, think that mothers end up subsumed in this passage under the title of 
“servants,” and while that may be true in some familial structures, it does not always hold true. Consider 
the full passage: “the father or master ordereth the whole family. For he obligeth his children and servants, 
as far as the Law permitteth, though not further, because none of them are bound to obedience in those 
actions which the Law hath forbidden to be done. In all other actions during the time they are under 
domestic government, they are subject to their fathers and masters, as to their immediate sovereigns. For 
the father and master, being before the institution of commonwealth, absolute sovereigns in their own 
families, they lose afterward no more of their authority, than the law of the commonwealth taketh from 
them.” Leviathan XXII.26. While Hirschmann says women are servants, I say women could be masters. In 
On the Citizen, Hobbes says that mothers can be masters (“in the state of nature every woman who gives 
birth becomes both a mother and a Mistress [Domina].” On the Citizen, IX.3). 
49 Hobbes says that custom has made it such that fathers are the ones who institute commonwealths. He 





concernment, the mother may do as she pleases. The mother is like the father and acts as 
a role model for obedience in two ways: she not only obeys the dictates of the sovereign 
herself, but she also provides a mirror for the way the father behaves with respect to the 
sovereign in her own relationship to the father. While Hobbes does not draw out this 
analogy explicitly, it fits in with how he talks about the relationships between the father 
and sovereign and mother and father, and this same analogy will be made more explicit in 
Locke’s treatment of the family (see Chapter 2).  
In summary, mothers can habituate children to obedience in two ways that are 
compatible with Hobbes’ discussions of women, the family, and education. First, mothers 
can serve as co-disciplinarians alongside of fathers. Second, they can serve as images of 
obedience that help children to see how to properly be obedient to the relevant authority 
figures in their lives.  
Part B: the pedagogical claim 
	
There are two ways mothers can play a civic role. The first way, habituation, I 
discussed above. The second way involves recognizing how mothers are pedagogically 
useful for Hobbes. In this section, I use Chapter XX of Leviathan to argue that 
motherhood’s crucial pedagogical function in Hobbes’ Leviathan is in helping readers to 
see the relationship between protection and obedience. 
On its surface, Chapter XX, “Of Dominion PATERNAL and DESPOTICAL”, 
does not at all seem to be about mothers or motherhood. The title suggests that mothers 
are not the focus of the chapter. What’s more, quickly after civil society is introduced, 




Leviathan, Hobbes talks about the father having the right of last determination because 
the family is so often embedded in a patriarchal society. However, in the middle of the 
chapter, Hobbes argues that dominion first (and therefore, naturally) belongs to the 
mother in the state of nature. As such, these passages represent something of a puzzle for 
interpreters. In short, it simply seems strange for Hobbes to spend time stressing that 
mothers have original dominion over children in the state of nature only to see that 
dominion go to fathers in civil society.50 In order to resolve this tension, we need to take a 
step back, and once we do so, we will not only be able to make sense of this otherwise 
seemingly strange set of remarks about natural maternal dominion but we will also see 
that motherhood plays a crucial pedagogical function in Hobbes’ work.  
In the larger framework of Leviathan, Hobbes most wants his readers to see that 
the protection the sovereign provides entails obedience on the part of subjects. Hobbes, 
himself, describes his project in these terms: “I have brought to an end my Discourse of 
Civil and Ecclesiastical Government…without other design than to set before men’s eyes 
the mutual relation between protection and obedience, of which the condition of human 
nature and the laws divine…require an inviolable observation.”51 What he means here is 
that the purpose of Leviathan is to show its readers that protection necessarily requires 
obedience and that this connection has its foundation in the natural law. Moreover, the 
positioning of this claim is important. The conclusion is added onto the end of Leviathan. 
This shows readers that, upon reflection, this is how Hobbes consciously chose to 
																																																								
50 That mothers have dominion over their children in the state of nature is not unique to Leviathan. Hobbes 
also makes claims to this effect in On the Citizen: “in the state of nature every woman who gives birth 
becomes both a mother and a Mistress [Domina].” On the Citizen, IX.3. 




describe the purpose of his book. Contemporary scholars have long noted the reasons 
why this obedience is so important. Again, historical context is important here. Looking 
back on decades of civil war and looking forward to the future, Hobbes seems to want to 
show that individuals fomenting war were initially wrong to do so because they were still 
living under a regime that protected them such that they could go about their daily 
business. With that said, given that the original sovereign was no longer in a position to 
protect the public, Hobbes’ claim here can and has been read as a justification for 
pledging obedience to the new monarch.52 In any event, the point is that obedience keeps 
society stable, which avoids the evils of the state of nature.   
The relationship between protection and obedience is central to what Hobbes 
wanted those in the universities to glean from his work. From what I argue above, it is 
clear that Hobbes thinks the relationship between protection and obedience is important, 
and he says explicitly that Leviathan should be “taught in the Universities.” He says that 
“the most men, knowing their duties, will be the less subject to serve the ambition of a 
few discontented persons in their purposes against the state, and be the less grieved with 
the contributions necessary for their peace and defence,”53 and also that his purpose in 
																																																								
52 This is not a controversial claim to make. In A Hobbes Dictionary, Martinich notes as part of the entry 
for “commonwealth,” that the purpose of obeying a sovereign in a commonwealth is to secure peace and 
individual flourishing. Sreedhar suggests in her work Hobbes on Resistance: Defying the Leviathan, that 
subjects are supposed to interpret the protection-obedience relationship as to their advantage in securing 
peace and stability. Sommerville notes the historical importance of this claim as giving license to formal 
loyalists to change their allegiance (i.e.—the old ruler could no longer offer subjects protection, but the new 
one could).  
A.P. Martinich. A Hobbes Dictionary (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 1995), 74. 
Susanne Sreedhar. Hobbes on Resistance: Defying the Leviathan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010), 121.  
Johann Sommerville, “Hobbes and Absolutism,” in The Oxford Handbook of Hobbes, ed. A. P. Martinich 
and Kinch Hoekstra (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 383.  




writing Leviathan was “without other design than to set before men’s eyes the mutual 
relation between protection and obedience.”54 Together, these passages show that a public 
that fails to recognize the relationship between protection and obedience is one that is 
susceptible to revolt and civil war.55 Poor education has led subjects to believe that they 
can rebel against a ruler simply because they do not like the laws the ruler promulgates—
this is why Hobbes says that certain classical texts are dangerous for the public. Given 
Hobbes’ reasoning for why universities should teach Leviathan, it follows that he wants 
people in the universities to see that the relationship between protection and obedience is 
important.  
Nowhere at the end of Leviathan or in portions where Hobbes talks about using 
the text as a pedagogical tool in universities does he refer to the family; however, if you 
revisit the portions of the text in which Hobbes talks about the family, you will see that 
protection and obedience are woven into his discussion of natural maternal dominion. 
Natural maternal dominion makes clear the relationship between protection and 
obedience: “seeing the infant is first in the power of the mother, so as she may either 
nourish or expose it, if she nourish it, it oweth its life to the mother, and is therefore 
																																																																																																																																																																					
The passage in its entirety is as follows: “Therefore, I think it may be profitably printed, and more 
profitably taught in the Universities (in case they also think so, to whom the judgment of the same 
belongeth). For seeing the Universities are the fountains of civil and moral doctrine, from whence the 
preachers and the gentry, drawing such water as they find, use to sprinkle the same (both from the pulpit 
and in their conversation) upon the people, there ought certainly to be great care taken to have it pure, both 
from the venom of heathen politicians and from the incantations of deceiving spirits. And by that means the 
most men, knowing their duties, will be the less subject to serve the ambition of a few discontented 
persons, in their purposes against the state, and be the less grieved with the contributions necessary for their 
peace and defence, and the governors themselves have the less cause to maintain at the common charge any 
greater army than is necessary to make the public liberty against the invasions and encroachments of 
foreign enemies.” 
54 Leviathan, review and conclusion.17. 




obliged to obey her rather than any other, and by consequence the dominion over it is 
hers.”56 In the state of nature—the state of war of all on all—children quite literally 
depend upon mothers to keep them alive: before birth, the mother nourishes the infant 
with her womb, and after birth, the mother feeds the infant from the breast. There is no 
other way for the infant to survive without the care of the mother. Fathers lack a uterus to 
carry the child before birth and lack breastmilk with which to nourish the infant after 
birth and keep the child alive in the state of nature.  
The mother, as such, is uniquely suited to preserving the infant from death, and—
Hobbes is quite clear on this point—as a result, the child is “obliged [my emphasis] to 
obey her.”57 If the mother chooses to abandon the child, the child is no longer obligated to 
obey her. The salient feature that renders children obedient is the protection offered by 
whatever party cares for the child, whether that party actually gave birth to the child or 
not. This point about motherhood in the state of nature is one upon which Hobbes insists 
even outside the bounds of Leviathan. In On the Citizen, he says, “in the state of nature 
every woman who gives birth becomes both a mother and a Mistress [Domina],”58 
indicating that women have dominion over a child upon its birth in the state of nature. 
What matters about natural maternal dominion is this: there is a readily visible 
connection between protection and obedience. The mother keeps the child alive and the 
																																																								
56 Leviathan, XX.5. 
57 In Leviathan, Hobbes contends that children—even infants—have a contractual relationship with the 
parent such that obligation and protection are entailed by the respective parties in question. As I note 
below, this seems utterly absurd: infants cannot contract because they cannot talk or offer any sign of 
voluntary agreement. The absurdity of infants contracting, however, does not undermine the larger point I 
am making about the analogy between natural maternal dominion and the relationship between subjects and 
the sovereign.  




child, as a result, owes the mother obedience. Natural maternal dominion is a specific 
example that illustrates Hobbes’ larger claim about the relationship between protection 
and obedience.  
As such, there is a tight connection between how Hobbes treats motherhood in the 
state of nature and how he treats the sovereign. Given that the state of nature is 
dangerous, the protection that the sovereign provides subjects is analogous to the 
protection a mother gives a child in the state of nature. The helplessness of infants, 
however, makes it far easier to see how protection obligates a child to obedience later in 
life. It is far more difficult to see how protection of the sovereign obligates full-grown 
adults to obedience without agreeing first to the general idea that protection from harm 
generates obedience. The sovereign, like the mother in the state of nature, has unique 
attributes that make possible protection. In the case of the sovereign, only the sovereign 
wields the power of right reason given to him or her by the collective commonwealth, 
and it is this power that prevents dispute and civil war.  Subjects, knowing that the 
sovereign protects them from the state of nature, are obliged to obey the sovereign. 
Subjects who know what the sovereign protects them from will have gratitude for the 
sovereign’s protection and loyalty to the sovereign as a result, just as children who know 
that their parent saved them from starvation and certain death are grateful and loyal to 
that parent for doing so.  
Drawing the connection between the mother-child relationship and the sovereign-
subject relationship helps us to solve the puzzle of why Hobbes talked about natural 




principles that fall out from natural maternal right remain. While mothering provides 
certain mechanisms by which children become obedient, the role of mothers in Leviathan 
shows that motherhood is foundational to establishing the broader conceptual relationship 
between obedience and protection that is critical for Hobbes’ picture of civil society 
wherein subjects have this same relationship to their sovereign.59 It is far easier to see that 
a child depends upon its mother than it is to see how an adult depends upon a sovereign 
for survival, but once readers accept that dependence obligates the dependent to 
obedience in the one situation, it is much easier to accept obedience in the other. What is 
more, although Hobbes makes references to the importance of “protection and 
obedience” not only at the end of Leviathan but also in Chapter XXI, the only analogy he 
gives for it is the mother-child analogy from Chapter XX. The singularity of this analogy 
further suggests that motherhood is significant. 
One acknowledgment challenges the strength of the analogy between child-
mother and subject-sovereign relationships: it seems utterly absurd that infants could 
contract in the same way that adults contract to enter civil society. Indeed, Hobbes, 
himself, notes that “only children and madmen are excused from offenses against the law 
natural.”60 Infants cannot give any meaningful signs of consent; no verbal agreements, no 
outward displays of bodily control like a handshake, and no signed documents. Pateman 
																																																								
59 Skinner makes a similar—but not the same—point when he talks about how the way mothers form 
children is analogous to the way in which the commonwealth forms. 
Quentin Skinner, “The Inaugural Martin Hollis Memorial Lecture: Hobbes and the Purely Artificial Person 
of the State,” The Journal of Political Philosophy 7, no. 1 (1999): 23, 
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refers to this contract as “enforced submission,”61 in which the child cannot voluntarily—
at least not in any rational or clearly moral way—consent to the contract. And Peter King 
says quite clearly, “infants and young children seem to lack the requisite cognitive 
apparatus for…obedience.”62 Anyone who has ever been around an infant or small child 
will know that it is unreasonable to command an infant not to cry and actually expect the 
infant to stop crying. That infants do not, in fact, obey parents challenges the analogy 
between the mother-child relationship in the state of nature and the sovereign-subject 
relationship in civil society. The analogy is incomplete.  
That the analogy is not a perfect one does not damage the interpretation of the 
passage that I put forth, because what I argue really matters in drawing an analogy 
between natural maternal dominion and the sovereign-subject relationship is the 
pedagogical value it brings in showing that obedience ought to be paid to those who 
protect you. Motherhood in the state of nature makes easier the pedagogical project 
Hobbes had in mind for Leviathan. Specifically, it is easier to see how a baby depends 
upon its mother than it is to see how an adult depends upon the sovereign; yet, this crucial 
analogy between protection and obedience is readily accessible when one considers the 
relationship of children to mothers in the state of nature. That ready connection makes the 
analogy between the parent-child relationship and the sovereign-subject relationship all 
the more accessible and easy to accept. As such, Hobbes’ discussion of motherhood acts 
as a useful rhetorical device, which—in turn—aids in his endeavor to use Leviathan as a 
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pedagogical tool to persuade subjects to obey the sovereign. For Hobbes, then, it is not 
only the case that individual mothers mirror obedience or act as role models for 
individual children; rather, the very conception of motherhood is critical to civic 
socialization for Hobbes insofar as it is part of this larger pedagogical project and overall 
argument regarding Hobbes’ conception of civil society. This pedagogical claim applies 
to adult readers of Leviathan. The connection between motherhood and obedience is not 
as useful for teaching children; rather, it is an argument about children that is useful for 
teaching adults.  
Taken altogether, what I am suggesting is that Hobbes is committed to a picture 
wherein both individual mothers in civil society and the conception of motherhood 
indicate that mothers are important to Hobbesian civic socialization. In practice, specific 
mothers inculcate their children with obedience as role models and disciplinarians. In 
theory, motherhood in the state of nature shows readers why subjects who receive 
protection should obey the sovereign who is uniquely suited to offer protection to them. 
The family, and mothers with their critical roles in it, serves as the first and only reliable 
means of mimicking the loyal relationship Hobbes thinks is most beneficial between the 
subjects and their sovereign and most useful to the maintenance of a stable political 
regime.  
For Hobbes, it is rhetorically useful to talk about natural maternal right because it 
makes more readily accessible to readers the connection between obedience and 
protection. The analogy makes the mother-child relationship in the state of nature 




talked about natural maternal right have missed. I say this not to criticize Hirschmann and 
other scholars who noted the relationship between mothers and habituating their children 
to obedience. These scholars were engaged in different and worthwhile projects. 
However, if we want a complete account of motherhood in Hobbes’ works, then this 
pedagogical point matters. 
Part C: mothers and the expansive notion of civic socialization 
	
This is not to say that mothers’ only contribution to civic socialization lies in their 
relationship to the obedience/protection dynamic; rather, if we consider the other 
characteristics that could come from civic socialization, we will see that mothers can aid 
in several of these areas, too, many of which contribute to a Hobbesian conception of a 
flourishing commonwealth. These include but are not limited to: a love of justice,63 care 
toward other subjects, patriotism/care for the commonwealth, a capacity for forgiveness 
of neighbors’ transgressions, etc. Several scholars have made these observations. For 
example, Jane Jaquette maintains that Hobbes’ “laws of nature concerning justice, 
gratitude, modesty, equity, and mercy are ‘civic attributes that reveal the kind of person 
the Hobbesian citizen is, or should be.’” That subject is modest, merciful, just, grateful, 
and treats others with equity.64 It goes almost without mentioning that caring for one’s 
fellow subjects, forgiveness, and a love of justice are helpful for maintaining the kind of 
commonwealth in which individuals can pursue their livelihoods and engage in fruitful 
production of goods and services.  
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Hobbes does not explain how people learn to be modest or to treat others with 
equity; he only really spends time talking about obedience. Even so, the discussion above 
regarding how mothers model or use discipline to habituate children’s actions provides 
one option for how these qualities come to exist in children. With that said, the lack of 
discussion regarding these other attributes is striking. It may be that Hobbes does not 
think being kind to others or modest are particularly important to his overall project in 
the same way that obedience is.  
But if it seems like all Hobbes really needs is obedience without these other 
characteristics, one ought to reconsider. Imagine a commonwealth where individuals 
cared nothing for one another, refused to make up after a disagreement, or did not trust 
one another. It would be entirely dysfunctional. There could be no successful armed 
forces without trust that each soldier would do her job; there could be no community if 
individuals truly cared nothing for their neighbors; and without an ability to make up 
after disagreement, it is likely that before long everyone would be angry with one another 
and have no means by which to diffuse that anger peaceably. There is certainly no way to 
develop industry, as Hobbes assumes would otherwise exist in a good society.65 In short, 
Hobbes’s theory benefits from an expansive conception of civic socialization because 
Hobbesian society needs the products of it. It is not a far stretch to see how mothers 
might also serve as role models for various aspects of civic socialization (although 
mothers are unlikely responsible for all aspects of civic socialization).  
																																																								
65 For example, consider Hobbes’ references to commodities “moveable and immoveable,” or those “traffic 
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 I have presented a reading of Hobbes that fleshes out the role of mothers in his 
theory, demonstrates the importance of civic socialization to the Hobbesian political 
project, and leads readers to a more robust sense of Hobbesian education. The role of 
mothers is larger than many scholars today would have us believe: mothers do, on 
Hobbes’ picture, have a civic role. They are responsible, at least in part, for establishing 
the protection-obedience relationship between the sovereign and the subject.  
 This is not to say, however, that Hobbes thought mothers or women in general 
could be “political” in any meaningful sense of this word. Then again, most men were not 
political on his view either. What we do have, though, is a wider lens through which to 











Despite being a childless bachelor, Locke was invested in studying the family. In 
order to understand Locke’s preoccupation with children and the family, assiduous 
readers should be familiar with Locke’s context as both a physician and an opponent of 
Filmerian patriarchalism. In his role as a physician, prominent lords and ladies consulted 
Locke on issues of marriage, pregnancy, childbirth and child-rearing.66 For example, 
Damaris Masham, a philosopher in her own right whose correspondence with Locke is 
well-documented, sought his medical advice during her pregnancy. Many of the 
prescriptions Locke gives to Masham in their correspondence are about the physical care 
of children in an attempt to ensure that children reach adulthood without physical or 
mental deformities that could be caused by poor parenting practices. This is one instance 
of a general theme in Locke’s writing: Locke took seriously the relationship between 
mind and body; healthy bodies lend themselves to healthier minds. In this chapter, I take 
up the issue of what sort of adult Locke wants a child to grow into in both body and 
mind, and I argue that the reasons for which Locke advocated cultivating adults in his 
own, specific fashion are closely tied up with his political opposition to Filmer.  
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With respect to his opposition to Filmer’s Patriarcha, Locke scholars have long 
noted the relevance of Locke’s anti-Filmerian sentiments to his views on the family and, 
more specifically, the role of women within the family.67 In particular, scholars often note 
that Locke’s choice to reinterpret the book of Genesis in both Treatises is the result of his 
desire to debunk Filmer’s argument in favor of patriarchal rule via the divine right of 
kings. In his reinterpretation of Scripture, the role of women features prominently and 
shapes Locke’s conception of the family. Specifically, Locke grounds his claim that 
mothers share equal dominion over children along with fathers in these reinterpretations. 
Here we see more evidence that Locke saw—as have many philosophers not only of the 
17th century but also before68—a connection between the family and civic society. 
However, my concern is not to cover well-trodden ground to show how Locke’s usage of 
the family relates to his opposition of Filmer; rather, I aim to investigate an overlooked 
consequence of Locke’s picture of the family: mothers have a civic role.  
In this chapter as in the previous, I maintain scholars have largely overlooked 
motherhood as a civic role.69 Civic society for Hobbes and Locke, scholars generally 
assume, is the realm of men: made by men and for men. To date, scholars have failed to 
appreciate a series of connections between the moral imperatives dictated by the natural 
law in nature, the moral imperatives dictated by the natural law in civic society, and what 
																																																								
67 Please see Mary Lyndon Shanley, “Marriage Contract and Social Contract in Seventeenth-Century 
English Political Thought,” Political Research Quarterly 32, no. 1 (Mar., 1979): 79-91. 
Please see also Gordon Schochet, “Models of Politics and the Place of Women in Locke's Political 
Thought,” in Feminist Interpretations of John Locke, ed. Nancy J. Hirschmann and Kristie McClure 
(University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007), 131-53. 
68 Chief among those philosophers that might come to mind are Plato and Aristotle. 
69 For example, Schochet says explicitly, “while Locke did see an altered status for women in the household 
or family, he accorded it no political significance.” 




it means to be a good citizen. I spell out these connections in this chapter. The result is 
that scholars have an incomplete picture of Lockean education because they have 
neglected the role of mothers and the family in Locke’s education. The specific civic role 
of motherhood, however, differs from and is in many ways less straightforward than it is 
for Hobbes, and as such merits a chapter in its own right.  
Although Locke uses the same language as Hobbes (and Pufendorf as well) to 
suggest that men and women are by nature equal outside of marriage, Locke has a 
different account of how women move from natural equality to subordination within 
marriage. Locke must explain the dominion of the father, and he must do it in such a way 
as to avoid constructing or espousing a Filmerian patriarchal structure, the likes of which 
he is staunchly committed to rejecting. This response has garnered much attention from 
scholars, particularly Pateman, who use Locke’s response to Filmer to argue that Locke 
excludes women from politics.70 To respond to Pateman, I argue in Section 1 that 
according to Locke women enjoy the same rewards of parenting as fathers, if not in 
degree at least in kind. This means mothers also have the same duties as fathers; 
consequently, even if Pateman is right about women’s subordination in the conjugal 
contract, that does not preclude the possibility of women having a civic role as mothers. 
In Section 2, I advance the argument that mothers do indeed have a civic role. First, I 
show that parental duties involve civic socialization, a type of social education that 
involves manners and norms that govern one’s interactions with other people. This, as I 
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argued in the previous chapter, constitutes a type of education. These manners and norms 
are not natural; they must be inculcated and encouraged in children, and so, insofar as 
socialization begins in the family, the family performs a civic function.  
Next, I show that this education is a moral education by connecting the education 
Locke describes with the natural law. Then, I demonstrate that this social, moral 
education is simultaneously a civic education by showing that the natural law compels 
people toward civic society and persists even once that society is established. This civic 
socialization, then, serves a civic function to the extent that it results in children who are 
capable of functioning in a civic order, not just a social order. These children will 
become adults who are prepared to follow the laws, even when it is not in their interest to 
do so; they will be willing to recognize the claims of others, even when they disagree. In 
short, civic socialization is responsible—at least in part—for cultivating Lockean civic 
virtues, which are important to living in Locke’s conception of civil society.  
Section 1: both mothers and fathers share dominion over their children 
 
Scholars disagree about how mothers fit into (or are excluded from) Lockean 
civic society. Although some scholars, including notable authors such as Pateman,71 
suggest that Locke espouses a hierarchical household structure that subordinates mothers 
(as wives) to fathers (as husbands) and therefore renders them irrelevant in civic life, 
others—notably Waldron—suggest that wives and husbands share power more or less 
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equally, and consequently at least have interpretations that may permit women to have 
some impact on civic society beyond mere begetting of children (although Waldron does 
not really go this far in his own interpretation). In both cases, scholars must grapple with 
Locke’s comments on the relationship of parents to children.  
I argue that regardless of one’s position regarding mothers’ prior subordination to 
fathers in the conjugal relationship, mothers have some share in parenting because they 
share in dominion with the father over their children. Sharing dominion means that 
mothers have at least a share in the duties and benefits that come with holding dominion 
over another, and one of the central duties that comes with having dominion over a child 
is education of that child. Hence, because women in their roles as mothers at least share 
in dominion over children, this means that mothers have some duties to educate their 
children, and it is this education that I argue renders mothers relevant to civic society in 
the same way, if not in degree then at least in kind, that fathers are under Locke’s picture.  
Part A: Pateman’s position: conjugal subordination renders women politically and 
civically irrelevant 
 
 Some scholars, such as Pateman, suggest that because women are already 
subordinate to the men through the marriage contract, women cannot wield political 
power. The overall argument goes something like this: Locke held that wives were 
subservient to husbands in the conjugal contract because husbands hold the right of last 
determination; the right of last determination gives husbands the right to make decisions 
in all things pertaining to the “common concernment”72 of the family; and, this includes 
																																																								




participation in civic society (i.e.—deciding whether or not to participate in the social 
contract). Pateman’s argument here is important to note because her focus on women’s 
subordination obscures her ability to consider that women, even if subordinated to their 
husbands, can have civic roles.  
 The evidence that wives, and therefore mothers, were subservient to their 
husbands comes primarily under two headings: (1) portions of both Treatises where 
Locke explicitly says wives are subservient to their husbands, such as the idea that 
husbands have the last right of common concernment mentioned above,73 and (2) portions 
of the Second Treatise where Locke drops the term “parental” in favor of “father.”74 
Pateman and others take these two pieces of evidence and use them to conclude that 
Locke did not intend to give women dominion in any meaningful sense over their 
children, at least no more than a servant would have who was appointed to watch after 
the children by the father. Instead, they read Locke as smuggling a patriarchal hierarchy 
into his conception of the family under the guise of granting dominion to women within 
their own households. 
																																																								
73 It should be noted that Pateman—and Locke scholars generally—recognize that whatever power 
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commonly contributes to the wellbeing of the family unit.  
Pateman, The Sexual Contract, 53. 
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 The chief piece of evidence showing that wives are subservient to their husbands 
is the right of last determination (i.e., common concernment). Locke explicitly says men 
have the right of last determination within the family as “‘the abler and the stronger.’”75 
Pateman maintains that Locke said this because of his assertion that there was some 
foundation in nature for men’s superiority over women when forming the conjugal 
relationship. Pateman asserts that the conjugal contract “establishes men’s political right 
over women.”76 Specifically, once women agree (either in or outside of the state of 
nature) to enter a marriage contract, they no longer are free and equal to men, but subject 
to them. As Pateman says, “Once a man and a woman becomes husband and wife and 
decisions have to be made, the right to decide, or ‘the last Determination, i.e., the Rule’, 
has to be placed with one or the other….Locke states that ‘it naturally falls to the Man’s 
share’ to govern over their ‘common Interest and Property’, although a husband's right 
runs no further than that.”77 Although Locke nowhere gives a full account of what he 
means when he says “naturally,” Pateman interprets this as expressing women’s alleged 
lack of reason.78 Regardless of its grounding, the major takeaway from Pateman’s book, 
The Sexual Contract, is that women are excluded from political society because they are 
subordinated in the conjugal contract first.  
 Pateman’s specific reading of the right of last determination leads to her argue 
that wives had severely diminished roles even in their own homes. For example, when 
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Locke suggests that the wife’s subjection should be limited even in the conjugal contract 
because women have certain rights, Pateman, in a piece co-authored with Brennan, 
replies, “However, this refers to the right she has to her life, and her right to share in the 
exercise of authority over children. Her ‘peculiar Right’ excludes her from the crucial 
area of decision-making about family property.”  She goes on to say that “Locke regards 
the labour of a wife, like that of a servant, as contributing to the property appropriated by 
her husband, or a master.” Quite literally, Pateman says that this sort of view “enables 
Locke to assume that women are ‘naturally’ fit only for a restricted role within the 
family. [my emphasis]”79  
Pateman takes this restricted role in the household to be important because she 
thinks Locke uses it to exclude women from civic life. She says, “the sexual contract 
requires that women are incorporated into civil society on a different basis from 
men….Women are not incorporated as ‘individuals’ but as women, which in the story of 
the original contract, means as natural subordinates.”80 Whatever it is, then, that women 
do as a husband’s subordinate, Pateman wants to suggest that once women have a 
subordinated role in the home, that they are excluded from participating in or even 
contributing to civic society.  
Inspired by Pateman, other scholars, including William Walker, use different 
textual evidence to arrive at a similar conclusion. Walker takes Locke’s terminological 
choices as an indication that Locke—while committed to political equality for men—was 
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against civic and domestic equality for women. In particular, Walker notes that Locke’s 
usage of “parental” sometimes slips later into “father” or “paternal.” He takes this as 
evidence that Locke also wanted to diminish the role of women in the home and society 
in similar ways; gradually phasing them out of the discussion. The idea is that without 
domestic equality, it seems strange to suggest that women had any serious impact on their 
children’s education and it is certainly outside the realm of possibility that women have a 
civic role to play. The seeds of the many offshoots of Pateman are the same: decision-
making rests with the father in Locke’s family, and this must mean that women have a 
severely diminished and therefore unimportant role even as mothers. 
Part B: Waldron’s position: there is no conjugal subordination, so mothers could have a 
civic role 
 
Waldron takes a different position and argues that Locke thought husbands and 
wives held roughly equal power in the conjugal contract. Waldron’s position leaves open 
the door for women to play some civic role, but if he is wrong about Locke on the 
equality of men and women in the conjugal relationship, then there is little opportunity 
for women to play a civic role.  
Waldron’s chief piece of reasoning for his claim that husbands and wives held 
more or less equal power is that Locke’s claims elsewhere in the text about women’s 
relationship to property would not make sense unless wives and husbands were roughly 
equal. For example, Waldron asks: Why would Locke have wanted to suggest that 
women—like men—were made in the likeness of God? Why say that mothers shared 




no particular incentive of ‘political correctness’ in this regard…[and it is likely that] his 
costume of respect for gender-equality would cause him more trouble than the 
patriarchalism he was supposed to be trying to disguise.”81 There is little or no motive for 
Locke to pretend to grant shared power to women to avoid alienating his female 
readership (he had relatively few female readers) or to uphold some contemporary view 
of political correctness (it would be anachronistic to say that Locke merely talked about 
women as naturally equal because he feared saying otherwise). Instead, Waldron 
contends that it is more likely that Locke wanted to carry out the implications of his 
egalitarian views more generally but felt compelled by society to not alienate his male 
readership. If this is the case, then Locke perhaps failed to be sufficiently brave to stand 
up to the conventional standards of his time, but that does not mean he was fully 
committed to rendering mothers powerless.  
 If we examine the right to last determination more closely, we see that its limits 
lend further credence to Waldron’s position despite Pateman’s assurances above that 
these limits were, themselves, severely limited. Consider the full context of the quote:  
But the Husband and Wife, though they have but one common Concern, yet having 
different understandings, will unavoidably sometimes have different wills too; it 
therefore being necessary that the last Determination, i.e. the Rule, should be placed 
somewhere, it naturally falls to the Man’s share, as the abler and the stronger. But this 
reaching but to the things of their common Interest and Property, leaves the Wife in the 
full and free possession of what by Contract is her peculiar Right, and gives the Husband 
no more power over her Life, than she has over his; the Power of the Husband being so 
far from that of an absolute Monarch, that the Wife has, in many cases, a Liberty to 
separate from him; where natural Right, or their Contract allows it, whether that Contract 
be made by themselves in the state of Nature, or by the Customs or Laws of the Countrey 
they live in; and the Children upon such Separation fall to the Father or Mother's lot, as 
such Contract does determine.82 
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Notice that upon saying that husbands have last determination, Locke immediately places 
limits on this power. Wives can still retain property; wives can still call for divorce once 
the children are out of the house;83 this is all contingent upon the conditions of the 
marriage contract. This is important to note because it allows some freedom within 
Locke’s theory for readers to consider that if laws had been differently constructed, or if a 
society were constructed such that women could negotiate contracts, there is nothing 
inherently prohibiting women from doing just that. The individuals entering into the 
contract could “decide whether to keep the right of election [last determination] in 
themselves or vest it in some subset of the people.”84 It is theoretically possible for 
individuals to decide who retains the right of last determination. Even if women—as they 
so often did—entered into marriage contracts in which las determination fell to the 
husband, because the mother agreed to the contract, she had at least some say in 
acquiescing to the terms of that contract. It is not as if women who are wives or mothers 
are totally excluded from the decision-making process simply by virtue of their being 
women. And so, Pateman’s claims about the conjugal contract and Locke’s view that 
women lack sufficient reason are at least in tension with what Locke says about women 
and conjugal contracts in the text. It would, for example, seem to require at least some 
degree of thought in order to agree to contract. Hence, it would at least require further 
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thing, nor to the ends of it, that it should always be for life; I mean, to such as are under no restraint of any 
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textual interpretation and reasoning to show that Locke indeed did think women lacked 
reason to the degree Pateman suggests.  
Even within marriage, Waldron’s assertion holds some weight: it is not clear that 
when wives and husbands disagree over what to do with their children that the father 
necessarily has the final say. Indeed, women need not always be subservient to their 
husbands in the family. As Waldron points out, Locke actively makes fun of this idea 
with respect to Elizabeth I and Mary Tudor as being subject to their husbands.85 It would 
be absurd to say that the sovereign leader of a nation was subservient to anyone in her 
country, including her own husband. One could scarcely imagine the right of last 
determination lying with anyone but them. These, of course, were extraordinary women, 
and as such they may represent the exception to the “abler and stronger” clause. Perhaps, 
it was the case that Locke simply intended for certain, exceptional women to defy the 
“abler and stronger” clause often referenced by Pateman and others. 
But, even for women who were not sovereign leaders of their nations, there is 
considerable evidence that favors Waldron’s position. Locke often says that women 
should share in parental responsibilities and that if anyone should have a natural power 
over children that it should be the mother. In the First Treatise, he suggests that women 
have at least an equal share “if not the greater” in responsibility over children.86 And he 
goes on to reassert that mothers have rights over their children. To suggest that conjugal 
subservience means that mothers have somehow significantly less say in a child’s 
education simply does not square well with Locke’s repeated insistence that women do 
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have a stake in their children and that they do have parental duties at least alongside of 
the father.87   
Assuming that fathers in Lockean society have a civic role, Waldron’s position 
seems to be just what one would want to show that mothers, too, could have a civic role 
because, on his view, mothers are roughly equal to fathers; however, the problem with 
Waldron’s position is that if he is wrong about the equality of wives and husbands in the 
conjugal contract, then he falls back into Pateman’s position: women are too 
subordinated to play a civic role. They are totally subsumed under the husband’s identity. 
If the situation is really an either-or situation, a situation in which mothers are either 
roughly equal or subordinated, then it would matter very much who was right: Pateman 
or Waldron.  
Part C: my position: mothers have a civic role regardless of their status as wives in the 
conjugal contract 
 
My reading of Locke will show that—for the issue at hand—it does not matter if 
Pateman or Waldron is right about subjugation in the conjugal relationship: even if 
women are subordinated to men in marriage, it does not follow that their role as mothers 
is unimportant or irrelevant, and if parenthood is a civic duty, this means that mothers 
have a civic role even if they are subordinated. This is not to say that women are or are 
not necessarily subordinated to men in marriage or that Locke intended for women to 
have a certain relationship to men. The explanatory power of my point is that even if 
Waldron is wrong and Pateman is right, this does not mean mothers have a trivial role in 
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childrearing or education, which, as I show in Section 2 below, gives mothers a civic 
role. 
Regardless of one’s position regarding wives’ subordination to their husbands, 
mothers have some share in parenting. Locke repeatedly and clearly states that they share 
dominion over their children with the father. And, as we will see shortly, holding 
dominion over their children means that mothers have at least a share in the duties and 
benefits that come with holding dominion over another. This dominion need not be 
equally shared; I need only to show that it is shared. One of the central duties (see 
Section 2) that comes with having dominion over a child is education of that child. 
Hence, because women in their roles as mothers at least share in dominion over children, 
this means that mothers have some duties to educate their children, and it is this 
education that I argue renders mothers relevant to civic society (at least as much as 
fathers are) under Locke’s picture.  
For example, Locke suggests that mothers share in dominion through frequent 
references to “parents” as having dominion and not merely “fathers.” This is a conscious 
decision on Locke’s part, and it is critical to his overall argument against Filmer’s ideas 
regarding the divine right of kings to rule.88 For example, in the Second Treatise, Locke 
says explicitly:  
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But what reason can hence advance this Care of the Parents due to their Off-spring into 
an Absolute Arbitrary Dominion of the Father, whose power reaches no farther, than by 
such a Discipline, as he finds most effectual to give such strength and health to their 
Bodies, such vigour and rectitude to their minds, as may best fit his Children to be most 
useful to themselves and others; and, if it be necessary to his Condition, to make them 
work when they are able for their own subsistence. But in this power the Mother too has 
her share with the Father.89 
 
Here, Locke unequivocally declares that mothers share dominion over children with 
fathers. If we take these explicit assertions as expressions of what Locke really meant, 
then whatever the duties and benefits are that come along with holding dominion over 
another human life, women in their role as mothers are meant to share in them alongside 
of men in their roles as fathers.  
 Because the inclusion of mothers is critical to Locke’s argument against Filmer, 
Locke is conceptually committed to a position where mothers share power alongside of 
the father, and scholars such as Walker, who want to maintain that Locke did not believe 
mothers could share power with fathers because of their conjugal subordination,90 must 
then explain how Locke is able to successfully argue against Filmer while simultaneously 
not really believing mothers share in parental power. To take women out of Locke’s anti-
Filmerian argument would destroy Locke’s argument against patriarchal political orders. 
Without his claims about Adam and Eve sharing in dominion, Locke does not have any 
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way to show that God gave the earth to more than just Adam in his capacities as a 
husband and father. Only with Eve can Locke say that the earth was not given to Adam 
alone. And, of course, if Locke only gave the world to Adam, then it becomes much 
harder to explain why the divine right of kings does not proceed through Adam’s line. It 
starts to look a lot like God gave Adam the earth as his kingdom (and his alone).  
 There are, of course, other ways in which Locke shows that mothers can wield 
parental power. Of particular note are Locke’s claims that mothers can hold sole 
dominion over their children. In the event that fathers became absent from the familial 
picture, whether through some manner of abandonment or death, Locke explicitly says, 
“If the father die whilst the Children are young” that the children “naturally every where 
owe the same Obedience to their Mother, during their Minority, as to their Father were he 
alive.”91 Mothers may then hold sole dominion over their children if a father is absent. 
This indicates yet again that there is nothing inherent in women that makes them so 
subservient that they would somehow be unable to hold dominion over their offspring. It 
further means that whatever duties and benefits accrue with dominion over a child can 
fall wholly to the mother in the absence of the father. So, either the duties and benefits of 
dominion are shared by both mother and father, or they belong solely to one parent if the 
other parent is absent. In at least some cases, then, mothers held sole dominion over their 
children. 
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So, even if wives are subordinated to husbands in the family, this does not mean 
that mothers92 have no say in parenting. The claims Locke makes about sharing above 
could also mean that the mother has a lesser share, but a lesser share is still more than no 
share. For example, in the “abler and stronger” passage cited above,93 Locke suggests that 
the right of last determination does not mean that the father must make all decisions. 
Instead, women can make decisions in all situations in which the two wills do not 
disagree, and even then, if it has to do with the woman’s life, the man has no absolute 
power over her. For example, if a wife knows that her house is out of food, she need not 
consult with her husband to make sure that she can purchase more food—presumably, not 
starving is in the interest of both the wife and the husband. It is not as if the wife must 
constantly ask her husband’s permission to do anything (or even most things). This point 
about wives being able to make decisions wherein her will does not disagree with the 
husband’s will extends to when the two have children.  
Section 2: parental education is a moral education 
 
In Section 1, I established that women can have at least a share of parental power 
over children, but I have not yet clarified why having a share of parental power is 
relevant to civic society.  In Section 2, I lay out the following sequence of logic that 
connects up mothers’ parental power with their civic role: parental power carries with it 
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the duty to educate children; this education is, at least in part, a moral education; morality 
grounds civic society insofar as it is both a reason why people should enter the social 
contract and the basis for law after entrance; morality, then, is important to civic society, 
and thus parents—who are responsible for at least part of this moral education—have an 
important civic role.  
Part A: Locke’s conception of parental power: the duty to educate 
 
Most of the time when Locke refers to “parental power,” he is talking about limits 
to parents’ rights over children and, more specifically, their property. Consider the 
following passage from the Second Treatise:  
there is, as I have proved, no reason why it [parental power] should be thought, to extend 
to Life and Death, at any time, over their Children, more than over any body else, neither 
can there be any pretence why this parental power should keep the Child, when grown to 
a Man, in subjection to the Will of his Parents, any farther, than having received Life and 
Education from his Parents, obliges him to Respect, Honour, Gratitude, Assistance and 
Support, all his Life, to both Father and Mother. And thus, ’tis true, the Paternal is a 
natural Government, but not at all extending itself to the Ends, and Jurisdictions of that 
which is Political. The Power of the Father doth not reach at all to the Property of the 
Child, which is only in his own disposing.94  
 
This passage illustrates three things: (1) Locke seems to take it as a given that his 
audience thinks of parental power as a sort of absolute power and so he had to argue 
against this claim,95 (2) Lockean parental power does not extend to adult children, and (3) 
Lockean parental power does not extend to the property or lives of children even while in 
their nonage. Locke takes (2) and (3) as the limits that serve to differentiate absolute 
power from parental power, and he grounds this difference in scripture. Although it is 
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beyond the scope of this paper to analyze Locke’s grounding in scripture, what is 
important to note is that the particular limits Locke places on parents reveal what parents 
cannot do to their children and, consequently, that parental power is not unlimited.  
Along with the particular limits noted in the passage above, Locke also notes what 
parents can do: expect obedience. Locke’s consistent assertions that parents have no 
power over the “Life and Death” of their children and no power to seize the “Property of 
the Child,”96 are almost always paired along with the claim that while the children remain 
in the home and are in their nonage, parents can expect obedience from their children in 
all other respects. Locke uses this term, “obedience,” often interchangeably with 
“respect,” or “honour,”97 and Locke makes repeated reference to this general obedience, 
respect, and/or honor to parents throughout the Second Treatise, First Treatise, and Some 
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Thoughts.98 Consequently, while Locke discusses limits to parental power, when laying 
down certain limits, Locke makes clear that parents can expect their children to obey 
them and reap other benefits, such as gratitude, from them for the duration of their lives. 
As such, Locke maintains that children have a duty to generally obey their parents in all 
but a few excepted areas. This is, in many respects, reminiscent of the relationship in 
Hobbes’ Leviathan between obedience and gratitude. Readers should see the previous 
chapter for a full discussion of this relationship. For now, it is enough to note that there is 
some conceptual continuity across Hobbes and Locke wherein parents can expect some 
level of deference from children for services rendered.  
Parental power, while often discussed in terms of property or gratitude, carries 
with it at least one additional facet germane to the issue at hand: parents have a duty to 
nourish and educate their children.99 In both the First and Second Treatises, Locke 
consistently holds that parents have a duty to care for their children, and he suggests that 
nourishment and education are two ways in which parents show that they care for their 
children. For example, he says, “For children being by the course of nature born weak, 
																																																								
98 For example, in Some Thoughts Concerning Education, Locke references children’s obedience to parents 
(with an emphasis on the plural) on the following pages: 25, 27, 33, 35, 36, and 97. In the Second Treatise, 
note his claims about parental and political obedience in I.66, as well as his usage of “obedience” in II.69 
and II.71. In the First Treatise, early on Locke notes that obedience is owed both to fathers and mothers in 
I.11, and notably again in his discussions regarding Filmer’s faulty interpretation of Scripture at I.61, I.65, 
and I.66. Locke’s comments are not, then, passing flights of fancy; rather, Locke consistently references 
power as belonging to mothers, too.  
Melissa Butler notes that the obligations children have to their parents remain the same regardless of 
whether the children are born to parents in the state of nature or civil society. She says, “Children growing 
up in the state of nature were under the same obligations to their parents as children reared in civil society.” 
Melissa A. Butler, “Early Liberal Roots of Feminism: John Locke's Attack on Patriarchy,” American 
Political Science Review 72, no. 1 (Mar., 1978): 146, www.jstor.org/stable/1953604. 
99 This additional facet appears also in Locke’s conception of the duties of the ruler to the ruled. I refer to 
this as “a” facet and not “facets” because Locke so often mentions the two together. Consequently, I treat it 




and unable to provide for themselves, they have by the appointment of God himself…a 
right to be nourished and maintained by their parents, nay a right not only to a bare 
subsistence but to the conveniences and comforts of life.”100 At another point he says, 
“The Affection and Tenderness, which God hath planted in the Breasts of Parents, 
towards their Children, makes it evident, that this is not intended to be a severe Arbitrary 
Government, but only for the Help, Instruction, and Preservation of their Off-spring.”101 
And, most clearly: “when he [a father or mother] quits his Care of them, he loses his 
power over them, which goes along with their Nourishment and Education, to which it is 
inseparably annexed.”102 Children are by nature dependent on their parents, and so Locke 
asserts that they have a right to care from their parents (I discuss the grounds of this right 
below). And where children have a right to receive care, there is a corresponding duty for 
the parents to provide that care. 
That parents have the duty to care for their children is significant because it shows 
that power, for Locke, is not merely a relationship of power over another but also a 
responsibility to the other, and as with duties generally, there are consequences for failure 
to fulfill them. Consider the implications that come with failing in this particular duty:  
The first part then of Paternal Power,103 or rather Duty, which is Education, belongs so to 
the Father, that it terminates at a certain season; when the business of Education is over, it 
																																																								
100 Locke, Two Treatises of Government, I.89. 
101 Locke, Two Treatises of Government, II.170. 
102 While this quote references only “father,” there is nothing inherent to motherhood that exempts her from 
these same duties. For further support, see below and the discussion of how mothers can and are 
responsible for educating their children, even on Locke’s own view. Additionally, the end of this quote 
makes an interesting caveat: parents are not parents by begetting a child; rather, they are parents only if they 
fulfill their duties to children. Those duties are twofold: parents must nourish and educate their children, or 
else, the parent “has no right to demand rule or dominion from him [the child].” Locke, Two Treatises of 
Government, I.93; Locke, Two Treatises of Government, II.65. 
103 A brief not regarding the usage of “paternal power” here. In the Second Treatise, Locke says quite 




ceases of it self, and is also alienable before. For a Man may put the Tuition of his Son in 
other hands; and he that has made his Son an Apprentice to another, has discharged him, 
during that time, of a great part of his Obedience both to himself and to his Mother.104 
 
Here, Locke says that if a parent fails to education a child, then that parent has not 
fulfilled his or her duty, and thus does not merit the benefits of obedience that would 
normally come with the parent-child relationship. And it is not just in the Treatises that 
Locke makes this explicit. He has a consistent commitment to this point. He makes 
similar claims in both Some Thoughts and A Letter Concerning Toleration. In order to 
reap the benefits of power (in the case of parental power, obedience from one’s children) 
one must fulfill the duties required of that powerful station (in this case, care for the 
child).  
Part B: Lockean education: its origins and practice 
	
Scholars have only recently begun talking about Lockean education in ways that 
connect it with morality instead of merely with politics or epistemology.105 I want to shift 
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the focus of the discussion in such a way that adds to the current understanding of 
Lockean education. I maintain that although Locke’s prescriptions about education seem 
to be non-moral, Locke actually sees these prescriptions as deeply connected to his moral 
claim grounded in the natural law that human beings should preserve one another as 
much as is possible. The absence of scholarly acknowledgment of the connection 
between Lockean education and morality is due in part to the fact that scholars have 
largely focused on the role of tutors or embodied habit formation (wearing leaky shoes, 
going to bed on time, etc.) in childhood education106 without full consideration of these 
habits’ conceptual grounding. In this part of section 2, I argue that these seemingly non-
moral prescriptions are deeply connected to the moral claim that underpins Lockean 
natural law.  
(a) the origin of Locke’s education: how the natural law gives Locke’s education a moral 
grounding  
 
Locke grounds the parental duty to inculcate their children with certain habits in 
the natural law insofar as the natural law compels us to preserve others as much as 
possible. Recall how Locke’s natural law works: once you understand what natural law 
requires of you, you are bound to it, and natural law often requires us to reign in our 
passions so that we may better live in society without unduly harming one another. 
Parental habit formation helps children to make and later see this connection by instilling 
																																																																																																																																																																					
philosophy simply do not talk much about Lockean education, favoring instead to focus on his 
epistemology, account of the natural law, views on toleration, or political theory.  
106 Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to address the role of tutors, I fully acknowledge that tutors 
play a critical role in the education of children, and this role—in many respects—can overlap with the 
education parents give to children. My aim, though, is not to say that parents have a role that no one else 
could possibly aide in; rather, my aim is to show that parents also educate children, and as such mothers as 




in children self-discipline and serving as a training ground to see how to care for one 
another.  
In order to see the connection between self-discipline and the natural law, we 
must first clarify what the natural law is, how it is moral, and how reason fits in with it. 
Locke says: 
The State of Nature has a Law of Nature to govern it, which obliges every one: And 
Reason, which is that Law, teaches all Mankind, who will but consult it, that being all 
equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or 
Possessions: for Men being all the Workmanship of one Omnipotent, and infinitely wise 
Maker; All the Servants of one Sovereign Master, sent into the World by his order, and 
about his business, they are his Property, whose Workmanship they are, made to last 
during his, not one another’s Pleasure. And being furnished with like Faculties, sharing 
all in one Community of Nature, there cannot be supposed any such Subordination 
among us, that may Authorize us to destroy one another, as if we were made for one 
another’s uses, as the inferior ranks of Creatures are for our’s….Every one, as he is 
bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his Station willfully; so by the like reason 
when his own preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to 
preserve the rest of Mankind, and may not unless it be to do Justice on an Offender, take 
away, or impair the life, or what tends to the Preservation of the Life, the Liberty, Health, 
Limb, or Goods of another.107  
 
When Locke says, “reason, which is that law,” he means that reason enables us to come 
to know the law of nature. If we reason, we will see that because God has made all 
human beings and because we ought not harm God’s creations, we have certain 
obligations. Of particular note are our obligations—even in the state of nature—to not 
only not harm others but rather to help others (“preserve the rest of Mankind”) as long as 
our own personal preservation is not at stake. If we take seriously the idea that how we 
ought to behave is a moral prescription, then the natural law is, at least in part, moral. It is 
a rule that commits people—on pain of disobeying God—to caring for their fellow men. 
																																																								




These obligations (to not harm and to help others) never leave us even after we enter 
society, and we will see why this is so important below. 
Locke uses the natural law to ground his claim that parents have a duty to care for 
their offspring. Not only does care for offspring—who would otherwise be presumably 
defenseless and unable to feed themselves—fulfill the criteria of the natural law that 
commands us to preserve others as much as possible, but Locke explicitly says that 
parents come to know this duty through reason. Of course, we come to know many things 
through our reason, and they need not all be moral; however, there are some duties that 
are moral on Locke’s account, and we know that the process by which we come to know 
them and be subject to them is through reason. The knowledge that one ought to care for 
one’s offspring and the knowledge that one ought to care for others are both accessible by 
reason. This is most clear in Locke’s discussion of Adam and Eve’s obligation to care for 
their children.108 God, the author of the natural law, gives Adam and Eve the original 
command to care for their children, and they come to obey this command once they are 
able to use their reason to know why God commands it: to do otherwise would be a 
violation of the law of nature wherein parents failed to preserve some other—namely, 
children—despite having the means to do so.  
 It would be easy to suggest that Locke’s natural law merely compels us to avoid 
harming others when possible and that it does not, in fact, compel us to actively care for 
others; however, the care-for-others interpretation makes more sense given Locke’s 
claims elsewhere in the text. When the natural law says that individuals must preserve 
																																																								




others,109 Locke should be interpreted as committing to the claim that people must—
under certain circumstances—engage in active assistance instead of merely passive non-
interference. For example, when others are starving, Locke is committed to forcing the 
rich to give from their surplus to those who are in need. Waldron advances this reading, 
and there is significant textual evidence for this interpretation in both Treatises. This is 
important for my argument because it shows that Locke’s law of nature grounds positive 
duties to perform actions and not merely duties to avoid interference.  
 In God, Locke, and Equality, Waldron argues that Locke is committed to a 
position wherein people do not have to be radically charitable (as, perhaps, someone like 
Peter Singer is committed to); rather, he is committed to a position in which people can 
be forced to be charitable in some cases.110 Waldron notes that Locke discusses charity as 
a positive duty (i.e.—you must give to those who have insufficient goods to preserve 
themselves) and not merely a negative one (i.e.—you must not take from anyone such 
that they end up with insufficient goods to preserve themselves). Waldron uses this 
evidence to argue that the First Treatise conception of charity is compatible with what 
Locke says in the Second Treatise. In the First Treatise, Waldron notes that the rich 
cannot “resist the poor when the poor attempt to seize their surplus goods for 
themselves.”111 This same idea appears again in Locke’s Second Treatise when he 
maintains that individuals have rights to acorns or apples if those individuals fear 
starvation: in both Treatises, Locke holds that need can supersede consent. Given the 
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textual evidence, Waldron is correct to conclude, “he [Locke] cannot consistently 
maintain that without also maintaining what I have called the doctrine of charity.”112 
Waldron supports my claim that the Lockean law of nature grounds positive duties to 
actions and not merely duties to avoid interference. 
 The specific idea that people must be forced or at least incentivized to be 
charitable is important because this indicates that Locke’s theory requires training people 
to be moral. He cannot, like Francis Hutcheson or Adam Smith, rely on a sort of natural 
affection for others to guide human charity, or indeed morals in general. Instead, because 
the natural law grounds care for others, and because reason is required to know the 
natural law, Locke’s theory needs an education that will guide children to use their reason 
and thus care for their fellow man before the children reach the age of reason.  
The grounds for a robust reading of the Lockean duty to care for others in the 
natural law should sound familiar: there is similar reasoning that grounds Adam and 
Eve’s care for their children, “not as their own Workmanship, but the Workmanship of 
their own Maker, the Almighty, to whom they were to be accountable for them.”113 God 
has commanded us to care for and preserve one another through the natural law. Here 
again, we see God grounding care for offspring, just as God grounds the natural law.  
(b) Locke’s education in practice: how habit formation fosters moral education 
	
How does the natural law relate to habit formation? I contend that there is a tight 
connection between the parental duty to educate and the natural law; this connection lies 
in the need to habituate children to reason. For Locke, children are born with the 
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capacity to reason, but they cannot yet reason from birth. Locke sees parents—meaning 
both mother and father—as helpful for cultivating reason in children via habit formation. 
The connections among mothers as parents, habit-formation as a type of education, 
reason, and the natural law become clear upon analysis of the following passage:  
And truly, if the preservation of all mankind, as much as in him lies, were every one’s 
persuasion, as indeed it is every one’s duty, and the true principle to regulate our religion, 
politics, and morality by, the world would be much quieter, and better-natured, than it is. 
But to return to our present business ; I cannot but commend both the kindness and 
prudence of a mother I knew, who was wont always to indulge her daughters, when any 
of them desired dogs, squirrels, birds, or any such things, as young girls use to be 
delighted with : but then, when they had them, they must he sure to keep them well, and 
look diligently after them, that, they wanted nothing, or were not ill used ; for, if they 
were negligent in their care of them, it was counted a great fault, which often forfeited 
their possession ; or at least they failed not to be rebuked for it, whereby they were early 
taught diligence and good-nature. And indeed I think people should be accustomed, from 
their cradles, to be tender to all sensible creatures, and to spoil or waste nothing at all.114 
 
This is, at base, a story about a mother habituating her child to the natural law. In this 
story, a mother uses punishments in order to condition her children who, by virtue of 
being children, did not yet have the use of Lockean reason to ground their behavior. The 
result of this conditioning is, as Locke reports, that the children became better people—
diligent and good-natured. When Locke uses words like “accustomed,” he is talking 
about habit formation, about accustoming children to behaving in certain ways. In this 
story, the mother’s power over her children gave grounds for her to form habits in her 
children. The specific habits she formed are necessary for Locke’s conception of morality 
in society: preserve others (in the text, Locke uses the phrase “good-nature” to refer to 
such kindness as is required to preserve others) insofar as it does not infringe upon your 
own self-preservation. The assumption is that children, if left to their own devices 
(without parental guidance), would transgress the law of nature with reckless abandon. 
																																																								




This is why Locke praises the mother in the passage: for not simply allowing her children 
to transgress the law of nature, and for not allowing her children to develop bad habits 
that would habituate them to selfishness, a lack of concern for others, and—perhaps—to 
be unable to help others or not harm them as adults when they become fully subject to the 
law of nature.  
The specific call to be kind to others has its roots in the natural law in two ways: 
(1) that you must leave enough and as good for others, and (2) that you should waste 
nothing; the passage above expresses the importance of upholding both of these, but with 
respect to child-rearing instead of being in the state of nature. Locke uses failures on both 
fronts to illustrate transgressions of the law of nature in the Second Treatise. With respect 
to the former, Locke is clear: given conditions of scarcity, you should take as much as 
you need but leave enough and as good for others so long as it is possible.115 Here, Locke 
uses education to make this same point. The children must be habituated to leave enough 
and as good. They must only take the animals that they can care for and look well after; 
otherwise, “it was considered a great fault.” In this case, it is a fault of character, a 
violation of the moral imperative the natural law sets forth.  
With respect to (2), consider the otherwise peculiar usage of the phrase “wasted 
nothing.” The natural law prohibits you from wasting or spoiling things, but when Locke 
talks about waste, it is usually in reference to property. For example, “God gave the 
World to Men in Common; but since he gave it them for their benefit, and the greatest 
Conveniences of Life they were capable to draw from it, it cannot be supposed he meant 
																																																								




it should always remain common and uncultivated. He gave it to the use of the 
Industrious and Rational.”116 Locke grounds this claim about not wasting the gifts that 
God, the author of the law of nature, gives to human beings. In this passage, however, he 
talks about waste and spoilage as critical to educate children to avoid. Like his claims 
about only taking enough property that “one can make use of…before it spoils,”117 here 
Locke says that the girls had to be taught by their mother to only take and keep the 
animals for which they could care without neglecting them. The animals would, in a 
sense, be wasted because the children could not sufficiently enjoy all of them on their 
own. Without habituation, these children would take as many animals as they liked 
without actually being able to care for them. Locke praises the mother in the passage 
above from Some Thoughts Concerning Education for educating her children by forming 
in them good habits that are in accordance with the natural law. 
Taken altogether, my analysis of this passage shows that Locke is talking about 
the natural law in the same way in both the Treatises and elsewhere in Some Thoughts: at 
all times, individuals must be concerned with preserving themselves and others. The 
natural law, here, is particularly Lockean insofar as it gives us duties to others (and 
therefore duties grounded in God). The children in the example above have a duty to care 
for the creatures of the natural earth; in the Second Treatise, Locke talks about this in 
terms of letting food or goods spoil after harvesting. When children receive an education 
by way of habit-formation, they become habituated to the rules set forth by the natural 
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law even before they are able to know the natural law through their own reason. They 
must be habituated to morality.  
Once we recognize that Locke’s prescriptions for education are grounded in the 
moral claim to preserve others as much as possible found in Locke’s natural law, we can 
see that even some seemingly non-moral prescriptions can carry moral weight. Consider 
that almost the entirety of Some Thoughts Concerning Education, Locke’s chief treatise 
on children’s education, is devoted to discussions of how to handle children’s bodies and 
thus prepare them to be adults. For example, he says that clothing is of paramount 
importance.118 He goes to great lengths to describe that the clothing should not be too 
constrictive or too loose. Locke has similar discussions of when and how children should 
sleep, at what hours they should be awoken, and what sort of food they can and cannot 
eat. These discussions about the body seem like they have nothing to do with inculcating 
in children a certain moral education; however, there is a moral dimension to this 
education, and it lies in what it means to form habits. Habit formation requires self-
discipline, and parents can aid the formation of self-discipline through the use of external 
discipline on their children. Children need to develop this self-discipline so that they are 
able to care for others as adults even when their immediate inclination is to take what 
they want. To develop it, children need repeated practice at curtailing their passions or 
self-interest, and the rules parents set down for their children help them to do this more 
readily. 
																																																								




To be sure, not all habit formation has to happen in a particularly moral way. 
There may be some Lockean habits that are non-moral. And moral education need not 
govern all aspects of a child’s education. It would, in point of fact, be a bit strange to 
suggest that even training in a trade was particularly or primarily moral in nature 
(although it may be in some distant sense). Here, I am not making a claim about all habit 
formation. Rather, I am saying that there are certain civic virtues—care for others is one 
of them, minimizing spoilage and waste are others—and for at least some of these civic 
virtues, habituation is important for learning habits of self-denial in order to be pursue 
these virtues and adhere to the natural law. 
There is one important tension in the text that requires further consideration. At 
certain points in his works, Locke suggests that reason comes with age and not 
necessarily education. For example, in the famous madman passage from the Second 
Treatise, Locke says children “who are not as yet come unto those years whereat they 
may have [reason]”119 should not be held responsible for their actions and should be in 
the care of their parents. Given that Locke links up reason with morality—i.e.-that you 
need reason to make moral choices—then the moral role of civic socialization ends up 
being obscured. In short, if reason comes with age and not education, then civic 
socialization loses much of its importance.  
There are several ways one could resolve this tension that are compatible with 
Locke’s work without denying the moral importance of civic socialization. For example, 
one could point to other portions of Locke’s texts that suggest that the age of reason may 
																																																								




not simply be a number but rather a certain amount of knowledge. Locke says, “Paternal 
or parental power is nothing but that which parents have over their children...till they 
come to the use of reason, or a state of knowledge, [my emphasis] wherein they may be 
supposed capable to understand that rule...they are to govern themselves by.”120 Here, 
Locke’s language suggests that there are options for coming to sufficient understanding 
of the rule of law. Children may age into it or they may acquire it through experience or 
education. I take experience and education to be compatible insofar as parents or 
educators can present their children or pupils with experiences designed to show them 
certain pieces of knowledge. In either event, Locke’s famous passages in the Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding in which he refers to the mind as a sort of blank slate 
suggest that even if children will come to an age where their minds are capable of 
processing information reasonably, their experiences will invariably shape what premises 
they have and how they are able to manipulate them.    
Another way of addressing the concern that reason is a product of age and not 
education is to look back in the history of philosophy. There is a general thread in the 
history of philosophy that suggests early life habituation is quite important in those 
individuals who could have otherwise been good, functional subjects or citizens but have 
instead been habituated such that they become bad people. Again, insofar as being a 
“good” or “bad” person is a moral issue, then it seems like habituation is moral. Plato and 
Aristotle both take up this concern. For Plato, the central books of the Republic are 
devoted to explaining guardian education. In the Republic, guardians must be moral 
																																																								




people. They must be ready to protect the city’s inhabitants against enemies foreign and 
domestic; they must be moderate in all of their behavior; they must be, as Plato describes 
it, virtuous. However, even these supposed gold-souled individuals can be led astray in 
their youths; corrupted, as it were. This is why Plato takes seriously their early education. 
They can be corrupted morally without good upbringing. Aristotle, too, notes the 
importance of good upbringing in the Nicomachean Ethics. Children who lack good 
upbringing acquire habits that make them less virtuous people. Less virtuous actions lead 
to a less virtuous character, and those with less virtuous characters are less likely to 
perform virtuous actions. It is a reinforcing system in which one’s upbringing ends up 
accounting for a great deal of whether one becomes a good or bad person. For both Plato 
and Aristotle, there is a deep concern that children are malleable in ways that can ruin 
them for life. The idea here is that good citizens need to be safeguarded in childhood until 
they develop their ability to reason from good premises. If individuals lack good habits as 
children, then even after they develop reason, they may have broken their relationships 
with their fellow man or come to believe in faulty premises.  
The same concern that Plato and Aristotle have is, at the very least, compatible 
with Locke’s arguments in his major works. Consider again Locke’s conception of 
people as blank slates: bad habits can derail even reasonable individuals if they are 
sufficiently ingrained in their minds. In the Second Treatise Locke says, “People are not 
so easily got out of their old forms [habits], as some are apt to suggest. They are hardly to 
be prevailed with to amend the acknowledg’d Faults in the Frame they have been 




time, or corruption; ’tis not an easie thing to get them changed.”121 As it turns out, civic 
socialization is important for Locke even if individuals naturally come to reason after a 
certain time because passions and poor habits can overcome even reasonable people. If 
individuals are socialized badly and develop poor habits, they are difficult to change. 
This shows that the habituation process families perform is, in point of fact, important to 
adult morality.   
Part C: how mothers contribute to a Lockean moral education 
 
As I argued in Section 1, even if scholars like Pateman are correct that the father 
is in some sense owed final obedience or has some greater degree of responsibility in 
parental duties, there is evidence that Locke sees mothers as engaging in the habit-
forming work of education alongside of fathers. The example from Some Thoughts above 
is one in which Locke explicitly highlights the mother for her work in disciplining her 
children in the home such that they form habits of being “good-natured” or kind to 
others.122 Later in the same text, Locke says that both mothers and fathers have the skills 
to “make his [the child’s] will supple and pliant to reason: teach him to love credit and 
commendation; to abhor being thought ill or meanly of.”123 The key here is that Locke 
explicitly places habit-formation in the hands of mothers alongside of fathers at least to 
some degree. He holds this position generally throughout his many and varied works. 
Consider comments made in the Second Treatise such as, “But in this power [dominion 
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over children] the Mother too has her share with the Father.”124 There is significant 
textual evidence that suggests Locke thought the mother shared the work of habit 
formation with the father, regardless of whether the father ultimately was more 
responsible for educating his children.  
More generally, Locke holds that mothers can be responsible for educating their 
children in ways that go beyond habit-formation. For example, Locke picks up on the 
Hobbesian point (see the previous chapter) that mothers can assist in habit formation by 
being a good example of obedience for her children. He says, “But, of all the ways 
whereby children are to be instructed, and their manners formed, the plainest, easiest, and 
most efficacious, is to set before their eyes the examples of those things you would have 
them do or avoid.”125 Given that Locke suggests that wives are subordinate to their 
husbands in the conjugal relationship,126 mothers can serve as just such an example of 
proper obedience for her children to follow.  
Another feature of education to which mothers can contribute is toward their 
children’s formal education. Again, even if the father is, on the whole, more responsible 
for this,127 mothers can either take it on in the absence of the father or share in those 
responsibilities directly. For example, Locke explicitly talks about mothers teaching their 
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sons Latin, a subject usually reserved for tutors or day-schools.128 Locke says that the 
child “would come himself to his mother to learn; and would not let his maid be quiet, till 
she heard him his lesson.”129 Later, he discusses a mother teaching her daughter French130 
and yet another mother teaching her child geography.131 
Part D: how Locke’s moral education leads to a civic role for mothers as parents 
 
The Lockean moral prescriptions parents inculcate are, I maintain, also civic in 
nature. There are two critical steps we must take to see the connection. (1) We must look 
closely at the limits Locke places on parental power. When we do this, we see that the 
limits to parental power are also limits to political power. This shows that Locke sees a 
close—but of course not necessarily causal—connection between the power parents 
exercise in the home and the power the governing body exercises. What this suggests to 
us is that the family unit is not wholly separate from civic society—the family exists in 
civic society and can help prepare children for civic life as adults. (2) We must also see 
that the moral obligations entailed by the natural law ground civic morality. When these 
are established, we see that morality is critical to Lockean society, and because parents 
have a duty to provide their children with this moral education, parenthood is civic in 
some sense.  
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(a) parental power and political power share limitations and goals: the family serves as a 
training ground for civic existence 
 
Locke’s discussion of the limits of parental rights over children’s property and life 
mirrors in many ways the limits he places on rulers’ powers over the ruled. For example, 
Locke explicitly says on several occasions that the magistrate or ruler’s power “cannot be 
an Absolute, Arbitrary Power over their Lives and Fortunes,” just as he suggests that 
parental power also cannot be absolute and arbitrary.132 In politics, power shifts from 
being a legitimate, political power to a despotical power when and only when the ruler 
has absolute, arbitrary power over life and death of his or her subjects.133 
Locke also references limits on the power of the ruler to take the property of the 
ruled, and this, too, mirrors precisely the limits Locke places on parental authority and 
children’s inheritance. The chief end, after all, of political society is to preserve 
individuals’ property, and when rulers seek to seize the property of the ruled, it is 
grounds for revolt. Locke makes this explicit when he says, “whenever the Legislators 
endeavour to take away, and destroy the Property of the People…they put themselves 
into a state of War with the People, who are thereupon absolved from any farther 
Obedience…[and] By this breach of Trust they forfeit the Power, the People had put into 
their hands.”134 In summary, the same limits that Locke places on parental power over 
their children are also the two key limits he places on political power. For Locke, 
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discussions of power tend to be framed in terms of the limits of power, but these limits do 
provide insight into the power that rulers or parents can exercise otherwise.135  
The striking similarities between how Locke treats parental and political power 
suggest to readers that the family can then be used as a sort of training ground to prepare 
children to be good citizens. (This is precisely the point that Hobbes suggests in his 
works as well.) Despite clear distinctions between civic existence and home life, it is not 
as if Locke thinks the home exists in some vacuum; that what happens in the home 
always stays in the home; that the attitudes and habits developed in the home have no 
bearing on one’s behavior outside of the home. I am not, of course, suggesting a 
Filmerian causal relationship between parental power and political power, nor am I 
saying that there is a conceptual relationship in which political power necessarily has its 
ground in parental power: indeed, these are just the sort of things Locke is arguing 
against. He takes great pains to distinguish his view from Filmer’s view that paternal 
right grounded political right. What I am suggesting, though, is that what is learned in the 
home has application also in civic life in the relationship of ruler over ruled, and that the 
only differences Locke wanted to draw between familial and political life (more narrowly 
construed than civic life in society) were whatever differences were required to show that 
Filmer’s patriarchal structure was incorrect. Let us not think that Locke meant to make 
the structures wholly separate as a result. Children learn what counts as a serious breach 
of their rights with respect to their parents first (in time). It is not a far stretch to say, then, 
that this preparation will make it easier for children become the kinds of adults that know 
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good governance in civic society when they see it. They are habituated to the law of 
nature in the home first, then they come to be able to see why it is sacred, and this better 
equips them to live it out in civic society.  
(b) Lockean society requires moral citizens for stability 
 
Recall that Locke’s conception of the natural law requires care for others: it is this 
care that acts as the foundation for morality in civil society. Locke says, “Every 
one…ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of Mankind, and may not unless it 
be to do Justice on an Offender, take away, or impair the life, or what tends to the 
Preservation of the Life, the Liberty, Health, Limb, or Goods of another.”136 The natural 
law dictates that we must not unduly harm one another. We must, instead, preserve one 
another as much as we possibly can so long as it does not endanger our own preservation. 
This gives us certain parameters for distinguishing how to behave, and if we take 
seriously the idea that how we ought to behave is what morality is trying to express, then 
we can say that the natural law is the foundation for discerning morally right actions from 
wrong actions. This preservation of others and self is the basis for entering Lockean civic 
society and for being a good Lockean citizen or subject.137  
The preservation of self and others is the very basis on which individuals enter 
Lockean civic society, and it remains the litmus test by which citizens can measure 
whether they should revolt; this indicates that the grounds for morality from natural 
society are imported into civic society. Consider Locke’s claim in the Second Treatise:  
																																																								
136 Locke, Two Treatises of Government, II.6. 




“Thus the Law of Nature stands as an Eternal Rule to all Men, Legislators as well as 
others. The Rules that they make for other Mens Actions, must, as well as their own i.e. 
to the Will of God, of which that is a Declaration, and the fundamental Law of Nature 
being the preservation of Mankind, no Humane Sanction can be good, or valid against 
it.”138  
 
The natural law is eternal and cannot be changed or altered by man-made laws. It stands 
across time and place. Hence, the moral obligations entailed by it also stand across time 
and place.  
Citizens, then, continue to have a moral duty to preserve themselves and others in 
society. And, in point of fact, without this care for others, the very stability of civic 
society is liable to collapse. Consider that without the duty to preserve one’s fellow 
citizens, there is little reason to answer a call to arms to defend your neighbor’s land in 
the event of invasion.139 Given that invasion is straightforwardly dangerous to the 
maintenance of the Commonwealth, Locke’s natural law does, in many respects, what 
Plato’s Noble Lie tried to do: it gives citizens a reason to care for one another, to preserve 
each other, to preserve the commonwealth insofar as it aids in the preservation of self and 
others.140  
Even without the threat of foreign invasion, civic virtue is also necessary for 
domestic peace and prosperity in Locke’s theory. Without a care for others, there is little 
reason to adhere to the laws of the commonwealth outside of punishment, and if most or 
																																																								
138 Locke, Two Treatises, II.135. 
139 In point of fact, Hobbes does not have this clause to care for others in his account of the natural law, and 
he actually explicitly says that a failure to defend one’s country is an instance of cowardice and not 
injustice in Chapter XXI of Leviathan. It is not, then, on his view, a violation of the social contract. 
Leviathan, XXI.16. 
140 Of course, if war would be unduly dangerous to the citizen, there still seem to be grounds in Locke to 
resist what the government was asking you to do, but then they would be grounds for revolt, and, as Locke 
notes, to revolt requires not just that one becomes personally inconvenienced; rather, the need for revolt 
arises if the government becomes a tyranny and expresses a settled design on the lives or liberties of the 




even a substantial portion of the commonwealth chose to transgress laws and harm the 
lives, liberties, or estates of their fellow citizens, the commonwealth, or any society, 
would have trouble enduring for lack of sufficient people to punish the transgressors or to 
grant those transgressors fair trials with impartial judges. Locke’s natural law is 
practically useful because it gives citizens a reason to be moral, and moral citizens are 
more easily governed than immoral ones who cause disorder in the commonwealth and 
must be subsequently captured and punished.  
The education parents provide for children, as established above, is one in which 
parents instill in their children a care for others, and this includes a desire to preserve 
others and the self-discipline to do without so that others may have enough. This is, in 
fact, a civic endeavor. The education parents provide makes it easier for their children to 
develop the character of a good citizen: one who cares about their fellow man and has 
self-discipline. It is in this respect that the moral education children receive is civic in 
nature. Lockean citizens must be moral, and because this shared morality underpins civil 
relationships in the commonwealth, the moral education children receive provides at least 
some substantial ground for the success of a Lockean civic society.  
Waldron supports my argument that parental education cultivates the requisite 
moral attitudes necessary to live in society but from the point of view of equality. He 
says:  
But the parent's role is not just to be the child's will; it is also to nurture and bring on a 
will in the child (related in the appropriate way to the child’s developing understanding), 
a will that will eventually make the substitution of the parent’s will for the child’s will 
unnecessary. So, as I said, the child is to be brought up and educated to a state of equality 
with adults. In addition, Locke emphasizes the importance of educating the child for 
equality [Waldron’s emphasis], so that he can take his place in a community of equals. 




greed for possessions, a need to boss others about, and peevishness when their desires are 
frustrated. These inclinations must be replaced, through education, with more moderate 
desires and a more respectful attitude towards others if the child is going to be able to 
take his place in the natural community of equals, and in any set of plausible social and 
political arrangements built up on that basis.141  
 
Here, Waldron is arguing that children must be habituated to value equality such that they 
are able to know its importance when they enter society. Children are not, in Locke’s 
picture, naturally kind to others. They are selfish, as evidenced by the girls’ desire to have 
many more pets than they can actually care for above, or as evidenced by any number of 
poor decisions Locke attributes to children throughout his works. The selfishness, 
inability to think of others, and inability to think of their own future must be stamped out, 
and the way Locke suggests to do it is by habituating children to better behaviors early in 
life. By punishing their children for bad behavior and providing for them examples of 
good behavior, parents actively play a role in habituating their children to be better 
citizens. Valuing equality, as I argue, is not the only quality necessary for a good 
Lockean citizen, and there is no reason why the same process of habituation that Waldron 
notes as being effective for equality cannot be generalized to cover other qualities present 
in the good Lockean citizen such as self-discipline, care for others, etc.  
 Given that mothers share in this responsibility to educate children along with 
fathers, then the degree to which fathers have a civic role via educating their children is 
shared by mothers in this role as well. It is no surprise, then, that when Locke talks about 
habituation to the natural law he references mothers as in the examples above.  
 
																																																								






Scholars, and in particular Pateman, have overlooked mothers’ civic role in 
Locke’s works. Because mothers share in the duties of parenthood, they play a part in 
habituating children to live in society, to be self-disciplined individuals who care for and 
preserve others as much as possible according to the dictates of the natural law. It does 
not matter if women are subordinated through the conjugal contract, and in some sense, 
the scholarly debate so far is responsible for obscuring this connection between mothers 
and civic life. One of the biggest reasons scholars have overlooked this role is because 
they have not considered the relationships among Lockean education, the natural law, 
morality, politics, and parental power. In Section 1, I laid the ground work to see these 
relationships by showing that mothers share parental responsibilities with fathers 
regardless of who, between Pateman or Waldron, has the correct conception of Locke’s 
conjugal relationship. My position is flexible: it allows Locke scholars to affirm or deny 
Pateman’s criticisms of Locke—that Locke perhaps maintains a patriarchal structure as 
part of his theory—while acknowledging that women could be subordinated to men in 
other ways. And whether one agrees with Waldron or Pateman, my picture allows readers 
to see that gender roles are complicated for Locke and that mothers may play a civic role 
for Locke even if a woman is subordinated as a wife. Indeed, it is likely that the reason 
Pateman missed the role of mothers in civic socialization is because she focused almost 
exclusively on drawing out a criticism of Locke as, in fact, still a patriarchal thinker 





Only when one sees that the natural law is moral can one see how Locke’s 
educative prescriptions prepare children to come to know the natural law. Once one 
makes this connection, one also sees who is responsible for preparing children to come to 
know the natural law. Then and only then can one finally see the civic dimension of 
motherhood in Locke’s works: mothers are useful for civic socialization. In this respect, 
mothers help in forging the kinds of citizens necessary for Locke’s picture of a fully-
functioning civic society. Without this education, it is not clear whether children will 
become adults who subscribe to the natural law, and without such adults, it is unclear 











 That this project results in a more robust understanding of Hobbes’ and Locke’s 
educational programs or conceptions of mothers is perhaps fairly straightforward; 
however, when we attempt to reason through the moral and political implications for 
mothers that result from their roles in civic socialization, we see that their role as agents 
of civic socialization complicate the moral status of motherhood. In what follows, I use 
Wollstonecraft to show that motherhood—even when motherhood requires highly-
educated women who understand politics, history, and science—has complex moral 
implications for early modern political theories such as those of Hobbes and Locke. The 
role is not necessarily straightforwardly problematic; nor is it a situation in which 
mothers’ subordination is clearly unproblematic. What the study of Wollstonecraft brings 
to light, in short, is a deep tension between the conception of mothering or motherhood 
and the conception of such liberal values as freedom and equality.  
Until the 1990s, scholars primarily cited Wollstonecraft (1759-1797) in terms of 
her positive contributions to minimizing women’s social and civic subordination, and she 
is chiefly championed for advocating for women’s educational equality and subsequent 
financial independence.142 In particular, Wollstonecraft’s educational reform is largely 
																																																								
142 Wollstonecraft’s claim that women’s purported intellectual shortcomings were the result of poor 
education was not new, even in her own time. “Mary Astell, Poulain de la Barre, Judith Drake, and 
Catharine Macaulay had all made this point previously, and writers like Hays, Mary Robinson, Olympe de 
Gouges, Judith Sargent Murray, and Charles Brockden Brown were contemporaneously arguing in similar 




taken as offering an alternative to a strict sex-based division of labor that places women 
in a subordinate role in the home and men in a dominant role in civic society.143 
However, in my reading, Wollstonecraft—knowingly or unknowingly—preserves 
sex-based divisions of labor. This can be seen in her educational reform. Wollstonecraft’s 
educational reform is primarily for the purpose of making women into better wives and 
mothers and not primarily focused on preparing women for employment outside of the 
home or, as I will show, advocating for women’s general civic equality.  
The idea that women are responsible for instilling civic virtue in children is one 
that I maintain appears in the liberal tradition through Hobbes and Locke, but in 
Wollstonecraft, I argue that we see its fullest expression: the civic importance of 
caretaking requires that we educate women like men. Although this will benefit women 
to some degree and better their situation in the home, I will show that Wollstonecraft’s 
project is limited and, in fact, entails a sex-based division of labor that likely re-
entrenches women’s subordinate status in civic life. This division of labor is useful for re-
evaluating Hobbes’ and Locke’s treatments of mothers as agents of civic socialization. It 
can help us to see the ways in which motherhood is morally and civically complex. On 
																																																																																																																																																																					
acknowledge the validity of this point in her conservative and evangelical Strictures on Female Education 
(1799).”  
Kirstin R. Wilcox. “Vindicating Paradoxes: Mary Wollstonecraft's ‘Woman’,” Studies in Romanticism 48, 
no. 3 (2009): 449-50, http://www.jstor.org/stable/27867283. 
143 “Private sphere” is not Wollstonecraft’s term. Instead, she use phrases such as “domestic concerns” and 
“private duties” to describe practices pertaining to the family and home life (child bearing, child-rearing, 
and household management). The term “private sphere” is a tool of much later feminists to refer to the 
home, the personal, and the nonpolitical (and non-civic). I use it here because it is a single, consistent term 
which captures the institutions with which Wollstonecraft was concerned. Similarly, the term “public 
sphere” is a useful term that encompasses the economic and civic happenings that Wollstonecraft discusses 




the one hand, mothers get a civic role; on the other hand, this role might very well render 
them ultimately less able to participate in civic society more generally.  
This chapter is divided into six sections. Section 1 is a reconstruction of 
Wollstonecraft’s argument for educational reform. In Section 2, Parts A and B, I present 
two ways in which scholars have traditionally understood Wollstonecraft on the 
relationship between women’s education and civic life, and in Part C, I situate my 
interpretation within the notable views of current scholarship. In Section 3, I offer an 
alternative interpretation of Wollstonecraft that demonstrates her theory contains a sex-
based division of labor. In Section 4, Parts A and B, I show how my reading 
demonstrates a particular set of limitations in Wollstonecraft’s logic, namely, that her 
theory likely results in a sex-based division of labor and the formation of a class of 
women whose greatest hope is to become highly educated housewives.144 In Section 5, 
Parts A and B, I address objections to my interpretation. 
A few words of note are worth mentioning. First, readers should note 
Wollstonecraft’s context when considering both Vindications. Wollstonecraft is primarily 
writing about white, middle and upper class women, who—by 18th century English 
																																																								
144 Bernard Mandeville, “An Essay on Charity, and Charity-schools,” in The Fable of the Bees: or, Private 
Vices, Public Benefits, ed. F.B. Kaye (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1988), 253-322, 
http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/846. This parallels Mandeville’s argument in “An Essay on Charity, and 
Charity Schools.” There, he argues that poor children educated in charity schools in the arts of reading, 
writing, arithmetic, and Latin (among other fields) are being educated to perform works that—because of 
their station—they will never actually be fit to pursue. Although Mandeville and I come to different 
conclusions (Mandeville argues that these students should simply not receive this type of education; 
whereas, I suggest that women ought to be allowed access to both an education on par with that of men and 
to pursue employment that would make use of that education, and that this is—in fact—the crux of the 
problem with Wollstonecraft’s program.)  
Please see also Moira Ferguson, “Mary Wollstonecraft and the Problematic of Slavery,” in Colonialism and 
Gender Relations from Mary Wollstonecraft to Jamaica Kincaid: East Caribbean Connections (New York: 




standards—were often in charge of overseeing household activities which included but 
were not limited to child-rearing, managing servants (if there were any) and household 
finances, among other things.145 There are works in which Wollstonecraft begins to reach 
out to discuss women in lower socio-economic classes and of different races, most 
notably, Maria: or, the Wrongs of Woman. In Maria: or, the Wrongs of Woman, 
Wollstonecraft’s characterization of Jemima suggests that women of lower classes could 
be saved from prostitution by better education. However, as scholars of the Vindications 
have noted, “the schooling she proposes for working-class women falls well short of that 
required to practise medicine or business” in 18th century England.146 The issues of race147 
and class148 in Wollstonecraft are rich enough to warrant a separate space. For now, it is 
important to note that the women with which Wollstonecraft was concerned in the 
Vindications were white, well-to-do women. Other versions of motherhood—other races’ 
																																																								
145 There has been some debate about whether Wollstonecraft’s primary audience consisted of middle class 
women or men, but the consensus is that the audience is middle-class at the very least. For more on this 
debate, please see Amy Elizabeth Smith, “Roles for Readers in Mary Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication of the 
Rights of Woman,” Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900 32, no. 3 (1992): 555-70, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/450921. Please also see the following: Anca Vlasopolos, “Mary 
Wollstonecraft’s Mask of Reason in A Vindication of the Rights of Woman,” Dalhousie Review 60, no. 3 
(Autumn 1980): 462-71. Laurie A. Finke, “‘A Philosophic Wanton’: Language and Authority in 
Wollstonecraft’s Vindication of the Rights of Woman,” in The Philosopher as Writer: The Eighteenth 
Century, ed. Robert Ginsberg (Selinsgrove, PA: Susquehanna University Press, 1987), 155-76. Kathleen 
McCormack, “The Sybil and the Hyena: George Eliot’s Wollstonecraftian Feminism,” Dalhousie Review 
63, no. 4 (Sept., 1999): 427-50.  
146 Susan Ferguson, “The Radical Ideas of Mary Wollstonecraft,” Canadian Journal of Political 
Science/Revue canadienne de science politique 32, no. 3 (Sept., 1999): 427-50, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3232731. 
147 For more on Wollstonecraft and race, please see Ferguson, “Mary Wollstonecraft and the Problematic of 
Slavery,” 288-98. 
Please see also Scott Juengel, “Countenancing History: Mary Wollstonecraft, Samuel Stanhope Smith, and 
Enlightenment Racial Science,” ELH 68, no. 4 (Winter, 2001): 897-927, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/30031999. 
148 For an interesting discussion of the relationship between women and class rank in the Vindications, 
please see: Wilcox, “Vindicating Paradoxes: Mary Wollstonecraft’s ‘Woman’,” 455. 
Please see also Anne K. Mellor, introduction to Maria: or, The Wrongs of Woman, by Mary Wollstonecraft 
(New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1994), x. 




experiences of motherhood or the experience of motherhood in lower economic classes—
are largely excluded from Wollstonecraft’s considerations in the Vindications.  
Second, a word about classification: Many scholars believe that Wollstonecraft’s 
attachments to this or that writer or this or that theoretical framework are critical to 
understanding her work and particularly her insight into the plight of women in the 17th 
and 18th centuries. The most popular way to categorize Wollstonecraft is within the 
liberal tradition.149 Scholars who label Wollstonecraft a “liberal” cite the frequency with 
which she responded to liberal thinkers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau or Thomas Paine, 
and the importance of her academic relationship with mentors such as Richard Price and 
Joseph Priestley.150 Others cite Wollstonecraft’s reverence for rights and their extension 
to wider and wider swaths of the population as evidence that she is primarily a liberal 
thinker.151  
There are, however, other (perhaps complimentary) ways to categorize 
Wollstonecraft. Some suggest Wollstonecraft is better understood as a republican 
thinker.152 Virginia Sapiro notes Wollstonecraft’s refusal to keep separate the public and 
private spheres and interprets this refusal as evidence that she could not have been a 
																																																								
149 Barbara Taylor, “Mary Wollstonecraft and the Wild Wish of Early Feminism,” History Workshop no. 33 
(Spring, 1992): 197-219, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4289149. Sapiro seconds this conundrum. Virginia 
Sapiro, A Vindication of Political Virtue (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), xx. 
150 Sapiro, A Vindication of Political Virtue, xx. 
151 “One reading of the book is that it called for extending the ‘rights of man’ to women, leading to an 
interpretation of Wollstonecraft as the consummate liberal of the later Enlightenment.”  
Sapiro, A Vindication of Political Virtue, 28. 
152 Sapiro, A Vindication of Political Virtue, xx. Please see also: Susan James, “Mary Wollstonecraft’s 
Conception of Rights,” in The Social and Political Philosophy of Mary Wollstonecraft, ed. Sandrine Bergès 
and Alan Coffee, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 148-65; Lena Halldenius, Mary Wollstonecraft 
and Feminist Republicanism: Independence, Rights and the Experience of Unfreedom (London: Routledge, 
2016); Alan Coffee, “Freedom as Independence: Mary Wollstonecraft and the Grand Blessing of Life,” 





liberal theorist, since the separation of the spheres has been taken to be a marker of a 
liberal theorist.153 This notion is seconded by Martina Reuter, as evidenced by her recent 
presentation “Mary Wollstonecraft on Natural Duties.”154 Still others classify her in 
different traditions. Daniel Engster says Wollstonecraft is “better understood as a feminist 
care theorist.”155 And some, such as Baker-Benfield, align her with virtue theory.156  
But Wollstonecraft, of course, did not classify herself. She was concerned with 
presenting coherent views, and she borrowed from different traditions in order to forge 
her own particular arguments. She was, in short, heavily influenced by a whole host of 
thinkers who wrote before and during her time. It can be useful to trace her liberal or 
republican influences as part of her context; however, my argument shows that regardless 
of Wollstonecraft’s classification, if we take seriously her claims about sex-based 
differences in duties, there is a tension in her work that creates serious limitations for her 
project and perhaps limitations for any project in which a woman’s value is tied to her 
role in the civic socialization of children. As I argue below, there is a tension between 
suggesting that mothers should be free and equal to fathers (as women and men, 
respectively) while simultaneously holding that mothers should stay home and raise the 
children and not have an equal share in life in civic society. What is more, classifying 
Wollstonecraft in this or that particular way will not alleviate this tension. 
																																																								
153 Sapiro, A Vindication of Political Virtue, 165. 
154 Martina Reuter, “Mary Wollstonecraft on Natural Duties” (American Political Science Association. San 
Francisco, September 5, 2015). 
155 Daniel Engster, “Mary Wollstonecraft’s Nurturing Liberalism: Between an Ethic of Justice and Care,” 
The American Political Science Review 95, no. 3 (Sept., 2001): 577, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3118234. 
156 “Wollstonecraft is most often interpreted as a liberal theorist, but some scholars place her thought within 
the classical republican tradition and interpret her as a virtue theorist (Baker-Benfield 1989; Johnson 1995; 
Landes 1988; Sapiro 1992).” 




Section 1: Wollstonecraft’s argument for educational reform 
	
 In this section, I reconstruct Wollstonecraft’s argument for educational reform to 
show some of the benefits Wollstonecraft thinks follow from it. On her view, educational 
reform betters not only women’s virtue157 but also the virtue of society. Grounding 
Wollstonecraft’s argument for equality in women’s education is a distinction between 
justifiable, “natural” distinctions of rank and unjustifiable, “unnatural” distinctions of 
rank.158 She draws this distinction by saying that the Christian God gives human beings 
certain rights from birth,159 the most germane of which are human’s superior160 
rationality161, and relatedly, liberty.162  
 Rationality and liberty are central to drawing just distinction for two reasons. (1) 
Rationality is, for Wollstonecraft, the God-given difference between humans and 
animals.163 (2) The free exercise of one’s reason leads to the cultivation of virtue.164 
																																																								
157 It bears mentioning that the term “virtue” is complicated for Wollstonecraft. It is in large part a 
conception rooted in Christianity; however, it is not synonymous with Christian virtue. For a concise 
consideration of Wollstonecraft’s conception of virtue, please see: Sapiro, A Vindication of Political Virtue, 
74. 
158 I will use the terms “unjustified” and “unnatural” interchangeably, following Wollstonecraft’s own 
usages in her works. She seems to have the same referents for both terms in mind. 
159 Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Men, 12-13.  
Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, 79-82.  
160 By “superior”, Wollstonecraft means superior in comparison with the rest of the animal kingdom. She 
takes this rational superiority to be grounded in humanity’s being crafted in the image of God. 
Consequently, she believes that rationality carries with it a sort of divine stamp of approval as a way to 
distinguish social positions.  
Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Men, 12-13.  
Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, 110. 
161 By “rationality” Wollstonecraft means “the simple power of improvement; or, more properly speaking, 
of discerning truth.” 
Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, 127. 
162 Her view of liberty is a sort of contractarian conception: “a degree of liberty, civil and religious, as is 
compatible with the liberty of every other individual with whom he is united in a social compact, and the 
continued existence of that compact.” Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Men, 7. 




Taken altogether, Wollstonecraft is advocating for a sort of meritocracy wherein 
individuals who exercise their reason to become virtuous and work hard are rewarded for 
their efforts with greater esteem.165  
 Unjust distinctions of rank, which include distinctions based on race,166 
inheritance of property,167 and inheritance of titles168, are then any distinctions not 
founded upon a superiority in virtue, talent, or merit.169 Such distinctions are particularly 
pernicious because they act as impediments to individuals’ rights to cultivate and exercise 
their reason, enjoy freedom, and gain independence.170  
 Wollstonecraft argues that sex is an unjust distinction of rank. Because women 
are men’s companions, they must be the same kind of beings as men; hence, they must be 
																																																																																																																																																																					
164 For Wollstonecraft it is not enough to accidentally make a virtuous choice or make virtuous choices 
because one has been told to do so. Instead, to be virtuous one must freely exercise one’s reason.  
For an interesting discussion of the relationship between unjust rankings and hierarchy, please see: 
Marguerite Deslauries, “Two Conceptions of Inequality and Natural Difference,” Canadian Journal of 
Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique 37, no. 4 (Dec., 2004): 787-809 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/25165729. While much of what I say dovetails with her argument, I disagree 
with the interpretation that Wollstonecraft held an anti-hierarchical stance on all fronts. Please see also: 
Martina Reuter, “The Role of the Passions in Mary Wollstonecraft’s Notion of Virtue,” in The Social and 
Political Philosophy of Mary Wollstonecraft, ed. Sandrine Bergès and Alan Coffee, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016), 50-66. 
165 This picture is further reinforced by Wollstonecraft’s usage of terms such as “talent” and “merit” 
throughout both Vindications. Further research needs to be done, though, with regard to whether 
Wollstonecraft draws a meaningful distinction among talents, merits, and virtue. For the time being, it is 
enough to note that these three notions are aligned with a just distinction among human beings.  
166 Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Men, 13. 
167 Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Men, 7, 9, 23. 
168 She makes this point particularly salient when discussing the relationship of titled, young pupils and 
their older, more learned teachers.  
Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Men, 38-9. 
169 Or, for that matter, in possibility or potential development of virtue, talent, or merit. 
170 It bears noting that there are certain limitations to the development of virtue that are not, even upon 
Wollstonecraft’s scheme, problematic. For example: individuals born with severe cognitive impairments do 
have concrete limitations on the extent to which they can develop their reason. Wollstonecraft’s point here 
is that those sorts of impediments are unavoidable; whereas, distinctions based upon rank (for example) are 





rational.171 If women are the same kind of beings as men, then it follows on 
Wollstonecraft’s scheme that virtue must be the same for women as for men, if not in 
degree,172 at least in kind. Consequently, Wollstonecraft argues that “their conduct should 
be founded on the same principles, and have the same aim.”173 The aim she seems to have 
in mind here is something like becoming a better human being.174 Because their virtues 
are the same, Wollstonecraft concludes that women’s subordination to men (particularly 
in marriage) is unjust.175 
Wollstonecraft observes that women’s subordination is perpetuated by institutions 
that “systematize oppression.”176 The tools used to oppress—or here subordinate—
women are the “partial laws and customs of society.”177 Wollstonecraft notes that it is in 
the interest of men, who hold civic and social power, to maintain the status quo. In 
particular, when women are kept away from education and productive means of 
employment, men end up with “slaves” or “play-thing[s].”178 Hirschmann helps to clarify 
																																																								
171 Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Men, 48. 
172 Wollstonecraft does indeed grant women’s inferiority—at least in part. She is willing to allow that “from 
the constitution of their bodies [my emphasis], men seem to be designed by Providence to attain a greater 
degree of virtue….but I see not the shadow of a reason to conclude that their virtues should differ in respect 
to their nature.” 
Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, 95. See also: Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the 
Rights of Woman, 110, 139. 
173 Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, 94-5. 
174 She is not saying that all individuals should be doing precisely the same kinds of things to better 
themselves. She does want to admit for differences in talent or fit. For example, someone who is 
mathematically-inclined may cultivate their reason through the study of math; whereas, someone who is 
artistically-inclined may cultivate their reason through pursuit of artistic endeavors. She’s talking about the 
pursuit of virtue as something like personal betterment or pursuit of excellence, and she thinks this is 
inextricably tied to people’s freedom and reason, as I note above.  
175 Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, 235. 
176 Wollstonecraft was using this term roughly to signal subordination and not “oppression” as 
contemporary readers of feminist philosophy would recognize it.  
Wollstonecraft, Maria: or, The Wrongs of Woman, 12. 
177 Wollstonecraft, Maria: or, The Wrongs of Woman, 5. 




what it means for women to live under systematized subordination: “Women's choices 
are constructed for them under conditions of systematic inequality, [consequently, 
women]…make all sorts of choices that are not just bad for themselves, but in themselves 
‘unfree.’ That is, they are ‘choices’ that they have been conditioned to make by 
circumstances.”179 During Wollstonecraft’s time, for example, women could not choose 
to become doctors or attorneys, as they were barred from attaining the requisite education 
and credentials necessary to publicly practice on a large scale.180 Instead, often the best 
choices open to them were with regard to what man to marry to better their station. In this 
respect, their choices were constrained and, as Wollstonecraft notes, markedly unfree.  
Chief among the tools used to perpetuate women’s subordination is women’s 
education.181 Educational programs,182 including those espoused by Dr. Gregory183 and 
																																																								
179 Nancy J. Hirschmann, “Choosing Betrayal,” Perspectives on Politics 8, no. 1 (Mar., 2010): 272, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/25698535.  
See also Sapiro, A Vindication of Political Virtue, 124. 
180 In point of fact, women had earned higher degrees in Italy and Sweden prior to Wollstonecraft’s time, 
but the societal norms in England prevented women from achieving the same distinction until the late 
1800s. 
181 “Education”, for Wollstonecraft, is not confined to the classroom. As Sapiro explains,  
“the use of the term, ‘education’ is not the current restricted notion of instruction, particularly in schools, 
but the broader sense more common in her day, more like our current conception of ‘child-raising’ or 
‘socialization.’ The unfortunate result of this common misinterpretation is that Wollstonecraft is often 
posed as offering ‘only’ education (meaning formal schooling) as the solution to women's problems.” 
Sapiro, A Vindication of Political Virtue, 27-8. 
182 Often such an education did not require formal lessons in a school; rather, the education Wollstonecraft 
railed against was more pervasive, something akin to a sort of socialization that crossed socio-economic 
boundaries. 
Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, 91. 
183 Dr. John Gregory, Father’s Legacy to his Daughters (Edinburgh, 1799), Eighteenth Century Collections 
Online, http://find.galegroup.com.ezproxy.bu.edu/ecco/infomark.do?&source=gale&prodId=ECCO 
&userGroupName=bost84371&tabID=T001&docId=CB128002888&type=multipage&contentSet=ECCO
Articles&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE. Dr. Gregory was one of the foremost authorities on 




Rousseau,184 were focused on skills to help women in their roles within the domestic 
sphere: being good wives and mothers. These programs advocated sex-based divisions of 
labor. Wollstonecraft argues that conventional women’s education, whether in or out of a 
school building, prevents women from becoming economically independent or 
intellectually equal to men and results in both (1) a lack of freedom for women185 and (2) 
a bevy of societal ills including an increase in the spread of vice. 
 With regard to the loss of freedom, Wollstonecraft argues women’s conventional 
education renders them unable to secure virtue or become independent. To give 
themselves a better chance at an advantageous marriage and subsequent self-
improvement, women must pay great attention to their appearance, since pretty women 
have more opportunities for good marriages. Their education, Wollstonecraft argues, 
shapes itself to the purpose of beautification, and women subsequently become heavily 
invested in their appearance.186 The impractical aspects of beautification become common 
practice for women. They learn that it is to their benefit to obey others and relinquish 
their freedom for a life of dependency.187 
The societal ills caused by an education in dependency are many and varied. In 
general, Wollstonecraft believes that inequality is harmful to society (“Among unequals 
there can be no society.”)188 Unjust inequalities are problematic for several reasons, (1) 
																																																								
184 Please see Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile or On Education, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic 
Books, 1979).  
185 Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, 120-21, 87. 
186 Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, 115. 
187 In this, Wollstonecraft was far ahead of her time, suggesting that in reducing women’s utility to their 
ability to find a mate and reproduce, women have been made to believe that they have no other 
opportunities for self-advancement. 




they impede friendship which is at least helpful and at most crucial to forging the social 
ties necessary for stable political life,189 and (2) they reinforce social, economic, and civic 
gaps between the unequal parties which fosters an environment likely to produce 
animosity among members of society;190 however, women’s subordination carries with it 
a third problem that Wollstonecraft recognizes: (3) it makes them less fit to be wives and 
mothers, and therefore impedes the passing on of an education necessary to foster public 
spirit. She makes this explicit when she says things like, “Public spirit must be nurtured 
by private virtue, or it will resemble the factitious sentiment which makes women careful 
to preserve their reputation and men their honour.”191 
If we take seriously Wollstonecraft’s assertions regarding the importance of 
motherhood192 and relationship between the cultivation of private virtue and public 
																																																								
189 Friendship cannot come from unjust inequalities because unjust inequality gets its power from a “great 
subordination of rank.” What we have, then, is a case of what Wollstonecraft calls “domination.” One 
individual is rendered dependent or submissive to another, and both are subsequently less incentivized to 
use their reason or work toward virtue, as they can rely upon reputation or wealth to garner esteem. 
Without virtue among individuals, there is little hope for genuine friendship to develop; and, although 
Wollstonecraft only hints at this point, without friendship, there is little hope that civic and social ties will 
be strong enough to foster virtues, engender moral behavior, or remain strong in the face of adversity. 
Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Women, 61, 84. 
190 Wollstonecraft says, “The preposterous distinctions of rank…divid[e] the world between voluptuous 
tyrants, and cunning envious dependents, [and] corrupt, almost equally, every class of people.” 
Wollstonecraft is here describing what the way in which institutions of power reinforce themselves by 
creating more dependents and denying others from sharing in titles or wealth. Such behaviors serve to both 
widen the gulf between unequals and create situations in which tyrannies are likely to appear. Assuming 
that both injustice and tyranny are destructive to political regimes (tyrannies are apt to be overthrown and 
result in societal unrest), then my interpretation clarifies why unjust rankings are pernicious to the health 
and wellbeing of society for Wollstonecraft.  
Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Women, 234. 
191 Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, 229. 
She also suggests a direct connection on p. 239: “But in order to render their [women’s] private virtue a 
public benefit…” Again on p. 70, “The box of mischief thus opened in society, what is to preserve private 
virtue, the only security of public freedom and universal happiness?” 
192 For example, calls motherhood an “indispensable duty,” that is “the peculiar destination of woman.” 




virtue,193 then it is indeed problematic for the whole of society, when women lack 
adequate education.194 An education promoting coquetry and falsity—the sort of 
education that one needs to acquire a husband—actually inhibits women’s ability to then 
do their duty as good mothers because it promotes a selfishness and an ignorance 
incompatible with the duties of motherhood.195 Good mothers need sense to help their 
children form their minds and temperaments such that the children become productive 
members of society,196 and they need to be selfless to devote themselves wholly to 
bettering other beings.197  
To remedy these problems, Wollstonecraft proposes that women be educated 
alongside men. By this, she means that women should learn the same kinds of things as 
men (presumably a school-based curriculum) and that women ought to “endeavour to 
acquire human virtues (or perfections) by the same means as men.”198 Although she does 
not go into detail regarding the specifics of this new education, she does explicitly say 
that women should have the opportunity to study anatomy, medicine, morality, and 
																																																								
193  Wollstonecraft draws an explicit connection in the text. She says, “Public spirit must be nurtured by 
private virtue, or it will resemble the factitious sentiment which makes women careful to preserve their 
reputation and men their honour. A sentiment that often exists unsupported by virtue, unsupported by that 
sublime morality which makes the habitual breach of one duty a breach of the whole moral law." 
Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, 229. 
194 For more on Wollstonecraft’s discussion of public spirit, please see: Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the 
Rights of Woman, 229. 
195 Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, 288. 
196 Taylor supports this reading when she notes that mothers will “tolerate no social injustice.” 
Barbara Taylor, Mary Wollstonecraft and the Feminist Imagination (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), 235. 
197 Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, 243. 




political history.199 The ramifications of this education, though, are debated among 
Wollstonecraft scholars. 
Section 2: how others have understood Wollstonecraft 
	
To date, scholars have largely focused upon three benefits of Wollstonecraft’s 
educational reform: (1) wives become better companions and friends for their husbands, 
(2) mothers serve as the foundation for a stronger, more virtuous familial unit, and (3) 
women are able to ensure their own economic independence regardless of their marital 
status. By minimizing vice and securing virtue in their own homes, Wollstonecraft 
suggests that the whole of society will become more virtuous. Scholars, however, have 
interpreted the relationships between women’s education, their domestic roles, and civic 
society differently.  
Part A: interpreting Wollstonecraft: the private sphere does not impact the public sphere 
 
One way of interpreting Wollstonecraft is to follow Susan Ferguson and argue 
that a Wollstonecraftian education does not “disrupt the structural separation of public 
and private spheres.”200 Ferguson sees Wollstonecraft’s emphasis on women’s education 
as limited to “the effect marriage and the household have on women’s character 
formation.” Consequently, improvements to women’s characters have no civic impact. 
Ferguson concludes that it is “not at all clear that Wollstonecraft’s ideal rational domestic 
																																																								
199 Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, 274. 
200 Ferguson, “The Radical Ideas of Mary Wollstonecraft,” 445. Roughly speaking, when Ferguson talks 
about the private sphere, she is talking about the home; when she talks about the public sphere, she is 




sphere would be any more politicized [civic] or any less isolated from the economic 
realm, than the irrational sphere she wants it to replace.”201  
Part B: interpreting Wollstonecraft: the public and private spheres as shared 
 
A second popular interpretation is represented by Sapiro.202 In her reading, 
Wollstonecraft has largely collapsed the distinction between the public and private 
spheres, between the home and broader society.203 As a result, men and women’s roles 
end up having both private and civic dimensions. The resulting picture is this: whether 
women work in the home as mothers or hold a job outside of the home, there is reason to 
think that they are contributing to the development of public and private virtue. The same 
goes for men in their endeavors.  
There are two central advantages to this interpretation. First, it explains why 
Wollstonecraft would think that motherhood has a civic dimension despite primarily 
occurring in the home. Second, it would clarify why Wollstonecraft holds positions such 
as, “for public affections, as well as public virtues, must ever grow out of the private 
character,”204 yet suggest that for women to cultivate their virtue, there must be changes 
to the public sphere.  
																																																								
201 Ferguson, “The Radical Ideas of Mary Wollstonecraft,” 446. 
202 Others hold similar positions, but like Sapiro, they do not consider the limitations of Wollstonecraft’s 
view. 
Please see: Elissa S. Guralnick, “Radical Politics in Mary Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication of the Rights of 
Woman,” in Mary Wollstonecraft and the Critics, 1788-2001, ed. Harriet Devine Jump (New York: 
Routledge, 2003), 340-50.  
203 “Wollstonecraft consistently refused to draw a clear line between the ‘public’ and ‘private’ spheres of 
life, and stood behind a more holistic and integrated notion of civic virtue that had a venerable history but 
was being submerged in the more forceful currents leading toward a belief in natural distinction between 
public and private.” 
Sapiro, A Vindication of Political Virtue, 179. 




  What is the payoff to arguing for an interpretation of Wollstonecraft in which men 
and women partake in one another’s traditionally-appointed spheres? In part, Sapiro’s 
point is that it is not quite right to categorize Wollstonecraft squarely in the liberal 
tradition. She takes crystallized differences between the public and private spheres to be a 
“cornerstone” of the liberal tradition.205 Sapiro then leverages her reading to suggest that 
Wollstonecraft is better understood as a republican who perhaps shared in some aspects 
of the liberal tradition.206 Beyond her concern with classification, though, the payoff is 
this: men and women have strong reasons to help one another. Given that the family “was 
the foundation on which public virtue rested,”207 men would have a newfound 
responsibility to cultivate public virtue by participating in home life. In parallel, Sapiro 
suggests that women will learn to “become truly virtuous” by expanding their affections 
“outward to include ‘universal benevolence.’”208  
Part C: the compatibility (or not) of my reading with other interpretations 
 
My interpretation of Wollstonecraft is in line with parts of both Ferguson’s 
reading and Sapiro’s reading. As I argue below, part of what Ferguson is pointing to is 
correct:  Wollstonecraft’s conception of the home, filled with educated mothers, does not 
really get women any closer to civic agency or social equality on par with men (and it is 
																																																								
205 Sapiro, A Vindication of Political Virtue, 165. 
206 This seems to be a reasonable position to take with respect to classifying Wollstonecraft in a tradition. 
She is hard to put in a single box, but she does certainly share key characteristic primarily with both the 
liberal and republican traditions. As such, her work can be a useful lens through which to see the 
similarities or compatibility between the two traditions.  
207 Here Sapiro notes Wollstonecraft’s own words: “‘Public education, of every denomination, should be 
directed to form citizens; but if you wish to make good citizens, you must first exercise the affections of a 
son and a brother. This is the only way to expand the heart; for public affections, as well as public virtues, 
must ever grow out of the private character’ (VW 231).” Sapiro, A Vindication of Political Virtue, 178. 




unclear that we should expect it to do so). However, I maintain that Ferguson’s position 
is something of an overstatement when she says that the central problem in 
Wollstonecraft’s picture is that the effects of educational reform are only immediately felt 
by women. To be sure, women are the first to feel different when they are educated 
differently; however, if we take Wollstonecraft at her word that such an education would 
help to foster virtue in society generally, then the household, marriage, and women’s 
characters can have significant influence upon the civic realm, not only via the formation 
of citizens, but also by making society better. The more virtue women have, and the more 
they can pass on virtue to children, then the more virtue society has collectively.  
Sapiro’s position and my own may well be compatible on many levels (perhaps, 
for instance, it is the case that the spheres mutually influence one another); however, 
Sapiro has been slightly too optimistic in her conclusions. Unlike Sapiro, who stresses the 
shared duties of men and women in both spheres, I maintain that the different duties men 
and women have are civically and socially significant. Catriona MacKenzie sums it up 
well when she says, Wollstonecraft’s “concern is to understand the kind of moral 
character required in order to achieve justice in the public realm and genuine reciprocity 
in the private. But what motivates this concern is a recognition that male and female 
embodiment are different and that this difference has ethical and political significance.”209 
By focusing on these differences, I am able to draw attention to limitations of 
Wollstonecraft’s scheme. 
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Section 3: women’s domestic roles do not erase all distinction between the public 
and private spheres 
 
In this part, I argue that even though Wollstonecraft can be understood as saying 
that women’s role in the private sphere is partially a civic role, this does not necessarily 
mean that the spheres lack all distinction. Despite significant overlap between the 
spheres, there is still room for a sex-based division of labor, and we see this when we 
look at Wollstonecraft’s statements about duty. An alternative to Sapiro’s picture is to 
understand Wollstonecraft as suggesting that although men and women can and should 
move between the spheres, there are some duties that preclude the participation of one 
sex or the other.  
Part A: motherhood is a civic role 
 
First, let us consider the evidence that demonstrates that women’s caretaking role 
as mothers is partially a civic role. Wollstonecraft presents educated mothers as 
benefiting the commonwealth in three ways: (1) by modeling patriotism for their 
children; (2) by demonstrating a love of humanity which subsequently reinforces the 
lasting bonds of camaraderie necessary for civil society; and (3) by inculcating children 
with “public spirit,” which Wollstonecraft specifically discusses as a civic activity that 
happens in the home. 
With regard to modeling patriotic behavior for children, Wollstonecraft says that 
if “children are to be educated to understand the true principle of patriotism, their mother 
must be a patriot; and the love of mankind, from which an orderly train of virtues spring, 




education and situation of woman, at present, shuts her out from such investigations.”210 
Here, we see that mothers must be well-educated to be patriots if their children are to 
become patriots, and so here we see that Wollstonecraft has placed responsibility for 
patriotism squarely in the hands of mothers.  
Next, I maintain that Wollstonecraft associates women with the cultivation of 
their children’s virtue more generally. Despite often addressing “parents,”211 she 
frequently writes somewhat ambiguously when talking about the impact mothers and 
fathers have upon children. Presumably, mothers and fathers are both supposed to assist 
with child rearing on her picture; however, when she talks about the ways in which 
children can be raised wrongly—by not allowing their reason to develop,212 neglecting 
children, etc.—she finds fault with mothers for ruining their children.213 The upshot is 
this: she calls on men to fulfill the “duties of husbands and fathers,”214 but because she 
rarely talks about fathers ruining their children, it seems that Wollstonecraft thinks 
fathers are less likely to keep children from virtue and/or that fathers have less influence 
																																																								
210 Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, 68 
211 For example, chapter 11 of A Vindication of the Rights of Woman is entitled “Duty to Parents.” 
212 Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, 247-48. 
213 A few of many examples from A Vindication of the Rights of Woman: Wollstonecraft talks about the bad 
lessons children learn when their mothers become tyrants (pp. 249-250) and blames weak women for not 
caring for their children’s bodies (p. 274). She notes, “the rearing of children, that is, the laying a 
foundation of sound health both of body and mind in the rising generation, has justly been insisted on as the 
peculiar destination of woman” (p. 288). And, of course, the famous passage on p. 243 wherein she calls 
motherhood one of the “grand duties annexed to the female character by nature.” 
214 Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, 275. Although these specific duties go undefined, 
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Stetson, “Women's Rights and Human Rights: Intersection and Conflict,” in Feminist Interpretations of 
Mary Wollstonecraft, ed. Maria J. Falco (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 
1996), 172.  
Please see MacKenzie, “Reason and Sensibility: The Ideal of Women's Self-Governance in the Writings of 
Mary Wollstonecraft,” 38. 




over children’s virtue (and, in point of fact, it might be that because fathers have less 
influence that they are less likely to harm or help children to become virtuous). We can 
subsequently infer that women—in Wollstonecraft’s view—substantially influence 
children because she focuses so singularly on how much potential women have to ruin 
children. Hence, in Chapter 11 when she discusses the importance of the family for 
fostering in children a love of humanity (an aide in forming lasting bonds within civil 
society), this is something women would largely be responsible for in her scheme. 
Relatedly, Wollstonecraft explicitly says that home life is the foundation for the 
cultivation of “public spirit.” She says, “Public spirit must be nurtured by private 
virtue.”215 “Public spirit” here seems to act as a sort of catch-all term for caring about 
one’s fellow subjects and citizens, caring about the fate of one’s nation or society, and 
actively engaging in caring about civic life. Here, Wollstonecraft clearly finds public 
spirit in the private virtues, which, as has already been established above, are the virtues 
women are responsible for inculcating and overseeing in their own homes.216  
If we take seriously the idea that more virtuous societies are better than less 
virtuous ones, then what Wollstonecraft is saying is that women in their roles as wives 
and mothers are responsible for making society better, which suggests, then, that 
mothers’ private-sphere roles are—in an important sense—civic and not merely private. 
Mothers are responsible for educating their children such that private virtue within the 
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understanding will make them more devoted and adept care givers because they will realize the importance 
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family translates into a more virtuous society. However, the fact that motherhood or 
domestic duties are civic does not, as I argue below, change Wollstonecraft’s reliance on 
a sex-based division of labor and the limitations that come with such divisions.  
Part B: the role of duty in establishing a sex-based division of labor 
 
 From the suggestions that mothers and fathers have duties in the private sphere 
and that women should be permitted to pursue goals outside of the private sphere, it does 
not follow that men and women are responsible for all of the same duties in precisely the 
same ways. Revisiting the texts reveals that Wollstonecraft persistently insisted that most 
women should remain—if not entirely—at least primarily engaged in domestic pursuits. 
This reading highlights a tension in Wollstonecraft’s work: education is supposed to 
somehow help minimize unjust distinctions based in sex differences, and yet 
Wollstonecraft has a conception of duty that maintains the status-quo with regard to the 
sex-based division of labor that keeps large numbers of women at home. I examine the 
implications of this tension in Section 5. 
She is committed to the claim that educational reform cannot and will not remove 
women’s civic and social duties to bear and raise children, and these duties, I argue, 
should be interpreted as being different in significant aspects from men’s duties as 
husbands and fathers. To show this, my argument proceeds as follows: first, I analyze the 
two types of duties Wollstonecraft lays out for women; next, I show that Wollstonecraft 
considers motherly duties unique; then, I argue that women’s duties to themselves as 
human beings can be fulfilled by being mothers; finally, I conclude that a central purpose 




reason such that they will see why they should remain in the home. In contrast with other 
thinkers of her time, such as Dr. Gregory or Rousseau, Wollstonecraft does not appeal to 
women’s sensibility to make them stay at home, nor does she require that women submit 
to men because of some natural inequality. The result is, I assert, generally an 
improvement to women’s home lives; however, it does serve to re-entrench many women 
in domestic duties. 
Wollstonecraft has two kinds of duties: duties to oneself as a human being217 and 
natural or civil duties.218 She most clearly distinguishes these two from one another in 
both kind and rank when she says, “The being who discharges the duties of its station is 
independent; and, speaking of women at large, their first duty is to themselves as rational 
creatures, and the next, in point of importance, as citizens, is that, which includes so 
many, of a mother.”219 From this, we can see that the duty of primary importance is the 
duty to “themselves as rational creatures,” meaning the duty to cultivate themselves as 
virtuous human beings through the exercise of their reason.220 Duties of citizens are 
secondary, and they involve a whole host of roles (the most germane of which are 
																																																								
217 Wollstonecraft is inconsistent in her terminology, but she often refers to these as “duties of man” or 
“moral duties of life.” 
Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, 79, 123. 
218 Again, Wollstonecraft is inconsistent in her terminology, but she largely lumps duties pertaining to 
social and civic life under umbrella terms such as “duties of public life” and “domestic duties” among 
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Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, 265, 145. 
219 Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, 235. 
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fatherhood and motherhood221) that contribute to the development of good citizenry and a 
stable commonwealth.   
Although the duties of fatherhood and motherhood both involve raising and 
educating children, there is significant textual evidence that suggests Wollstonecraft sees 
the duties of men and women as entailing different requirements.222 For example, she 
notes on two separate occasions that men and women have “respective duties,”223 and she 
even discusses the life of husbands and wives that have separate duties as “the happiest 
and most as well as the most respectable situation in the world.”224  
Although she nowhere delineates the entirety of what those respective duties 
might be, she does note a few differences in their duties. Chief among those different 
duties are bearing and nursing children,225 what Wollstonecraft calls “the first duty of a 
mother.”226 Bearing and nursing children are jobs only women can fulfill. The language 
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here, though, is quite strong, and Wollstonecraft indicates that failing in these duties 
should carry drastic consequences. Specifically, “The wife, in the present state of things, 
who is faithful to her husband, and neither suckles nor educates her children, scarcely 
deserves the name of a wife, and has no right to that of a citizen.”227 Here, we can see 
Wollstonecraft draws an explicit connection between women’s duties in the home (to 
bear and nurse children) and women’s titles in civic society. To fail at home is to fail to 
be a citizen.  
With regard to fathers, Wollstonecraft says relatively little, but what she says is 
severe. Specifically, fathers have the unique right to “inflict the punishment [of children 
when they disobey their parents or other authority figures]; he must be the judge in all 
disputes.”228 Many scholars ignore this comment altogether or dismiss it as an outlier in 
Wollstonecraft’s theory, an attempt to pander to the interests of her male readership. 
Even if it is an outlier, it is—at most—an indication that Wollstonecraft thought men and 
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women had some duties peculiar to their sex; or—at least—a set of statements that does 
not minimize the duties she says are peculiar to women.229 
Given that Wollstonecraft presents women’s duties in a hierarchical relationship, 
first to themselves as rational beings and second their maternal duties, we might be 
inclined to think that Wollstonecraft has given women an out with regard to maternal 
duties. If their first responsibility is to cultivate their own virtue and if motherhood 
encumbers that process, then women might have good reason not to become mothers. At 
times, Wollstonecraft seems to allude to this picture.230 For example, she notes that 
French and Italian women have been confined to private life and laments how this has 
prevented them from fulfilling their duties to themselves as rational creatures. 
However, there is overwhelming evidence in the text that suggests Wollstonecraft 
thought that one could fulfill both the duties of motherhood and the duties to self at the 
same time, that the two can be mutually supportive. She suggests this in two ways: (1) 
that reason helps women to recognize the importance of and better execute the duties of 
motherhood, and (2) that the duties of motherhood can help to deepen women’s virtue.  
On several occasions, Wollstonecraft explicitly argues that fostering reason, the 
core requirement to fulfill one’s duty to oneself, is necessary to be a good mother. For 
example, “reason is absolutely necessary to enable a woman to perform any duty 
properly,”231 “nor will women ever fulfil the peculiar duties of their sex, till they become 
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enlightened citizens,”232 “by thus narrowing their minds they are rendered unfit to fulfil 
the peculiar duties [motherhood] which nature has assigned them,”233 and education in the 
exercise of reason is “the only way to make them properly attentive to their domestic 
duties.”234 As all of these remarks make clear, Wollstonecraft thinks mothers must 
cultivate their minds and exercise their reason. 
Less obvious is that Wollstonecraft also thought domestic duties, including 
motherhood, could help further their human duties. I have in mind passages where she 
talks about the ways women exercise their reason in their capacities as mothers to, for 
example, help their children understand the value of patriotism. For women who do have 
domestic duties, “when they neglect domestic duties, they have it not in their power to 
take the field and march and counter-march like soldiers, or wrangle in the senate to keep 
their faculties from rusting.”235 The suggestion here is that proper execution of the duties 
of motherhood and parenting can prevent women’s reason from deteriorating in the 
absence of other pursuits outside of the home.  
But I contend Wollstonecraft is not just attempting to help women of her time 
make the best of a bad situation, in which they had limited political rights and few 
opportunities for political engagement, by giving them a better chance to feel fulfilled in 
their domestic roles. Rather, a central motivation for and result of Wollstonecraft’s 
educational reform is that most women should remain in the home engaging in domestic 
pursuits. The advancement her position makes in comparison to others of her time is that 
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she uses reasoning to ground women’s importance in the home instead of appeals to 
sensibility or a forced submission based in men’s authority over women.  
Key to this point is a recognition that Wollstonecraft was opposed to previous 
accounts of women’s role and education wherein women were forcibly confined to 
domestic pursuits.236 A particular passage, which often goes overlooked in current 
accounts of Wollstonecraft’s duty, looks suspiciously like a promissory note for what 
Wollstonecraft ends up advocating for on my picture. She says: 
If indeed this [the private-sphere] be their destination, arguments may be drawn from 
reason: and thus augustly supported, the more understanding women acquire, the more 
they will be attached to their duty—comprehending it—for unless they comprehend it, 
unless their morals be fixed on the same immutable principle as those of man, no 
authority can make them discharge it in a virtuous manner.237  
 
On my reading, Wollstonecraft is here saying that if it is the case that women ought to be 
engaged in domestic pursuits, then we should be able to construct an argument that 
demonstrates how greater understanding will show women the reasons why they ought to 
complete their domestic duties. This, I argue below, is exactly what Wollstonecraft, 
herself, shows.238  
																																																								
236 “I have repeatedly asserted…that women cannot, by force, be confined to the domestic concerns for they 
will, however, ignorant, intermeddle with more weighty affairs, neglecting private duties only to disturb, by 
cunning tricks, the orderly plans of reason which rise above their comprehension.” 
Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, 69. 
237 Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, 69. 
238 One might think that Wollstonecraft was suggesting that women need not take on these roles, but if so, it 
becomes very difficult to make sense of the following passage: “When I treat of the peculiar duties of 
women, as I should treat of the peculiar duties of a citizen or father, it will be found that I do not mean to 
insinuate that they should be taken out of their families, speaking of the majority. ‘He that hath wife and 
children,’ says Lord Bacon, ‘hath given hostages to fortune; for they are impediments to great enterprises, 
either of virtue or mischief. Certainly the best works, and of greatest merit for the public, have proceeded 
from the unmarried or childless men.’ I say the same of women. But, the welfare of society is not built on 
extraordinary exertions; and were it more reasonably organized, there would be still less need of great 
abilities, or heroic virtues.” It seems quite clear that Wollstonecraft explicitly expects and needs most of 
society to have families. Indeed, she seems to think that if society were better organized, more people could 




First, it bears noting that maternal duties only apply to women who have children; 
however, most women ought to have children in Wollstonecraft’s larger scheme. I make 
this assertion for two reasons: (1) Wollstonecraft suggests that relatively few people—
men or women—should forego family life, and (2) most women, if sufficiently educated, 
will want to fulfill maternal duties because of the importance of those duties to civil 
society.  
To address the first reason, there is a famous passage where Wollstonecraft cites 
Francis Bacon’s claim that men who do great works often have no children. In reply, she 
says, “I say the same of women.”239 So, there is room in Wollstonecraft’s picture for at 
least some women to be successful without recourse to the duties of the private sphere. 
However, in Wollstonecraft’s subsequent sentences she says, “But, the welfare of society 
is not built on extraordinary exertions; and were it more reasonably organized, there 
would be still less need of great abilities, or heroic virtues.”240 Here, I take her to mean 
that if society were better organized, we would have less need for men and women to 
forego family life for the sake of intellectual pursuits, that people would live happier and 
more peaceable lives.241 This interpretation has the added benefit of working in concert 
with her assertion that a happy family life wherein all parties fulfill the “respective duties 
of their station” live in “the happiest and most respectable situation in the world.”242 
There are, however, objections to this interpretation, which I address below. What I 
interpret this passage to mean, then, is that Wollstonecraft hopes that most people can 
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enjoy a happy family life built on a foundation of mutual respect and the attempt to 
cultivate virtue. 
With regard to my second point, that Wollstonecraft’s education program is 
designed to get women to see the value of performing their duties, Wollstonecraft 
mentions on several occasions that women must have an education that helps them to 
understand their particular domestic duties. The education provides two particular 
insights for women: they will see not only how those domestic duties contribute to the 
public good but also how they are an expression of their virtue. The idea is that this will 
make women want to discharge their duties admirably. She demonstrates this with 
rhetorical questions such as, “And how can woman be expected to co-operate unless she 
know why she ought to be virtuous? unless freedom strengthen her reason till she 
comprehend her duty, and see in what manner it is connected with her real good?”,243 and 
discussions of the relationship between domestic duties and “the general good.”244 As I 
already established, the good Wollstonecraft has in mind here are things like the 
preparation of future citizens that occurs as a direct result of child-rearing.245 When we 
take a step back and look at Wollstonecraft’s bigger picture, we see that what 
Wollstonecraft is doing is providing reasons why women might want to take seriously 
their roles as mothers.  
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For Wollstonecraft, it is also critical that the mother, herself, take on the duties of 
motherhood (particularly breastfeeding) and not simply use money or status to ensure that 
someone else performs those acts for their children. She says, “In the superiour ranks of 
life, every duty is done by deputies, as if duties could ever be waved.”246 Although she 
discusses this in the context of problematic social class distinctions, the core of the idea 
helps to explain why Wollstonecraft takes seriously the idea that women who fail in their 
maternal duties by employing wet-nurses ought not to be considered citizens.247 In short, 
women must perform these duties if they have children; otherwise, the duty goes 
unfulfilled, and any woman in this case who originally saw the importance of domestic 
duties has completely missed her mark in the attempt to fulfill them.  
Taken altogether, we end up with a picture of Wollstonecraft where her 
educational program is designed to help women see the value of fuifilling their duties, 
and—more specifically—how both their duties to self and gender-specific duties can be 
exercised in concert. What this leaves us with, then, is a theory that includes248 a sex-
based division of labor and justifies that division with recourse to the cultivation of 
reason. 
Section 4: the limitations of Wollstonecraft’s project 
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Although the civic importance of women’s domestic roles seems laudable,249 I 
argue that civic and social inequality for women likely follow from Wollstonecraft’s 
account because she still permits and, in fact, likely encourages a sex-based division of 
labor. It is not the case that she holds some false beliefs about women such that, if 
removed, her position would actually help to deliver women from their subordination; 
rather, I am arguing that the kinds of views Wollstonecraft holds about women, their 
conditions, and the improvements she believes that can be made to those conditions are 
limited in various ways by her intuitions and assertions regarding women’s primary 
function in society. Education might help women to be less subordinated within their own 
homes, but it is not enough to change much about their social and civic subordination 
more generally, particularly because this education is largely undertaken for the sake of 
children and husbands. 
Part A: how a sex-based division of labor limits the efficacy of equal education 
 
One of the consequences that follows from having sex-based duties in 
Wollstonecraft’s picture is that women’s education is unlikely to be used for women’s 
advancement outside of the home. Instead, the implication is that Wollstonecraft’s theory 
results in what I have termed “the problem of the highly-educated housewife.” 
I characterize Wollstonecraft as giving two main reasons for women to actually 
engage in employment in the public sphere: (1) to prevent catastrophe in the event that a 
woman is left without financial support, or (2) in the case that a woman exhibits talent in 
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a given profession. For most women, however, only training (and perhaps employment 
prior to marriage) for employment is desirable.250 Such training not only ensures 
women’s independence in the face of adversity but, more importantly, prepares women to 
be better companions to their husbands and to bear and raise virtuous citizens.251  
In the 18th century, concerns about who would care for widows and unwed 
women abounded. Wollstonecraft’s educational reform can be read as an attempt to 
protect these women from the certain financial ruin that was likely to occur to real 
women of her time. The uneducated widow, “either falls an easy prey to some mean 
fortune-hunter, who defrauds her children of their parental inheritance, and renders her 
miserable; or becomes the victim of discontent and blind indulgence.”252 These women 
lacked sufficient understanding to educate their children, and so they fail to fulfill the 
duties of their station.253 However, with a Wollstonecraftian education, they are better 
assured that if their husbands die or if they fail to secure a husband, they are still able to 
support themselves (thus not becoming a charity case), secure themselves against vice, 
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Wollstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Man, 24. 
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been saying was that if women are going to be in the home that their position should at least be bettered by 
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and—most importantly—fulfill their motherly duties in the event that they have children. 
But Wollstonecraft’s education here is only useful to the women who do not have 
alternative means for financial support. 
Second, there is room in Wollstonecraft’s theory for some rare women to avoid 
the duties of motherhood altogether. As discussed in the previous section, women who 
are exceptional—like the exceptional men Bacon discussed—may not be required to bear 
and raise children. However, it seems unlikely that all women or even a majority of 
women could avoid the duties of motherhood for the practical reason that the 
commonwealth needs to sustain itself. Too few mothers, and the commonwealth 
eventually suffers from population decline.254 Consequently, this exception should apply 
to few women in Wollstonecraft’s picture.  
The motivation behind Wollstonecraft’s educational reform seems, then, to be 
aimed less at getting women into the workforce, and more about producing better 
mothers.255 For example, Wollstonecraft asserts, “[t]o be a good mother—a woman must 
have sense, and that independence of mind which few women possess who are taught to 
depend entirely on their husbands.”256 The suggestion is that women will be more 
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useful257 to society if they have a different sort of education because they will raise 
children to be better, more obedient citizens. 
If we take seriously the ideas presented in Section 3, that Wollstonecraft does 
think women have some special duties and that an equal education will make them 
understand better why those duties need to be fulfilled for the common good and make 
them better at fulfilling those goals, then we are left with a picture in which women likely 
take their educations and use them to become better housewives. Women’s education is, 
in large part, for the sake of men and children. While this might make women more 
industrious and fulfilled in their caretaking roles, Wollstonecraft’s theory ends up 
encouraging women of reason to remain in the home, as the well-educated women will 
exercise her reason and understand the value of her specific duties.  
This is all surprising in light of Wollstonecraft’s disdain for systematic inequality. 
She saw herself as striking out against systematically subordinating educational systems 
that based women’s education on the assumption that women had inferior rationality, 
were predisposed to sensibility, and, consequently, that the educated women needed to be 
curtailed by forcing women to remain at home, in childlike states. In particular, 
Wollstonecraft notes that “the important task of education [will not] ever be properly 
begun till the person of a woman is no longer preferred to her mind.”258 She here suggests 
that there is a problem with society when it values women more for what their bodies can 
do instead of what their minds can achieve.  
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While Wollstonecraft shows that motherhood is an intellectual pursuit through 
which mothers can become more virtuous and have personal fulfillment, in practice, 
Wollstonecraft leads readers down a different route to the same destination as her 
adversaries, Dr. Gregory and Rousseau. On all of their pictures of motherhood, mothers 
are valued for their contributions in the home. Granted, Wollstonecraft values mothers 
who use their reason; whereas, Dr. Gregory and Rousseau (as Wollstonecraft presents 
them) value mothers who have educations in coquetry and falsity. Nevertheless, 
Wollstonecraft has not given subsequent generations sufficient grounds to move women 
closer to greater social and civic equality. The greatest obstacle to women’s ability to 
become full members in civic life is not just their lack of education or ability to exercise 
reason, but also, attitudes and practices that suggest women’s primary uses in society are 
as wives and mothers, bearing and raising the next generation of subjects and citizens. 
Without a change in attitudes and practices, women are likely to suffer from the “highly 
educated housewife problem” wherein women’s value is still associated with fulfillment 
of their private-sphere duties. And this is precisely what happens in Wollstonecraft’s 
account. 
Part B: why a loss of freedom and continued lack of equality likely follow 
	
What is entailed by Wollstonecraft’s account is a picture in which women are still 
valued as mothers above all else for society to properly function and, consequently, 




that women should not “be confined to merely domestic pursuits”259, so long as a central 
aim of education remains making women into better partners in marriage and better 
mothers, many advancements they make outside of the home are still expected to be used 
chiefly in the domestic sphere.260  
 I have in mind the famous passages where Wollstonecraft delineates potential 
professions for women.261 She there suggests that the purpose of these professions is so 
that “[w]omen would not then marry for a support,”262 rather than for personal 
fulfillment. What is more, many of the professions she mentions here are professions that 
would have been directly useful in the home. In particular, she says that teaching women 
“the elements of anatomy and medicine” is beneficial not only for taking care of 
themselves but also “to make them rational nurses of their infants, parents, and 
husbands.”263 The same goes with “the anatomy of the mind.” It is beneficial for its 
ability to help women better befriend their husbands.264 The real trouble with women not 
having an education and not being able to support themselves lies in how women’s 
dependency harms the state of marriage and motherhood, and, consequently, society. 
When I say that a loss of freedom likely follows from Wollstonecraft’s account, 
what I mean is that women lose liberty in a very real sense if they wish to be good 
mothers and good subjects, fulfilling their civic duty. By “lose liberty”, I mean that 
women are either (1) required to make their desires for personal success outside of the 
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home subservient to their duty to raise future citizens and subjects, or (2) already 
convinced by way of reason that their personal and/or civic success is synonymous with 
their success in raising children.265 In the first case, women lose the freedom to do what 
they want to do. Consider the wife who enjoys working in biology or astronomy but 
exhibits no particular talent at it. On Wollstonecraft’s picture, such a wife cannot choose 
to become a biologist or astronomer and forego childrearing without failing to fulfill her 
civic duty. And, as we know from above, if she fails in her duty, she scarcely deserves 
the designation of “citizen.” In the second case, women’s desires are shaped by her duty, 
which is a duty she did not willingly and knowingly impose on herself, but which, as 
Wollstonecraft notes, is due to “nature” (a term associated with grounding in reason).266 It 
is, therefore, a duty that women cannot choose or not choose to undertake. Consider here 
the woman who perhaps is gifted in biology, but does not ever figure out that she is gifted 
because she foregoes pursuing advanced education in biology in favor of cultivating her 
virtue by becoming a mother. Perhaps this is less likely, but there are concerns that 
women might be seduced by the idea that they have a clear and well-tested path to virtue 
in motherhood such that they do not seek out opportunities to cultivate their other 
interests.  
Section 5: objections and replies  
Part A: what about Wollstonecraft’s calls for women’s employment in the public sphere? 
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There are passages in which Wollstonecraft calls for women’s employment 
outside of the home, which may seem like counterevidence to my interpretation. I 
propose three ways of handing these types of passages, depending upon what it is that 
Wollstonecraft says in them.  
First, there are passages that could be read as suggesting women’s economic 
independence is a prerequisite for their becoming good wives and mothers. I have in 
mind statements such as, “It is vain to expect virtue from women till they are, in some 
degree, independent of men”267 and “Whilst they are absolutely dependent on their 
husbands they will be cunning, mean, and selfish.”268 However, I propose a second, 
plausible interpretation: women should be prepared to be economically independent, and 
in this respect, they will never be “absolutely” (my emphasis, in the sense of “entirely” or 
“totally”) dependent upon their husbands. Wollstonecraft’s writing is often ambiguous 
with respect to whether women must seek external employment or simply should be 
prepared to seek employment outside of their homes. I want to suggest that her phrases 
such as “in some degree” and “absolutely dependent” are evidence of this ambiguity. 
Consequently, it seems unlikely that we can have a definitive answer from the text alone 
that would tell us whether Wollstonecraft thinks all women must be employed outside of 
the home or not. My interpretation has the advantage, though, of reflecting the situations 
that Wollstonecraft was particularly concerned with: widows who were left with no 
means to support themselves and unmarried women with no means of financial support. 
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Wollstonecraft is silent on the issue of whether married women with working husbands 
should be required to work outside of the home. 
Second, there are passages that I contend should be treated more as outliers 
because they discuss the purpose of employment outside the home specifically for the 
cases of exceptional women or women who lack the means to support themselves 
otherwise. Often the exceptional women Wollstonecraft had in mind were likely 
unmarried or, at the very least, childless. Employment outside of the home “might well 
mean not being able to take on family duties. She [Wollstonecraft] cited Francis Bacon’s 
saying that men with wives and children were unlikely to be involved in great enterprises 
for good or evil, and that the greatest works have been done by single and childless men. 
‘I say the same of women,’ Wollstonecraft wrote.”269 Given that Wollstonecraft was 
aware of the difficulties women with families would have faced, and given that most 
women would become bothers, it seems unlikely that she would have expected the 
majority of women to also hold a job.270 Instead, it is possible to interpret her as saying 
that exceptional women would work outside the home because they were exceptional. 
Other women, however, need only to be able to work outside of the home should they 
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have no alternative means of support.271 Hence, the passages discussing exceptional 
women are compatible with my reading of Wollstonecraft in which she thinks that the 
most important job for the majority of women is to become a mother.  
Third, there are passages that seem to suggest women have a duty to be employed 
outside the home in addition to being mothers, either concurrently or separately. One 
example of such a passage is when Wollstonecraft says women’s “first duty is to 
themselves as rational creatures, and the next, in point of importance, as citizens, is that, 
which includes so many, of a mother.”272 Often, readers of this passage interpret 
Wollstonecraft as saying that the duty to self as a rational creature and the duty as a 
citizen to be a mother are mutually-exclusive.  
In Section 3, I addressed the issue of compatibility between women’s duties to 
themselves as rational creatures and their domestic duties. To summarize, if we consider 
what it means to be a “rational creature”, Wollstonecraft indicates that it involves the 
exercise of reason as opposed to purely sensibility,273 and that as part-and-parcel of 
having reason women “ought to endeavor to acquire human virtues (or perfections) by 
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the same means as men.”274 The former of these two descriptions is readily compatible 
with motherhood—mothers can and, as Wollstonecraft notes, should exercise reason as 
opposed to sensibility in child-rearing. 
With regard to acquiring virtues by the same means as men, we need only 
remember that having the same virtue does not require having the same duties. Female 
citizens “should be equally intent to manage her family, educate her children, and assist 
her neighbours.”275 All of these duties pertain to home life, and none of them necessarily 
involve commerce or anything else in the so-called public sphere.276 Men, however, have 
duties to go to war when called upon in Wollstonecraft’s picture, whereas women do not. 
Though it is a distinct duty of men, going to war does not result in forming a wholly 
different kind of virtue for men.   
Part B: did Wollstonecraft want more for women?  
There is some reason to believe that Wollstonecraft was actually advocating for 
more than a world in which women are highly educated housewives. The thought is that 
Wollstonecraft scaled back her claims and used rhetoric that appealed to the self-interest 
of men in order to achieve greater educational equality for women.277 Perhaps the reason 
why she focused so intently upon the ways in which education could help women to 
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become better wives and mothers was to show how educated women could be useful to 
husbands and fathers, thus catering to her male readership. She does make some 
statements that indicate that she wanted much more for women. For example, “I cannot 
help lamenting that women of a superior cast have not a road open by which they can 
pursue more extensive plans of usefulness and independence. I may excite laughter…for 
I really think that women ought to have representatives, instead of being arbitrarily 
governed without having any direct share allowed them in the deliberations of 
government.”278 
I concede that Wollstonecraft probably did want more for women than to become 
highly educated housewives, and she may very well have calculated her argument to 
appeal to men’s self-interest. However, there are reasons to believe that even if we grant 
that Wollstonecraft was merely using rhetoric as a tool for greater social change, the role 
of women’s duties in her account are problematic, and there are still severe limitations to 
her picture. It is possible that she simply did not realize how limiting they were.   
First, even if we grant these rhetorical claims, social and civic power is not for all 
women, but only for exceptional women.279 In the previous section, I laid out the textual 
evidence for this claim, and it remains true regardless of the words in which 
Wollstonecraft frames it. The time constraints on mothers are severe enough (even if men 
help out in the home) that, at the very least, women are removed from the workforce for 
several years. These years of missed opportunities and experience outside the home are 
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irreplaceable and make it very difficult for women to advance in a career after having 
such a gap in employment.280 Women are still required to put their career interests on 
hold to raise children, and the only women who seem to be able to escape this civic duty 
are the ones who are exceptional enough that their contributions to economic or civic life 
outweigh their very crucial civic duties to bear and raise children. Although there is a 
similar issue for men—only the few exceptional men can avoid having families—there is 
no expectation that only these few, select men will be able to hold down jobs for the 
remainder of their adult lives.281 
 Second, simply saying that Wollstonecraft was using rhetoric and wanted greater 
social and civic power for women is not an easy answer to the limitations I present. Even 
within Wollstonecraft’s own framework, it is unwise to discount motherhood as a civic 
duty. The practical fact remains that without women acting at least as child-bearers, the 
commonwealth cannot maintain itself in the sense that it cannot produce a population of 
citizens. And for those who might suggest that women could go back to work in the so-
called public sphere right after having children, and for those who place great importance 
on Wollstonecraft’s call for men to take up greater domestic responsibilities, there are 
practical barriers that are not so easily dismissed (at least not without recognizing that the 
entire social system in which Wollstonecraft is embedded needs an overhaul).282 Men 
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were responsible for working, often outside of the home, for several hours each day. 
Children, though, need to be watched and cared for all day long. Mothers, then, end up 
spending far more time with their children than men, even on Wollstonecraft’s picture. 
And for the women who did not, for those who hired help, Wollstonecraft offers scathing 
critiques regarding their abandonment of duty that scholars, such as Sapiro, have already 
noted. 
Whether Wollstonecraft intended to scale back her claims or not, I have offered a 
reading of Wollstonecraft that allows us to see that she has—perhaps inadvertently—
smuggled in a sex-based division of labor that results in certain limitations of her project. 
In my reading, although Wollstonecraft sees women’s domestic roles as having civic 
import and although she wants greater independence for women through educational 
reform, her position likely further entrenches women in their domestic roles. 
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In Chapters 1 and 2, I established both that Hobbes and Locke appeal to civic 
socialization as a way to form good subjects or citizens and that mothers play a role in 
their conceptions of civic socialization. What remains to be seen, however, is why this 
role is important for scholars to recognize. To this end, it is useful to begin exploring 
some of the larger ramifications of this insight.  
 For contemporary historians of philosophy, civic socialization indicates that our 
accounts of education in early modernity include more than formal educational practices 
or apprenticeships. That education could occur beyond a classroom setting has gone 
largely overlooked by Hobbes and Locke scholars. Indeed, relatively few Hobbes 
scholars talk about civic education at all. If they do, it might be to briefly mention the 
passages in which Hobbes attacks university education of the time or to note that he 
thought Leviathan should be taught in universities. As I discussed above, Vaughan’s 
Behemoth Teaches Leviathan—a work about Hobbesian education—has little concern 
with habit formation or informal methods of learning and focuses quite squarely on 
university reform.283 Richard Tuck’s article “Hobbes on Education” does not so much as 
mention obedience; it focuses on the relationship between tutoring, university-education, 
and politics.284 The same goes for Waldron in “Hobbes: Truth, Publicity and Civil 
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Doctrine.”285 Even Tarcov, who I discuss above, devotes only one page to the issue of 
early childhood habit formation in Hobbes.286 
For Hobbes scholarship in particular, identifying civic socialization as part of 
Hobbesian education (broadly construed) allows historians of philosophy to have a more 
complete picture of Hobbes’ education and its relationship to the health and wellbeing of 
the commonwealth. In particular, civic socialization makes clear the mechanism by 
which subjects learn about and become habituated to the protection-obedience 
relationship between the sovereign and the subject. And this protection-obedience 
relationship is integral to the stability of the Hobbesian commonwealth.  
 There is more scholarship directly addressing Locke on education; however, the 
idea that Locke included socialization as part of his educational practice is also relatively 
under-investigated, as I noted in Chapter 2. Tarcov devotes a substantial portion of his 
book Locke’s Education for Liberty to the importance of habit formation to Locke’s 
conception of education.287 However, he does not quite connect the natural law with 
habituation and civic society, although he does connect habituation with Lockean 
morality and Locke’s hopes for civil society. Only once we see that the natural law is 
moral can we see how Locke’s habit-forming prescriptions are designed to prepare 
children to come to know the natural law. Without this education, it is not clear whether 
or how children will become adults who subscribe to the natural law, and without such 
well-habituated adults, it is unclear how Lockean society could be peaceful or stable. For 
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historians of philosophy, acknowledging civic socialization allows for a more complete 
picture of Hobbes and Locke on education. And given that education and political 
stability are intimately related in Hobbes’ and Locke’s theories, historians of philosophy 
can have a clearer, more complete picture of their political theories.  
 A second important implication for historians of philosophy interested in early 
modernity is that women have a larger role in the theories of Hobbes and Locke than 
previously thought. In particular, women who are mothers have important roles in 
education and, insofar as education is critical to the health and wellbeing of the 
commonwealth, mothers play a larger role there than assumed. While writing about the 
role of women in early modernity has increased in recent decades due in part to initiatives 
such as the Re-reading the Canon288 series and Project Vox289 as well as journals 
dedicated to feminist philosophy and the history of philosophy such as Hypatia, scholars 
have paid little attention to mothers. Instead, much of the secondary literature on women 
in the 17th and 18th centuries focuses on wives and female rulers. For example, Pateman’s 
The Sexual Contract was a groundbreaking work in 1988 when it was published, and her 
focus there on the role of women as wives continues to impact discussion of the role of 
women in early modernity today. There she suggests that women largely disappear from 
civic life once they have contracted themselves into subordination in marriage. Other 
scholars, such as Makus and Waldron, largely picked up her thread of conversation and 
either largely agreed with Pateman and expanded the discussion of wives as subordinated 
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creatures or disagreed with Pateman and wanted to show that wives were not 
subordinated by a sexual contract.290  
However, the practical realities of life in the 17th and 18th centuries show that most 
women grew up to become not just wives but mothers, and Chapters 1 and 2 demonstrate 
that mothers play a far more substantial role in Hobbes’ and Locke’s political theories 
than the scholarship would suggest. While there may be good reasons for thinking that 
most women who are wives291 are civically marginalized and politically subordinated to 
men, when these same women become mothers, they can and do have roles in civic 
society. In short, what we see is that women are not wholly removed from civic life by 
virtue of being women. Their inclusion or exclusion varies depending upon their role 
within the family. There is not something inherent to women, or indeed even to the 
society formed by the social contract, that necessarily merits their exclusion from civic 
society according to these philosophers. 
In Chapter 3, I turned to Wollstonecraft, a thinker who hopes to open a road to 
greater civic and social equality by elevating the civic importance of women’s roles as 
wives and mothers. She even goes so far as to assert that women should have equal 
education alongside of men so that women can be better wives and mothers. However, in 
my interpretation, Wollstonecraft’s program does not include full equality, at least not for 
most women. In fact, on my view, she ends up with a picture wherein women—through 
their reformed education—likely recommit themselves to domestic duties in the name of 
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reason, thus re-entrenching their subordinate status in civic life. This conclusion has some 
rather far-reaching effects.  
With regard to Wollstonecraft scholarship, it suggests that Wollstonecraft perhaps 
is limited in ways that later feminists have not sufficiently addressed. In particular, the 
call for equal education so often associated with Wollstonecraft perhaps was not the tool 
that subsequent feminists took it to be. By this, I mean that the education Wollstonecraft 
called for was only a necessary—but not sufficient—condition for minimizing women’s 
social and civic subordination. With all of this in mind, it is important to remember that 
Wollstonecraft was writing within a specific context, and given her context, she did offer 
a theory that stressed partnerships between men and women in marriage instead a 
situation of straightforward subordination, and she did recognize the importance of equal 
education for preparing women to have gainful employment outside of the home. This 
does not mean, however, that her theory is without its own limitations.  
Wollstonecraft is further useful to historians of philosophy who are interested in 
parsing out a deeper tension within philosophical works of the 17th and 18th centuries and 
examining whether natural equality necessarily is at odds with civic subordination. 
Wollstonecraft, herself, is committed to fundamental equality between the sexes. They 
are, in her view, striving for the same kind of virtue (if not in degree, at least in kind). 
However, mothers end up systematically excluded from civic and social life in the 
commonwealth because the very role of motherhood makes it such that they cannot have 
an equal share in civic and social life. They must commit themselves to bearing and 




see how two concepts, natural equality and civic subordination, can be compatible 
seeming contradictory to our contemporary ears.  
That women could be subordinated to men in early modern liberal theories of 
philosophy is not a new idea, but the new insight that Wollstonecraft, a modern 
philosopher, helps us to make is that women’s subordination need not come in the social 
or conjugal contracts. Pateman may be right or wrong about wives’ subordination to 
husbands; there are issues for women regardless of their subordinated status to husbands 
in the conjugal contract. Women’s subordination need not be natural either. Women can, 
instead, become subordinated in social and civic society through motherhood. As such, 
motherhood represents an alternative way to highlight tensions between gender relations 
and natural equality.  
Like Hobbes and Locke, Wollstonecraft thinks that mothers ought to be engaged 
in the project of civic socialization and that this project is important for the wellbeing of 
the commonwealth at large. It is important with respect to both morality and stability. 
Furthermore, all three thinkers suggest that men and women have natural equality. 
Hobbes and Locke suggest as much when talking about their respective states of nature, 
and Wollstonecraft argues for this in A Vindication of the Rights of Woman. Given their 
assertions that men and women are equal by nature, this raises some further questions 
about Hobbes’ and Locke’s theories. For example, is there a tension between natural 
equality and civic subordination in Hobbes’ and Locke’s theories? Is it the same in nature 
as the one present in Wollstonecraft’s works in which women are naturally equal to men 




further want to consider whether civic subordination necessarily follows from certain 
conceptions of motherhood, or are there ways around mothers’ civic subordination that 
are open to those writing in the 17th and 18th centuries?  
In order to answer whether there is a tension in Hobbes between natural equality 
and civic subordination, it is first necessary to ask whether mothers are subordinated in 
civic society on his picture. I maintain that mothers are subordinated in this way. 
However, mothers’ subordination is not because women are inherently inferior to men or 
because he thinks only men are fit to rule because of their biology. Consider this: Hobbes 
favors the absolute sovereign, and so training subjects to follow only one ruler is 
important on his theory. Consequently, Hobbes states that one parent must be 
subordinated to the other so that there is only one ruler in the household. In theory, this 
could be either parent; however, in practice—in two-parent households—the mother will 
be subordinated to the father. For Hobbes, the mother’s subordination is a matter of 
custom. In fact, the hierarchies in which male heirs are preferred to female or where 
fathers rule the household instead of mothers, is a product of custom.292 Hobbes’ theory 
allows for us to conceive of a society in which fathers were subordinated to mothers; 
however, once custom establishes that mothers stay home to raise children while men do 
not, there is no particular reason on Hobbes’ theory to change this situation.  
Further, mothers’ civic subordination follows from Hobbes’ picture because of 
the custom that mothers care for children, and it is reinforced by the value Hobbes places 
on using mothers’ obedience to fathers as a mirror for obedience to the sovereign. If the 
																																																								




customs of a place dictate that women remain in the home, raising children,  and if this 
custom lends itself to greater societal stability, then there is no reason to upset societal 
stability to change women’s situation. In practice, these early modern thinkers seem to 
espouse the view that society is better off (more stable) when mothers remain in the 
home, inculcating children with civic virtues. Even if women had an education alongside 
of men in day schools or universities, Hobbes’ theory ends up in the same place 
Wollstonecraft’s does: with highly-educated housewives. Education does not give 
Hobbes a reason to upend custom. Of course, on Hobbes’ view, custom could favor 
matrilineal power (and this has been noted by many scholars). The point is that given the 
way the world has developed, on Hobbes’ view, once custom has been established that 
women raise children in the home (and are valuable for doing so) and men are valued for 
their larger civic contributions (whatever those may be), there is no reason to destabilize 
society by reversing these customs.  
As in Hobbes’ theory, in Locke’s theory, women’s civic subordination may be 
important to—but perhaps not logically necessary for—children’s moral and civic 
education. To be sure, subordinated wives help, as in the case of Hobbes, to mirror the 
type of obedience that children should display to their sovereigns. And given the customs 
of the time in which Locke wrote, this could be what he actually intended to happen. We 
could, however, conceive of a Lockean marriage wherein the wife contracted herself into 




formation and delegation of habit-forming duties to her husband.293 What is more, there is 
at least an outside possibility that habit formation does not require mothers to primarily 
be in the home around their children on Locke’s picture. However, in the event that habit 
formation is a time-consuming endeavor, or if societies reward or place value on women 
who devote themselves to child-rearing, then Locke’s picture of motherhood ends up re-
entrenching women in subordinated roles within their own households, just like 
Wollstonecraft’s.  
 Even though mothers’ subordination might not be logically necessary on Locke’s 
picture, it seems likely that Locke’s assumptions about the value of motherhood leads to 
their subordination more generally on his picture. There is evidence to suggest that Locke 
thought motherhood was valuable and laudable. We know from Locke’s correspondence 
with Damaris Masham that he took seriously women’s roles as mothers. Furthermore, as 
noted in Chapter 2, Locke himself heaps praise on mothers who mother well. He does not 
heap praise on women who abandon their children for the sake of an education, and even 
when he talks of queens, they are exceptions—women who were special. This is squarely 
in line with Wollstonecraft’s later statements about exceptional women noted above. 
Although we lack definitive evidence, there is significant circumstantial evidence 
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suggesting that women—even on Locke’s picture—were praised when they devoted 
themselves to being good mothers.  
If valued primarily for their caretaking roles, mothers are subordinated even when 
they receive the same education as men. The long and short of it is this: so long as 
women are valued for their abilities to bear and rear the next generation of subjects or 
citizens, and as long as women’s primary value civically is in their ability to prepare the 
next generation for life in civic society, women will be incentivized to remain in the 
home instead of pursuing opportunities elsewhere in civic life. 
 Some may suggest that the civic role of parents in educating their children is a 
minor issue in philosophical analyses of early modern education. One might point to the 
role of the ruler and tutors in Locke’s works or the role of universities in Hobbes’ works; 
however, the oversight—this overlooking of mother’s civic role—seems to play into the 
concerns of feminist critics to date. At the heart of Pateman’s work, for example, are 
concerns not only that women have been unduly overlooked in early modern political 
philosophy but that certain philosophical frameworks or assumptions inherently require 
women’s subordination in political life. While my own work focuses on civic society, 
both of Pateman’s concerns persist and perhaps are expanded to include concerns that 
certain roles women can play result in subordination. 
The complexity of motherhood in Hobbes, Locke, and Wollstonecraft makes 
these thinkers well worth reading and adds to the value of studying their works. The 
conversation about the role of mothers in 17th and 18th century philosophy is one that 




continue to explore the ways in which specific concepts are philosophically compatible or 
incompatible. Hobbes, Locke, and Wollstonecraft all take stances regarding mothers that 
are, in some sense, fairly new or radical while simultaneously holding onto other ideas 
about mothers that are traditional. This, as I take it, can shed light on whether these 
concepts really are philosophically incompatible. If they are not, then there may be good 
reason to revisit some of our contemporary assumptions regarding motherhood, equality, 
education, and participation in social or civic life. 
For example, the notion that civic subordination can coexist with a belief in 
fundamental human equality suggests that philosophers ought to be wary of panaceas for 
women’s subordination resting largely or entirely on women’s education. Education is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for alleviating civic subordination. If we want to 
alleviate such subordination, we should further ask: For the sake of whom is this 
education working? Does this education reinforce sex-based divisions of labor? Is civic 
subordination necessary for societal functioning? If we can eliminate it, how might we 
accomplish it? Looking to great thinkers such as Hobbes, Locke, and Wollstonecraft can 
help us to shed light on whether the concepts of equality and subordination can and 
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